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The Anschluss of Austria and the greater German Reich is 
often pinpointed as the beginning of Nazi Germany's attempt for 
European Hegemony. With the annexation of Austria came an 
improved strategic position regarding Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslovakia, and Hungary, and would provide Hitler with a 
springboard from which he could launch his thrust into Eastern 
Europe. The road toward Anschluss was a difficult one to . travel: 
Germany needed to be wary of the threat from the Western Powers 
during her quest for a greater German Reich, and also had to 
consider the Austrian domestic situation as she laid plans for a 
union. In order to successfully complete the Anschluss, Germany 
and her allies within Austria needed to strike at the precise 
moment when both the Austrian internal situation and the attitude 
of the European powers were ripe for exploitation. 
While it is possible to view the fall of Austria as an event 
planned and implemented in full by an insightful Adolf · Hitler, 
scholars are generally in agreement that this was not the case. 
As Gordon Brook-Shepherd states, nit was at once the most 
inevitable of his conquests and the most accidental; the best-
planned, and the most improvised. n1 Hitler and the ' German 
government worked slowly and diligently (and without much 
success) toward the Anschluss throughout the 1930s; but the 
events of early 1938 suddenly tipped the scales in favor of the 
National Socialists and, in less than three months' time, 
executed a plan for union which had eluded pan-Germanic demands 
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£or decades. 
It is di££icult to argue against the idea that Hitler was 
not the only participant in the Anschluss. A.J.P Taylor argues , 
that, "Hitler did not make plans -- £or world conquest or £or 
anything else. He assumed that others would provide 
opportunities, and that he would seize them."2 At least in the 
case o£ Austria, this statement, by itsel£, is basically correct. 
Yet in supporting this argument, Taylor makes what I consider to 
be a gross (but not uncommon) oversight in his review o£ the 
sources o£ opportunities o££ered to Hitler. Taylor argues that 
the political leaders o£ Austria, Great Britain, and Italy were 
responsible £or giving Hitler his opening into Austria. 3 Brook-
Shepherd echoes these £eelings as well, citing Schuschnigg as the 
primary reason £or allowing Hitler to annex Austria. 4 While 
Schuschnigg, Mussolini, and Chamberlain certainly were involved 
in the process, I believe that this interpretation ignores an 
even greater cause o£ Anschluss: 
union. 
that o£ popular support £or a 
The idea £or a greater German state was not a .£oreign one to 
Austrians 
1867, and 
in 1938. It was prevalent in the area as £ar back as 
attracted an Austrian £ollowing throughout the 19th 
century. With the de£eat o£ the Habsburg Monarchy in World War 
I, the cry £or the union o£ all German speaking sections in the 
Empire was 
political 
loud and almost unanimous £rom all sides o£ 
and popular spectrum. The roller-coaster economy 
the 
o£ 
the Republic o£ Austria did little to silence the unhappy voices 
in the new state, which many £elt was something. o£ a bastard 
nation. The world depression o£ 1930 hit the country very hard, 
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and encouraged a good number o£ economically stricken German -
Austrians to Join in an Anschluss plat£orm in hopes o£ creating 
an improved economic state. By the end o£ 1932, one o£ the maJor 
proponents o£ an Anschluss was the Austrian Nazi party, which was 
making sizeable gains in the country. 
With the success o£ Hitler in the Reich came an increase in 
the popularity o£ National Socialism and the Anschluss idea in 
Austria. The turbulence o£ the era produced an unsuccess£ul 
attempt to overthrow the Austrian government, much to the dismay 
o£ Hitler (who had not been entirely against the plan) and the 
German Foreign Ministry (which had warned the upper echelons o£ 
the £utility o£ a violent putsch in Vienna). As a consequence o£ 
this £ailure, Hitler was £orced to change his "plans" £or 
Austrian Anschluss, Just as he had changed his "plans" £or 
assuming power a£ter the £ailure o£ the Munich Putsch o£ 1923. 
Rather than pursuing a revolutionary (i.e. illegal) assumption o£ 
power, German £oreign policy pursued an evolutionary (i.e. 
legal) process, aiming at winning power through diplomacy and 
"inside men" (such as Arthur Seyss-Inquart). This new thrust o£ 
German £oreign policy toward Austria, however, did not take into 
account the actions o£ the Austrian National Socialists. While 
Hitler bided his time, these Nazis sought to secure a Nazi state 
through terror tactics and violence. These two policies each 
pushed toward the same goal, but in di££erent ways. From 1934 to 
1938, both diplomacy and terror were used to reach'one common 
goal: Anschluss. 
In my estimation, the presence and threat o£ the Austrian 
National Socialist party was the determining £actor in the 
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National Socialist party was the determining xactor in the 
success ox the union. While it is true that Schuschnigg and 
Chamberlain helped open the door xor German expansion, the 
actions taken by these men hinged upon the internal situation in 
the Republic ox Austria. Without a popular movement inside the 
state, the legitimacy ox a German move toward annexation would 
not have existed, thus denying Hitler the diplomatic excuse that 
union was desired by both Germans and Austrians. Moreover, the 
threat ox insurrection and revolt within Austria xorced 
Schuschnigg to approach Hitler xor help, and thus into the Lion's 
den. While the Austrian Chancellor did move toward a dangerous 
position, he was moved there xor a reason; the presence ox the 
Nazi party in Austria. 
The Anschluss was successxul in 1938 because ox its broad 
range ox support. The movement had begun in Austria during the 
19th century, and its public appeal had greatly increased with 
the xall ox the Empire. With the success ox the German National 
Socialists came a larger Austrian xollowing. The combination ox 
Austrian Nazis and German xoreign policy helped bring about the 
end ox an independent Austrian state. While it is correct to say 
that the actual Anschluss was both planned and improvised, and 
that outside xorces were inxluencial in the process ox union, it 
is vital to give equal time to the National Socialists in Austria 
xor their part in the action. The improvisation ox the act ox 
Anschluss was due primarily to the internal chaos caused by the 
Austrian Nazi party, which not only gave Hitler a legitimate 
excuse xor Anschluss, but which also pressured Schuschnigg into 
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In order to fully appreciate the complexities involved in 
the relationship between Austria and Germany during the Anschluss 
crisis, it is necessary to trace the origins of the movement for 
the unification of the two states. Without a brief political, 
social, and economic background of the Austrian attitude toward 
Anschluss, the events and emotions of early 1938 are almost 
beyond comprehension. The enthusiasm exhibited by the Austrians 
as the German Reich assumed control of the country was entirely 
genuine. Few tears were shed as the government shifted from the 
hands of Schuschnigg to Seyss-Inquart, and then to Adolf Hitler. 
Austrian National Socialism had been in existence a long time 
before Adolf Hitler caught on to the ideology, and remained a 
separate entity from the German party until after the Treaty of 
Versailles. When the Wehrmacht drove through the streets of 
Vienna in 1938, Austrians were at least somewhat aware of the 
political intentions of the Nazi regime. 
The Anschluss idea was not a new concept to Austrians in 
March of 1938. It had long been an issue among Austrians of 





defeat at the hands of Bismarckian 
with a new constitution. The move 
Prussia, 
toward 
liberalism had gained increasing strength during the previous two 
decades, as had been made quite clear by the wave of revolts 
throughout Europe in 1848-49. As in other states, the Habsburgs 
had encountered a revolt of their own in Vienna during this rash 
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of rebellion. While the revolt failed to topple the autocratic 
empire the point had been made that not all was well in Austria. 
With the constitution of 1867, the Empire became a dual-state, 
taking the name Austria-Hungary. Because of the ethnic 
composition of 
Czechs, Slavs, 
the country (which was inhabited by Germans, 
and, if one wishes to include them as a 
nationality, Jews), this semi-split only helped fuel the 
nationalist feelings within each of the ethnic groups in the 
state. As a result, many of the members of these ethnic groups 
began behaving more as members of their nationalist group than as 
members of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 1 The Czech maJority in 
Bohemia, seeing section 19 of the constitution (which proclaimed 
liberty and equality for all nationalities), 
due to their lack of government Jobs, 
quickly argued that 
Czech schools, and 
government subsidies to Czech theaters and museums, the Czech 
maJority was, in fact, being discriminated against. The German 
minority in Bohemia, which paid most of the taxes in the 
province, did not want to be forced to finance a culture that was 
not their own. While the Czechs demanded that Bohemia be a Czech 
administrative unit, the Germans supported a partition 'of the 
area and a creation of a "Deutsch-Boehmen".2 The Germans in 
Styria and Carniola, meanwhile, pressed for the detachment of 
certain Slav areas in Austria in order to make them fully German-
speaking. 3 Tempers flared when, in 1897, the Badeni Language 
Ordinances were passed by the Government. 4 This legislation made 
Czech the formal language in the administrative sphere of 
Bohemia. The Badeni dispute, as well as others, divided the two 
nationalities throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
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The animosities created by the language and cultural 
disputes o£ the late 19th centuries were £anned by the growth o£ 
the Austro-Hungarian economy. With the rise o£ the Empire's 
industrial capabilities came increased tensions in Austria. 
Because o£ the massive production o£ goods in urban areas, many 
rural dwellers moved to cities to work and make money. As a 
result, the number o£ large cities (those with populations over 
10,000) in Austria-Hungary quadrupled between 1850 and 1900. 5 
Massive migrations occurred within the Empire, and, much to the 
chagrin o£ German workers, most o£ the migrants happened to be 
Czechs £rom rural regions. 6 To the German industrial worker, the 
Czechs presented not only a threat to the German-ness o£ the 
area; they were also in competition £or Jobs. Because the Czech 
£armer was used to surviving on a much lower standard o£ living 
in the countryside than the German was used to in the city, 
employers £ound that the new Czech work£orce was a much less 
expensive one than the German work£orce. 7 Hence, Germans began 
to £eel that they were in danger o£ losing not only their German 
heritage, but also their Jobs in the Austrian industrial sector. 
Because o£ the increase o£ both productivity and a labor £orce, 
this period (1870 to 1900) saw various trade unions begin to 
appear throughout the Empire. Yet the Marxist-Socialist unions 
which began operat~ng in the latter third o£ the 19th century 
soon ran into the problem o£ nationalist animosities. The German 
union members resented Job competition £rom the Czechs. The 
Czechs, seeing that the union leaders were primarily Germans, 





the Czechs withdrew from the Marxist union to form its own 
Czecho-Slav union. 9 The German workers in Austria-Hungary were 
soon to follow suit. In 1904, the German Workers Party <Deutsche 
Arbeiterspartei - DAP) was created in order to fulfill the needs 
of the German laborer in the Empire. The platform rested on 
nationalist and socialist principles: liberation of the German 
workers from economic, political, and cultural oppression; 
disregard for the internationalism of Marxist theory due to its 
lack of protection for German interests in an economically 
competitive market; and the improvement of economic and social 
conditions, possible only through the use of trade-union 
organizations. The latter of these three planks was the most 
important for the DAP: the platform declared that, "The economic 
and political organization of achieving thIs end (trade unions) 
is the purpose of the DAP. "10 By 1904, German-Austrian workers 
had begun to organize economic groups which could fight the 
influx of Czechs in their living and working areas. At the same 
time, political groups began to form in German areas which went 
hand-in-hand with this nationalist and socialist approach. 
The Growth of Pan-Germanism in Austria 
The growth of German workers' parties was paralled in the 
19th century by the growth of pan-Germanic sentiments in Austria. 
Throughout the century, the main proponents of nationalist 
feelings came from university students in Lower Austria and 
Vienna. Nationalist incidents occurred as early as 1875, when 
violent demonstrations were held in Graz by students of the 
university, espousing German nationalist claims, while shouting 
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down Austrian patriotic displays during a meeting of German 
scientists. 11 Student demonstrations in this vein continued 
throughout the 1880s and '90s, often led by the wealthy Viennese 
anti-Semite Georg Ritter von Schoenerer, who served as the 
spiritual leader of the pan-Germanic nationalists until the early 
20th century. Schoenerer spoke of an Anschluss with the greater 
Reich, proclaiming that, "We German-Austrians must never lose 
sight of our goal, 
with, Germany. "12 
a reunification, i.e. a very close alliance 
In 1885, Schoenerer asked for his supporters to demonstrate 
their feelings concerning his stand on German-Austrian issues. 
This request was answered with over 3,000 letters of 
encouragement from admirers allover the country. 13 A quarter of 
these letters came from agrarian workers, while another 20~ were 
written by local councillors, mayors, or village officials. 14 
Karl Lueger, who would -become one of Vienna's most popular mayors 
at the turn of the century, was an early follower of Schoenerer, 
and carried nationalist and anti-Semitic principles with him into 
office. Students, . disillusioned with the Empire, comprised most 
of this show of strength. Support for nationalist and fascist 
movements in Austria never really died. As F.L. Carsten has 
astutely observed, the student supporters of Georg Schoenerer 
during the 1880s and '90s were to become the middle-aged 
supporters of Adolf Hitler in the 1930s. 15 
During the mid-1880s, Schoenerer formed the Verband ·der 
Deutschnationalen. a small pan-Germanic party. 16 Complete with 
newspapers and magazines, the Verband began to reach out to an 
audience of perhaps a few thousand. 17 By 1899, enough German 
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nationalists had been organized to come up with a platxorm ox 
nationalist ideas. In a 25 point program, a nationalist 
convention in Eger agreed that the national wealth ox the Empire 
should be distributed to the workers ox Austria-Hungary. The 
rights ox the worker to receive good wages, to organize, to 
bargain collectively, and to collect disability and unemoployment 
insurance could not be impeded. Moreover, unskilled laborers 
(Czechs) could not take Jobs away xrom skilled workers 
(Germans).18 These nationalists were in £avor o£ socialism, but 
against the internationalism espoused by Marxist thought. 
As the Verb and was taking shape, Schoenerer, the ideological 
and inspirational leader o£ the nationalists, was recieving 
£inancial support xrom pan-Germanic groups in both Germany and 
Switzerland, mostly because ox his "Los Von Rom" campaign. This 
plan was primarily aimed at austrian Catholics, in an ex£ort to 
convert them to Protestantism, thereby making Austria an 
appetizing area £or Germany to annex. 19 Protestant parishes in 
Austria also supplied Schoenerer with money to continue his anti-
Catholic, anti-Czech, anti-Semitic, anti-Marxist, anti-
Capitalist, and pan-Germanic £ight in Austria. Schoenerer was 
slowly spreading the idea o£ Anschluss in Austria. While he did 
not attract a mass o£ support xrom the German-Austrians, he was 
the pioneer in the political push in £avor ox union with Germany. 
because o£ his lack o£ inspirational leadership, Schoenerer and 
the Verband never attracted a large £ollowing; those who did 
£ollow this nationalist group were largely characterized as 
middle class intellectuals who spent their time bickering over 
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minute ideological points. 20 Nevertheless, Schoenerer was the 
father of Austrian nationalism, and the first to.capitalize on 
the feelings of Germans who were not content with the integration 
of their state . 
The DAP, on the other hand, was building a decent 
constituency in Austria during the first decade of the century. 
In the elections of 1911, the DAP's popularity in Bohemia 
increased seven fold from the the elections of 1907, scoring 
particularly well in cities with large Czech immigrant 
populations. 21 At this time, a young, energetic extrovert named 
Walter Riehl Joined the DAP, and quickly rose through the party 
ranks to become one of the three leading figures in the party. 
His fervent loyalty to the Germans in Bohemia earned him a large 
following of party members, and accounts for his rise through the 
DAP hierarchy. Riehl would soon play an important role in the 
early days of Austrian-National Socialism. 
The war in Europe, however, cut short the political activity 
of the DAP during the second decade of the 1900s. With its 
members and organizational leaders fighting on various fronts, 
the DAP struggled to stay together. 22 Political activity came to 
a virtual standstill until the last days of the war, when, in 
August of 1918, a convention of DAP members in Vienna passed a 
motion to officially change the name of the DAP to the DNSAP 
<Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei). Because most 
of the members of the DAP were National Socialists in the vein of 
Schoenerer anyway, the party leaders reasoned that by officially 
including the National Socialists into the party they would not 
be drastically altering their positions. They were also 
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con£ident that they would be able to garner more support, drawing 
pan-Germans into their £old. As they suspected, t.he old 
Schoenerer £ollowers Joined ranks with the union o£ German 
Nationalist Workers to £orm an alliance which would, during the 
next twenty years, carry the banner o£ the Anschluss throughout 
Austria. 
The roots o£ pan-Germanism and volkish thought were 
deeply imbedded in the Austrian political sphere well be£ore the 
turn o£ the Twentieth century. The clash o£ ethnic groups in 
Austria-Hungary sparked the ris~ o£ the nationalists in German-
Austria, and helped £uel later movements which would be 
instrumental in completing the £inal union between Austria and 
Germany. While small in scope, pan-Germanic nationalist thought 
was a legitimate movement be£ore 1918, and introduced the idea o£ 
Anschluss to German-Austrian citizens throughout the empire. 
While most did not immediately £ollow the pan-Germanic rhetoric 
o£ Georg Schoenerer, one can £airly wager that a broad section o£ 
the population was aware o£ the arguments which £avored a union. 
Anschluss thought, there£ore, was not reserved solely £or the 
£anatical National Socialists during the 1930s. Indeed, it was 
present in the 19th century, and helped prepare the £uture 
Austrian Republic xor its ultimate downxall. 
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The dissolution o£ the Austro-Hungarian Empire opened the 
door £or political change within the state. Suddenly, a£ter 
centuries o£ authoritarian rule, the nationalist groups in the 
old regime had a chance to rule themselves, by whatever means 
they chose. Woodrow Wilson's concept o£ sel£-determination had 
the ring o£ liberty, equality, and Democracy, all o£ which had 
been lacking under the Habsburg Monarchy and during the years o£ 
the Holy Roman Empire. Naturally, each ethnic group within the 
Empire had it own vision o£ the £uture. While the Czechs and 
Hungarians were anxious to build their own states, the German-
Austrians £ound themselves in an interesting situation: they had 
three choices £rom which they could decide. The restoration o£ 
the Monarchy was always a possibility (and would remain a 
possibility until 1938), even though the victorious allies were 
sure to £rown upon that idea. Austria could £orm a Republic o£ 
its own, without the aide o£ the Monarchy, regardless o£ her lack 
o£ agricultural and industrial capabilities. Finally, Austria 
could conceivably Join with .greater Germany, and £orm a more 
economically viable state. As the treaties o£ Versailles and St. 
Germain were being written, however, it became quite clear that 
the German-Austrian public would have little choice in the 
matter: their £ate would be in the hands o£ the Allied Forces, 
particularly France. While the Anschluss option was to be 
18 
Germany would grow within the new Republic of Austria with enough 
vehemence to make its primary supporters, the NSDAP, a force to 
be reckoned with in the Austrian political sphere. 
The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy set the 
stage for an expression of surprisingly common opinions. As the 
danger of losing a large chunk of the German population drew 
near, German-Austrians of all political convictions, left - wing 
Social Democrats as well as right-wing National Socialists, 
banded together in Bohemia to protest the incorporation of 
"Deutsch-Boehmen" into Czechoslovakia. 1 Even Socialist 
Internationalist Josef Selinger cried of the "'Love of our 
people. ,"2 Due to the new Socialist government in Germany, the 
Anschluss movement in early 1919 garnered a good deal of support 
not only from the pan-Germanic nationalists, but from the Social 
Democrats in Austria as well. The nationalists, like the 
Greater-German party < Grossdeutsche Volkspartei - GVP), had 
always wanted Anschluss as a way of securing their German 
cultural heritage. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, 
viewed the Anschluss as an acceptable way of spreading the 
Marxist ideology, and of strengthening their political position 
in Austria. 3 As Radomir Luza remarks, "The Austrian Anschluss 
movement consisted of a fluid group commanding a maJority of the 
population."4 The Anschluss ideas of Georg von Schoenerer, which 
had seemed rather obscure to a number of Austrians in 1900, were 
suddenly reaching a bi-partisan audience that was large in scale. 
The only real obstacle for the movement to hurdle was that of the 
Big Four. 
Unfortunately, this obstacle was an unsurmountable one. 
19 
While Britain and the United States were not adamantly opposed to 
an Anschluss, the French, led by an embittered Clemenceau, were, 
"above all determined to weaken Germany, and there£ore 
prevent the union o£ Germany and Austria. "5 
the Treaty o£ St. Germain on September 12, 
With the signing o£ 
1919, French wishes 
were honored. The concept o£ National Sel£-Determination seemed 
to by-pass the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. Austria was not only 
explicitly forbidden to Join with Germany, but she was also 
partitioned by the Allies, gluing sections of German-Austria onto 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Italy. Both southern Bohemia and 
southern Moravia, with a combined German population of 357,000 
18,500 Czechs) were added to the new (as opposed to 
Czechoslovakian state. The predominantly German Drau River 
valley, in southern Styria, was awarded to Yugoslavia, thus 
cutting an important . rail link between Austria's eastern and 
western provinces. Worst of all, the culturally important South 
Tyrol, along with its 225,000 Germans (and only a handful of 
Italians), 
Italians 
was given to Italy, " 
could have a strategic frontier 
so that the 38 million 
against 6.5 million 
Austrians."6 As a result of this dissection in the name of self-
determination, fully one-third of the old German-Austrian 
population was under the rule of alien governments. 7 
The Treaty of St. Germain, after slicing of£ chunks of 
German-Austria and presenting them to foreign governments, not 
only 
that 
diminished the German-Austrian population, but saw ' to it 
what was remaining of Austria could never expand. The 
Treaty did grant Austria its independence, in the form of a 
20 
Republic, but then rezused to allow this newly zormed sovereign 
state to pursue its own policies. Article 88 oz the Treaty 
proclaimed that; 
the independence oz Austria is inalienable other wise than 
with the consent oz the Council oz the League oz Nations. 
Consequently Austria undertakes, in the absence oz the 
consent oz the said Council, to abstain zrom any act which 
might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever 
compromise her independence. 8 
The Allies had covered their own tracks. They had stripped 
Austria oz her national/cultural cohesiveness by "awarding" 
provinces and people to various governments. Then, making sure 
that a powerzul Germany could never rise again to threaten the 
Western Powers, Austria was denied the right to conduct her own 
zoreign policy as she might see zit. An Anschluss was 
denied, and the slim hopes zor the cultural unity oz German-
Austria was broken. 
The prohibition oz an Anschluss by the victorious Allies in 
1919 only heightened the desires zor a union with Germany. As is 
the case with so many things, the zlat denial oz the idea simply 
made its adherents work harder (and with more success) to convert 
others to the cause. Perhaps the most convincing demonstration 
oz both the dissatiszaction with the Treaty oz St. Germain and 
the desire oz Anschluss can be.zound in the results oz local 
plebiscites held in two Austrian provinces. In April oz 1921, 
90r. oz those eligible to vote in the Tyrol, " • cast 145,302 
ballots in zavor oz the province's Joining Germany whereas only 
1,805 opposed the proposition."9 One month later, a plebiscite 
in the province oz Salzburg conzirmed this mandate by voting 
overwhelmingly in zavor oz union with Germany. Out oz 126,482 
21 
possible voters, over 98,000 chose the Anschluss proposal, while 
a scant 877 voted against it. 10 These plebiscites certainly did 
not go unnoticed by the leading National Socialists. During his 
trial in 1946, SS General Ernst Kaltenbrunner tried to Justify 
the eventual Anschluss of 1938 by citing these plebiscites as 
evidence of the Austrian popular desire for a union with 
Germany. 11 
Demonstrations and organizations popped up throughout 
Austria supporting the Anschluss idea. In 1928, a gathering of 
Anschluss supporters in Vienna numbered over 200,000. 12 Three 
years earlier, in 1925, the Austro-German Volksbund and the 
Austro-German Volksgemeinschaft were formed to promote the 
Anschluss movement. The Volksbund was a mass movement which 
successfully incorporated members of all Austrian parties into 
one pro-Anschluss party, while the Volksgemeinschaft aimed at 
winning the support of intellectuals. 13 To further emphasize 
this turn toward union, it should be noted that in a 1929 
questionnaire given to the members of the Austrian National 
Assembly, two-thirds of the delegates were in favor of a union 
with Germany.14 The Anschluss movement was now spreading into 
official regions of the state. 
To compound the Anschluss problem, the children of Austria 
were brought into the controversy through the educational system 
in Austria. Teachers were forced, by government order, to ngive 
equal time to both Austrian and German history.n15 In fact, 
three of the most popular and widely circulated textbooks in 
Austrian secondary school espoused an Anschluss,' while at the 
same time "emphasized the uniqueness of Austrian history. "16 
22 
Teachers were encouraged to promote the value o£ the volk and o£ 
the £atherland, which gave a great deal o£ academic <and 
propagandistic) £reedom to pro£essors. 17 Taking this educational 
"indoctrinatory" evidence into consideration, it is obvious that 
by 1930, the pan-Germanic Anschluss movement had reached every 
corner o£ the Austrian population: workers, intellectuals, 
government o££icials, and even school children were all included 
in the push toward the union o£ Austria with Germany. 
One o£ the maJor indicators o£ the £orce o£ the Anschluss 
movement at any particular time in Au~tria was the economic 
situation coinciding with the period in question. When times 
were good and the economy was on an upswing, the Anschluss 
movement would die down a bit. But when times were bad, and the 
economy o£ Austria was on a downward spiral, cries o£ Anschluss 
became more numerous and had a much higher pitch tu them. From 
1919, when the Treaty o£ St. Germanin was being prepared by the 
Allies, until 1922, when Austria was £orced to make a £ervent 
plea to the League o£ Nations £or a large-scale loan, Austrian 
£ood production was well below hal£ o£ its demand. The Austrian 
crown, 16 o£ which had equaled one US dollar in 1919, took a 
three year nosedive. In 1922, one US dollar could buy as many as 
83,000 Austrian crowns. Meanwhile, The cost o£ living increased 
an un£athomable 2,645 times during this same period. 18 
In light o£ these £acts, it is no coincidence that the 1921 
plebiscites in the Tyrol and in Salzburg were overwhelmingly in 
£avor o£ the Anschluss. When the Austrian government succeeded 
in securing a L30 million loan £rom the League o£ Nations in 
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October, 1922,19 it was £orced to publicly rea££irm Article 88 o£ 
the Treaty o£ St. Germain, denying its right to unite with 
Germany. The Geneva Protocal, as this agreement came to be 
called, and the money given to Austria, did not solve the 
economic problems in the Republic. 20 Unemployment remained high, 
seldom dipping below 10~ during the 1920s. 21 Seeing the £ailure 
o£ even this gigantic loan to improve the desperate condition o£ 
Austria's economy, nIt was then natural that Austrians should .•• 
be drawn to the belie£ that their economic problems could 
only be solved through union with Germany.n22 The quick £ix 
notions o£ these discouraged Austrians would reappear, with an 
even greater £orce, in 1930, when the Great Depression brought 
Austria, as well as the rest o£ Europe, to its knees: 
And yet, when the Austrian currency was changed to the more 
stable schilling in 1924 and the Austrian economy began to pick 
up, the Anschluss movement became less important to Austrians who 
suddenly £ound themselves economically solvent. As Kaltenbrunner 
was to say in 1946, 
The starting point (0£ the move toward National Socialism) 
was the abnormal economic depression in Austria and beyond 
that the Anschluss movement, and £inally National Socialism 
made the Anschluss come true. This course, £rom economic 
depression via Anschluss movement to National Socialism, was 
the road o£ nearly all National Socialists. 23 
Economics served as a common denominator £or the amount o£ support 
the movement received. One should bear this in mind later on, 
when the decade o£ the 1930s saw a turn toward an Anschluss 
mentality. 
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Austrian National Socialism in the Decade o£ the 1920s 
The DNSAP between 1918 and 1933 experienced a paradoxical 
decade-and-a-hal£. While it succeeded in attracting a decent 
amount o£ members, it could not establish itsel£ as the leader o£ 
the nationalist groups. While it initially succeeded in £inding 
a leader £or a short period o£ time (in the person o£ Walter 
Riehl), it soon dissolved into a party o£ £actions until the late 
1920s. While the roots o£ Anschluss thought could be traced back 
to the National Socialists, they were but one o£ a number o£ 
parties which advocated union with Germany. It was not until the 
1930 electoral success o£ the National Socialists in Germany that 
the Austrian party was able to substantially capture a large 
group o£ members £or the organization. 
As the Austro-Hungarian Army collapsed in 1918, the members 
o£ the old DAP and o£ the small, scattered National Socialist 
groups throughout German areas o£ the Empire returned to their 
homes to begin the £ight £or their own national sel£-
determination. As has already been mentioned, the newly £ormed 
DNSAP was but one o£ many political parties advocating Anschluss. 
Leading the party was Walter Riehl, the old DAP organizer £rom 
the pre-war days. In an e££ort to strengthen the party and the 
uni£ication movement, the Austrian DNSAP Joined with the SUdenten 
DNSAP and the Polish Silesian Nazis to £orm the Interstate 
National Socialist Bureau in December o£ 1919. 24 The energetic 
Riehl was named chairman o£ the Bureau, and. in 1920. organized a 
second commission, which was attended by the new members o£ the 
party £rom Germany. Among their representatives was Adol£ 
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Hitler, 25 who quickly rose through the ranks of his own branch of 
the party. 
With the ascent ion of Hitler came an increase in radical 
feelings toward a Putsch. As this "illegal" concept began to 
grow within the party, Riehl began to shy away from his German 
cohorts. Riehl was a believer in the parliamentary process, and 
was interested in putting a representative in the Austrian 
Parliament. 26 Hitler, on the other hand, was not interested in 
.. the slow legal process advocated by his Austrian ally. In August 
of 1923, at the fifth, and last, Interstate National Socialist 
convention, Riehl, realizing the popularity of Hitler, resigned 
as chairman of the Bureau and set off to form his own, legally 
oriented party.27 This split with Hitler pulled roughly half of 
the Austrian National Socialists with Riehl, while the other half 
followed Hitler <and, accordingly, changed their name to the 
NSDAP. This branch was also known as the "Hitler Bewegung", or 
"Hitler Movement"). This factionalization of the party would 
continually impede the move toward a National Socialist state, as 
in-fighting took its obvious toll. It would not be until 1930 
that the NSDAP would finally outdistance (and eventually annex) 
the Riehl - led DNSAP, and only then because of the success of the 
NSDAP in Germany at the polls. 
The second problem facing Austrian National Socialists 
during the decade of the twenties was that of competition from 
other political parties in the country. The Nazi party was not 
the only organization in Austria which was considered to be a far 
right-wing, or even an extremist, group. The Heimwehr (Home 
Guard) and Frontkampfervereinigung <Front Fighters Association), 
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both oz which were paramilitary outzits, were but two oz the 
numerous ultra-conservative groups in Austria during the post war 
years that resembled the Nazi party in its political platzorm. 
Unzortunately zor the NSDAP, nThe Nazis' anti-Semitism and demand 
zor an Anschluss were zar zrom unique even among the more 
moderate Austrian parties. n28 The NSDAP was not alone in its 
conceptions oz proper political action, and suzzered zrom the 
amount oz competition zeIt zrom other organizations. Thus, due 
to the lack oz Austrian leadership in the party (Hitler chose no 
real successor azter Riehl's departure until 1931) and the 
existence of right-wing groups similar to the NSDAP, National 
Socialism was unable to occupy a distinct place in the Austrian 
political spectrum throughout the decade oz the 1920s. 
The Growth oz Austrian National Socialism: 1930 - 1933 
As the '20s came to a close and the decade oz the '30s 
began, Austria was zaced with a dangerous situation. The 
Republic was hit Just as hard as, iz not harder than, the other 
states in western and central Europe. In 1929, Austria's 
unemployment rate (12.3X) had been higher than Great Britain's 
(10.4X) and Germany's (9.pX).29 In 1930, 95X of those Austrians 
who had held Jobs in 1929 were still working. By 1936, . a scant 
64.6X oz those who had held Jobs in 1929 were at work. 30 By the 
end of 1933, unemployed workers numbered over 400,000. 31 Due to 
her industrial and economic backwardness,32 Austria was dependant 
upon the importation oz goods zrom other states; states which did 






hinged directly on 
Austria. As the 
As Austrian imports sank,33 so too did the 
As has been previously mentioned, National 
especially pro-Anschluss £eelings, o£ten 
the economic standing o£ the Republic o£ 
crash began, and continued throughout the 
thirties, the NSDAP gained sympathy £rom disenchanted workers and 
urban p~tit bourgeoise, who were convinced o£ the £ailure o£ 
Democracy.34 Again, the quick-xix solution o£ Anschluss became, 
£or many Austrians, a viable alternative to the chaos o£ the 
Depression. 
The NSDAP was not inactive during the early years o£ the 
slump. Due to Hitler's striking electoral popularity in 




as much as 
in the Austrian 





1930. 35 In 1931, Theo Habicht (a German> was appointed by Hitler 
to take the lead in the Austrian NSDAP (by this time, Walter 
Riehl and the DNSAP had Joined with the Hitler Bewegung because 
o£ the party successes in in both German and Austrian elections). 
The leaderless, factionalized Austrian National Socialist party 
o£ the twenties 
hierarchy. The 
was now an organized group with 
success of the party was re£lected 
a visible 
in local 
elections held in Upper Austria in April, 1931. 15,770 votes 
went to the Nazis (an increase of 36X £rom 1930), while the other 
maJor Nationalist party, the Heimwehr, collected 19,000 votes (a 
drop of more than 50X £rom 1930). Also in April, elections were 
held for the Student union at the University o£ Vienna, where 35X 
o£ the votes cast by those enrolled were £or Nazi candidates, 
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resulting in 15 of the 40 chairs going to the young National 
Socialists. 36 The students of the '30s were following in the 
footsteps of the students of the 1880s and '90s. As 1931 drew to 
a close, the NSDAP was still the smallest recognized 
Austria, but "it now had the precious 'momentum' 
political parties need for real success. w37 
party in 
that all 
Nazi strength in Austria boomed in 1932. Habicht set forth 
a definite program, aiming to overthrow the Austrian government 
and to unite Austria and Germany.38 The government was not 
unaware of this feeling, and 
"considerable growth of the party 
expressed concern over the, 
in the Lander. "39 Within the 
Austrian Army, 
often present 
it was known that a fair amount of officers were 
at party meetings (200 men from were 
reported in 
Klagenfurt).40 
attendence in Linz, and another 
the Army 
50 spotted at 
to The party was growing in places where loyalty 
the state was crucial for Austrian Independence. 
Pro-Nazi feelings heigthened as the Depression worsened, as 
was reflected by the local elections held in the spring of 1932. 
The provinces of Vienna, Lower Austria, and Salzburg combined to 
cast 336,000 votes in favor of the NSDAP (compared to 66,000 in 
1930). In Vienna alone, 201,000 pro-Nazi votes were cast in 
1932, an increase of 170,000 from the 1930 elections. 41 The vote 
in Austria in 1932 gave the Nazi party 16Y. of the electorate. It 
must be noted, however, that a good deal of the increase in pro-
Nazi votes came at the expense of other pan-Germanic groups, some 
of which were forced to fold. 42 As might be expected, these now-
defunct nationalist groups gravitated toward the NSDAP, for an 
29 
event in Germany in 1933 would change the way politics was to be 
used in Austria for the next three years. 
When Adolf Hitler assumed control of the German government 
on January 30, 1933, Austrian political ideologies underwent 
something of a crisis. The Social Democrats and the Christian 
Socialists (the two biggest parties in Austria in 1933), who had 
supported the Anschluss movement from its 1918 beginnings, 
now £orced to drop the plank in light of the new fascist, 
Marxist, and anti-clerical government in Germany. 43 due to 
virtual destruction of the other pan-Germanic parties by 






only party in the Republic which still supported an Anschluss. 44 
Just as the need for a leader in the party had been filled (by 
Habicht in 1931), how the other maJor problem £or the Austrian 




incorporation o£ the anti-Marxist Agricultural League 
pan-Germanic Greater German People's party into the 
The Nazis were now taking the form of a consolidated 
party, complete with a leader and a good base of popular support. 
By April, 1933, an estimated 20Y. to 25Y. of the Austrian voting 
population was National Socialist. An additional lOY. of the 
electorate was believed to be pro-Anschluss, 
favor of the National Socialist plat£orm. 46 
if not entirely in 
The movement supporting the union of Austria and Germany was 
a strong one during the post-war period. After declining a bit 
during the late twenties, pro-Anschluss thought increased as a 
result of economic catastrophe and National Socialist success in 
Germany. It was a movement supported by Social Democrats as well 
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as National Socialists, and by workers as well as the urban petit 
bourgeoisie. Likewise, the Nazi party, a£ter a promising start 
in the early twenties, did not take hold in Austria until 
Hitler's popularity had increased and the Republic's economy had 
crashed. As Adol£ Hitler assumed control o£ the Reich, and as 
Austrian workers lost their Jobs, the NSDAP emerged as the only 
pro-Anschluss party in the country, and was able to capitalize on 
the pan-Germanic attitudes o£ £ellow Austrians expressed in 
plebiscites, demonstrations, and education. The Anschluss 
movement, like the NSDAP, was not something imposed upon 
Austrians by greedy German Nazis. Rather, it was an Austrian-
based £eeling which could never be avoided. By 1933, the 
Anschluss movement had become a maJor political issue, while the 
Austrian National Socialist party had become a power£ul <and 
growing) political organization. As Hermann Goehring proclaimed 
in Nuremburg in 1946, "The party in Austria was there£ore not a 
Fi£th Column £or the Anschluss, because the Austrian people 
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While the urge £or Anschluss grew steadily in Austria 
throughout the 1920s and early '30s, the movement was not, o£ 
course, reserved solely £or Austrian citizens, nor was it a 
concern shared by everyone in the Republic. Anschluss had been 
in the minds o£ the leaders o£ the German government during the 
Weimar years, and had increased in intensity as the new Nazi 
regime took its place in the Reich. The desire £or a union was 
certainly present in Germany, as it was in Austria, during the 
'20s and '30s, and £ound supporters in both camps who were ready 
to act upon this wish. Likewise, as is the case in any 
controversial issue, the Anschluss had a great many opponents (in 
Austria as well as in other Western European states), some o£ 
whom happened to hold high o££icial positions in Vienna. As we 
shall see, the tentative moves made by the Weimar government gave 
way to blatant attempts toward a union by the Nazi party in both 
Germany and Austria. Both policies - - the slow, evolutionary 
policy o£ Weimar, and the more radical, terroristic policy o£ the 
early years o£ National Socialism were thwarted by the 
opponents o£ Anschluss; Italy, France, and, more importantly, 
the Austrian government, which was led by the energetic Engelbert 
Doll£uss. 
The Weimar Republic consistently viewed an Anschluss as a 
wonder£ul dream which could never really come true. As the 
treaties £ollowing the First World War came to prove, the 
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victorious allies were in no mood to accommodate German wishes. 
Backed into a corner, Germany was £orced to accept whatever terms 
were o££ered to her without complaint. This attitude prevailed 
well into the 1920s, and explains why no attempts were made to 
bring about an Anschluss: 
already embittered French, 
Germany did not want to anger the 
and pursued a timid approach toward 
£oreign policy. The reparation payments demanded o£ her were 
already too high £or her to pay, and the Weimar leaders chose not 
to antagonize France with outbursts o£ Anschluss £eelings £or 
£ear o£ compounding this extraordinary burden put upon her 
economy. 
And yet an Anschluss was indeed desired by Germany, but only 
a much smaller scale than the complete political and economic 
union espoused in Austria. The German plan was a much more 
gradual inclusion o£ Austria into the German culture, 1 and German 
e££orts would seem tame compared to the overt attempts toward 
Anschluss by the Nazi administration in the thirties. The Weimar 
Republic aimed its thrusts at the cultural aspect o£ the 
question. Exchanges were made between Austria and Germany to 
coordinate the two legal systems into one, and to present a 
consistently pro-Anschluss attitude in each country's respective 
presses. 2 These moves, while ine££ectual, were certainly 
genuine, and show Germany's commitment toward the movement. The 
German government during the 1920s was, in e££ect, working to 
prevent even £urther restrictions on the Austro-German union than 
had been initially placed upon them in the treaties o£ Versailles 
and St. Germain. 4 
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As the twenties progressed, however, so, too, did the 
boldness of the German government. While it was still convinced 
-, 
of the impossibility of a complete political union, it began to 
toy with the idea of pursuing an angle different from the mere 
cultural incorporation of the Reich with the Republic that had 
been the previous aim of German foreign policy. As the decade of 
the thirties opened, the focus of German Anschluss thought 
centered around the possibility of an economic union. 5 Both the 
German and Austrian governments had suffered political setbacks 
in national elections during the fall of 1930, attributable to 
the dire economic situation surrounding the two states. Both 
governments, seeing their popularity decrease, were desperate for 
some kind of success, preferrably an economic one. 6 The attempt 
to regain a popular base o.f support was also considered to be 
consistent with the long sought-after union of the two states, 
and was viewed in the German Foreign Ministry to be, " a 
prelude to and a temporary substitute for the Anschluss ... 7 The 
mode to be used was that of a customs union, which would build an 
economic alliance by banning customs payments on imports and 
exports between the two states. In late November of 1930, the 
two German-speaking governments began to contact one another in 
order to set up conditions for a customs union. 8 
Naturally, the French were opposed to such an act, citing 
the Geneva Protocol of 1922 as well as Article 88 of the Treaty 
of St. Germain as grounds for reJecting this plan. To the 
allies, and France in particular, this economic alliance looked 
too much like a move toward total Anschluss; a prospect 
•. .1!1 
unacceptable to Prime Minister Briand and the French government. 9 
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Franco- German relations quickly deteriorated as 1930 drew to a 
close. Talks continued between Austria and Germany, which pushed 
France into the position o£ being a regulator. Paris began 
bombarding Berlin with warnings. As these warnings continued to 
£low into Germany, " • the proJected customs union now became 
the £irst consideration in German policy. "10 It had become not 
only an issue o£ Anschluss, but matter o£ whether or not German 
policy could be conducted regardless o£ the desires o£ £oreign 
states. 11 
In March, 1931, an agreement was struck between Austria and 
Germany to 
desired by 
implement the plan. While secrecy was obviously 
that the both sides, the news quickly leaked out 
customs union had been accepted by both sides. France Jumped 
into action, o££ering Germany £inancial aid in return £or a 
renunciation o£ the customs union. 12 The o££er was re£used. 
Germany was adamant in making this, her £irst independent venture 
into £oreign a££airs since Versailles, a success£ul act. 13 Due 
to Great Britain's lack o£ concern over the customs union, the 
path toward economic union seemed clear. 
stop it £rom occurring. 
Only a disaster could 
Three months later, such a disaster struck. The Kreditan-
Stalt, a Viennese bank responsible £or the £inancing o£ most o£ 
Austria's industry, crashed in June, 1931. 14 This quickly 
undercut the customs union proposal. "In order to save the 
currency, Austria urgently needed £oreign credits, in the £irst 
place £rom France. "15 France, in a politically wise move, agreed 
to save the Austrian economy only i£ Austria would renounce the 
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customs union plan. Faced with no options, Austria agreed, thus 
destroying the first legitimate, if not somewhat disguised, move 
toward Anschluss between the two German states. 
The Weimar Republic was interested in forming some kind of 
bond with the Republic of Austria throughout the '20s and into 
the '30s. While not exactly monumental in its actions, a few 
attempts were made to draw the two states together. Forced into 
a pressurized situation by the depression of 1930, both 
governments risked alienating the Western Powers with the customs 
union in order to preserve political power at home. While the 
measure was not a successful one, it does indeed demonstrate the 
desire for Anschluss in Germany before the ascent of Adolf Hitler 
and the German National Socialist party. 
The Nazi German Response 
A new attitude toward Anschluss with Austria followed the 
Nazi party into power in January, 1933. Adolf Hitler's view of 
Austria as a German state had been voiced as early as 1925 in the 
opening chapter of Mein Kampf: 
German-Austria must return to the great German mother 
country, and not because of any economic considerations. 
No, and again no: even if such a union were unimportant 
from an economic point of view; yes, even if it were 
harmful, it must nevertheless take place. One blood demands 
one Reich. Never will the German nation possess the moral 
right to engage in colonial politics until, at least, it 
embraces its own sons within a single state. Only when the 
Reich borders include the very last German, but can no 
longer guarantee his daily bread, will the moral right to 
acquire foreign soil arise from the distress of our own 
people. 16 
The pursuit of Anschluss was a maJor part of Hitler's policy, and 
his vision of a united German-speaking Reich would not leave him 
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until it became a reality. 
As Hitler stepped into o££ice on 
success£ul route to a union was in 







£urthered the cause, nor had the £ailed customs union idea. The 
new regime now turned its back on the pseudo-Anschluss attempts 
which had £ocused on economic and social issues. Hitler and the 
German Foriegn Ministry abandoned these hal£-measures in £avor o£ 
an outright political incorporation o£ Austria. While the 
National Socialist section in the German government and the 
German diplomatic entourage di££ered in the means toward this 
end, both sides were in agreement that a political Anschluss was 
indeed possible. 
As Chancellor o£ Germany, Hitler's aim was to achieve 
success £rom within Austria itsel£. The growing Nazi party, 
spurred by Nazi successes in Germany, appeared to be the per£ect 
vehicle £or Hitler to use to gain a political £oothold in 
Austria. Once the NSDAP could gain entry into the o££icial 
government the road to Anschluss would be a quick and easy 
a££air.17 This RGleichschaltung R,1B or internal admittance into 
the Austrian government, was dependent upon national elections 
and cabinet appointments to show both the popularity o£ the Nazi 
movement and its success. With these elections and negotiations 
£or coalitions within the Austrian government, Hitler could 
increase, the size and role o£ the Austrian National 
Socialists until by pseudolegal means a position o£ growing 
authority in the government could be exploited £or·the subsequent 
attainment o£ power. R19 Thus, with Nazis in prominent positions 
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and with a reasonable argument for popular support, 
complete an Anschluss whenever he so desired. 
The German Foreign Ministry, however, 
Hitler could 
had serious 
reservations about any kind of German intervention in Austrian 
affairs. There were fears within the German diplomatic circles 
that the Austrian government, as well as both France and Italy, 
were gearing up for massive opposition against any kind of German 
move toward Anschluss. 20 The Austrian government was seen by the 
Foreign Ministry as willing to look anywhere for help in an 
effort to secure its independence. France and Italy were seen as 
open to a possible restoration of the Habsburgs in Austria as 
long as it would keep the two states separate. 21 The debate 
between the ideologs in the party and the members of the 
Ministry would remain unresolved until July 25, 1934, 
Foreign 
when the 
answer to the question-of the effectiveness of intervention would 
be found in the position held by the diplomatic corps. 
The Austrian Response 
As has been demonstrated, the Anschluss movement within 
Austria certainly had had a great deal of support throughout the 
twenties and early 1930s. And yet, in 1933, there occurred a 
sudden shift in attitude away from a union with Germany of any 
kind; an economic, cultural, or political move was now frowned 
upon in of£icial Austrian circles. This move away £rom an 
Anschluss can be attributed to two political changes: the rise 
o£ Engelbert Doll£uss in Austrian politics and of Adolf Hitler in 
German politics. It was, in fact, Dollfuss' reaction to Hitler's 
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rise that truly a££ected the political climate in 1933-34. 
Doll£uss was a prominent £igure in the Austrian political 
arena during the 1920s. He had served as the Minister o£ 
Agriculture, and was a leading member o£ the moderate right-wing 
Christian Socialist party. Due to the slim maJority garnered by 
the party in the elections o£ May, 1932, Doll£uss was able to 
£orm a tenuous coalition government with two other parties (the 
Heimatbloc and the Landbund) that held a scant one vote maJori~y 
over the opposition, which was comprised o£ the Social Democratic 
party and various Grossdeutsche parties (the NSDAP had not yet 
won any seats in Parliament in May, 1932). Doll£uss could not 
bring in either the Socialists, due to his extreme anti-Marxist 
views, or the the growing Nazi party, due to his Catholism.22 
The £ragile coalition government £ormed by Doll£uss would not 
last a year, due to its thin base o£ support. Without a broad 
£oundation o£ popular or legislative support, Doll£uss £ound 
himsel£ in a precarious position. With the success o£ Hitler in 
January, 1933, Doll£uss £ound that the anti-Catholic Nazis were 
dangerously close to gaining more support in Austria. 
On March 4, 1933, barely a month a£ter Hitler's riegn, 
Chancellor Doll£uss £ound himsel£ in a position to secure his 
position as head o£ state. In a vote lost by the government 
during a session o£ Parliament, the validity o£ two o£ the 
opposition's deputies were questioned. In the ensuing £racas, 
not only the President o£ the Parliament (a Social Democrat) 
resigned, but so, too, did the two Vice-Presidents. 23 With 
Parliament lacking any kind o£ authoritative head, Doll£uss 
siezed his opportunity. Due ~o the Austrian Constitution, not 
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even the President o£ the country, Wilhelm Miklas, could summon 
Parliament back in session. 24 In order to run the government, 
the Christian Socialists (the maJority party) agreed to a short 
term authoritarian government with Doll£uss at its head. A £ew 
days later, however, the party cleverly announced that the new 
regime could and would continue in its present state on the basis 
o£ an obscure enabling act that had been passed in 1917 during a 
military crisis. 25 The act, which no one had bothered to revoke 
a£ter the war, now gave Doll£uss a £ree hand to rule over Austria 
as he so desired, without the help, or hindrance, o£ the Austrian 
Parliament. 
This new semi-dictatorship was a thorn in the side o£ the 
new Nazi regime in Germany. Doll£uss permanently disbanded the 
Austrian Parliament (but kept his cabinet intact) and outlawed 
any national elections which might be used to re-instate the 
body. Without national elections, the Austrian NSDAP £ound 
itsel£ in a £rustrating position. 
base o£ support among Austrians, 
It knew that it had a growing 
and now with the help o£ an 
overtly sympathetic German government, the chances o£ succeeding 
in achieving an Anschluss seemed greater than ever be£ore. But 
the outspoken anti-Nazi Doll£uss regime was now a maJor obstacle. 
The lack o£ elections prevented the NSDAP and its Fuehrer £rom 
taking advantage o£ the new wave o£ support. To make matters 
worse, Doll£uss had £ound a willing partner (or protector) in the 
person o£ Benito Mussolini. 
Italy had had its eyes on Austria and the rest ox 
Southeastern Europe since Mussolini's rise to power in 1922. 
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Now, with Doll£uss leading a semi-dictatorial Austria, Mussolini 
Jumped at the opportunity to bring Austria closer to Italy. 
Knowing that Doll£uss needed £oreign support £rom another 
authoritarian state, but was uncom£ortable dealing with the anti-
Catholic Nazis, Mussolini began guiding' Doll£uss toward an 
Italian mode o£ Fascism. 26 Doll£uss, much to the Italian's 
delight, accepted the 0££er,27 and took Mussolini's advice on a 
number o£ issues, including the £ormation o£ a Fatherland Front 
(who's goal it was to preserve Austrian independence) and the 
elimination o£ opposition groups. 28 Mussolini, in turn, promised 
to support Austrian independence and sovereignty.29 Be£ore the 
summer o£ 1933 was over, Austria was considered by many to be a 
Fascist state in the Italian mold. 
The Fatherland Front was a particularly interesting group in 
the new Austrian Fascist government. It was not a political party 
in itsel£, but, as years passed, the Front would accept members 
£rom di££ering political parties. 30 Its role was to create and 
uphold the independence o£ the state o£ Austria. It is 
important, 
with the 
however, to emphasize one o£ the £undamental problems 
Front, which also goes a long way in explaining the 
eventual acceptance o£ a German government in 1938. Austria was, 
a£ter all, a nation created not by Austrians, but by her rivals. 
Over three million German-speaking Austrians were in 
Czechoslovakia and Italy. And still, the Fatherland Front wanted 
Austrians to accept this bastard country and turn their backs on 
the millions excluded £rom the Austrian state. 31 But the Front 
did exist in Austria, and was used by Doll£uss, along with the 
similarly £ascist Heimwehr party, as a paramilitary tool to 
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suppress any whimpers oz opposition zrom either the lezt or the 
right. 
In the spring oz 1933, the situation in Austria was in a 
state oz sudden change. A new government in Germany was now 
vehemently pro-Anschluss, and was espousing a more comprehensive 
attitude toward political union than had ever bezore been 
supported by a German administration. In Austria, a new 
dictatorship had been zormed, regardless oz the zact that it was 
based on an ever-so-slight maJority in the state. Support zor 
the NSDAP was on the rise, but was now unable to be ozzicially 
measured due the abandonment oz the election process by the new 
Fascist leader. Anschluss was zrustratingly close, but 
unattainable in its present situation. With its goal so close, 
the Austrian National Socialist party began to take matters into 
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The £rustrations £elt by the Austrian Nazi party in 1933 
were widespread and dangerous. The NSDAP was a growing movement 
with a strong backing £rom its German allies. And yet the 
authoritarian Doll£uss regime was denying it the opportunity to 
legally enter into the government. Naturally, the Austrian NSDAP 
reacted against the anti - Nazi government as soon as parliament 
was o££icially disbanded. For £ive years, £rom March, 1933 to 
March, 1938, the Austrian Nazis and their supporters in Germany 
moved to change the status o£ the party. During these years, the 
£orce and pressure exerted upon the Austrian government by the 
NSDAP became a maJor £actor in determining the eventual outcome 
o£ the Anschluss question. 
The policy o£ pressure changed direction a number o£ times 
during the £ive year buildup. Due to the continual changing o£ 
circumstances within the Austrian Nazi party, the Austrian 
government, and the German government, there was not a common 
line o£ Anschluss policy upon which all three parties could 
agree. While the German government concerned itsel£ with £oreign 
opinion and diplomacy (which ultimately led them to a position o£ 
evolutionary change), the Austrian Nazis, impatient with the lack 
o£ action £rom the Reich, o£ten diverged £rom German policies, 
causing a disparity. between the two pro-Anschluss £orces and 
con£using the situation in Austria. Because o£ sh~£ts in policy, 
the £ive year push during the 1930s can be broken down into £our 
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di££erent stages. The £irst o£ these began with the dissolution 
o£ Parliament on March 4, 1933 and ended with the £ailed putsch 
on July 25, 1934. The second stage, one of extreme caution and 
delicacy, dates £rom the autumn o£ 1934, with the realization o£ 
the impossibility of Revolution within Austria a£ter the £ailure 
o£ the July putsch, and lasted until the breakthrough o£ the 
Gentlemen's Agreement o£ July, 1936. Stage three, characterized 
by increased internal stri£e, stretched £rom the summer o£ 1936 
until the acceptance by Chancellor Schuschnigg o£ a German 
invitation to re-negotiate the terms o£ the 1936 Agreement on 
February 7, 1938. 
month; initiated 
The £ourth and final stage lasted roughly one 
by Schuschnigg's acceptance, this stage was 
completed with the £inal approval o£ the German-Austrian 
Anschluss by the Austrian cabinet and the Austrian people in the 
middle o£ March, 1938. ' 
The £irst o£ these £our stages o£ activity was characterized 
by a great amount o£ con£usion, stamped with a Jumble o£ motions 
by a number o£ di££erent actors (most notably the German Foreign 
Ministry, the German Nazi party, and the Austrian Nazi party, 
along with their opponents, Chancellor Dolluss and his pseudo-
Fascist government). While the German and Austrian party members 
were in general (but not complete) agreement about the need £or 
an active terroristic party within Austria, the German Foreign 
Ministry adamantly supported a slow and non-violent policy toward 
an Anschluss with Austria. Because o£ this disagreement, the 
Austrian NSDAP found itsel£ in a delicate position: it was 
receiving directives £rom both the German party and the German 
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Foreign Ministry, which espoused di££ering routes toward the 
solution o£ the Austrian question. Regardless o£ their actions, 
either passive or violent, the Austrian Nazi party was sure to 
antagonize at least one branch o£ the German government. Because 
o£ this, the Austrian party £ollowed its ideological leaders 
(Habicht and, to an extent, Hitler), and pursued a rather violent 
path toward Anschluss. In a situation where both sides (the 
German party 
satis£ied with 
and the German Foreign Ministry) could 





£ollow its instincts 
to receive. Only 
and 
with 
accept the inevitable criticism it was 
the outright £ailure o£ the violent 
Austrian policy was any kind o£ concensus reached within the 
German government. The Foreign Ministry, with its evolutionary 
program, was success£ul in convincing its ideological superiors 
that revolution in Austria was not the answer. 
Although the illegal coup d'etat £ailed in 1934, the violent 
actions 
Austria. 
o£ the NSDAP do suggest the in£luence o£ the 
The responses o£ Doll£uss illicited by 
party in 
the party 
demonstrates the £ear the £ormer possessed o£ the latter, as well 
as the importance placed upon the Nazis by the Austrian 
government: the movement had to be stamped out at all costs. 
Its popularity was undeniable, and its ability to in£luence the 
policies o£ the Austrian government became quite evident by the 
time Doll£uss lay dying in the Austrian chancellery on July 25, 
1934. 
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Action and Counteraction 
As soon as Doll£uss' position as dictator had been secured 
in the early weeks o£ March, 1933, the battle between the 
government and the Austrian Nazi party began to build into a 
heated a££air. Oddly enough, the £irst move toward outright 
con£rontation was initiated not by the National Socialists, but 
by Doll£uss himsel£. By banning the national election o£ 
Austrian members o£ Parliament in early March, Doll£uss was 
immediately putting the NSDAP on the de£ensive. Six weeks later, 
in April, 1933, as Doll£uss and Habicht discussed the possibility 
o£ an agreement between the two, the Chancellor became well aware 
o£ the wisdom o£ his prohibitive action. As the two men spoke, 
local elections in Innsbruck (an area traditionally wary o£ the 
Nazi party) gave the NSDAP the maJority o£ municipal seats. 1 
Without a national election, the Nazis were unable to prove their 
popularity to Doll£uss and to the Western Powers. 
Doll£uss' next move was to ban all public meetings and to 
£orbid any political parades, 
the Christian Socialist party 
with the noteworthy exceptions o£ 
and the nationalist, £ascist 
Heimwehr party.2 
the popularity 
This action, with the intention o£ squelching 
o£ both the National Socialist and Social 
Democratic parties, only served to antagonize them, and made 
violence a spokesman £or their wishes. The Nazi response came in 
the £orm o£ terror bombings, aimed at destroying the Austrian 
government. These bombings would continue throughout 1933 and 
well into 1934, and helped not only to vent their £rustrations 
against the government, but also to apply pressure on the 
administration to change its policies. Because the Nazi aim at 
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this time was nGleichschaltung", these bombings were, at xirst, a 
xorm ox protesting the abandonment ox the electoral procedure and 
the denial ox public political displays. 
The German government was also quite perplexed by the 
suspension ox demonstrations and the voting process. In response 
to this rexusal ox National Socialist recognition, high German 
Nazi oxxicials began to scheme and plan against the Dollxuss 
regime. George S. Messersmi th, consul General ox the United 
States in Berlin until the spring ox 1934 (when he became 
Ambassador to Austria), testixied in an axxidavit axter the 
Second World War that, 
I was told by high Nazi oxxicials in conversation with 
them, that these waves ox terror (the bombings ox 1933 and 
1934) were being instigated and directed by them. (and) 
that they were responsible xor these activities in Austria. 
These admissions were. . consistent with the Nazi thesis 
that terror is necessary and must be used to impose the will 
ox the party not only in Germany, but in other countries. 3 
The terror bombings, initiated by Nazi Germany, were seen in 1933 
as one ox two ways ox pushing the Austrian government toward 
Anschluss. The other way was xormulated by Hitler. While there 
was speculation about (but no proox ox) German involvement in the 
bombings, the second xorm ox pressure applied to the Dollxuss 
regime was obviously German in origin. 
In order to pressure Dollxuss into repealing his anti-Nazi 
stances, Hitler xirst threatened, and then implemented, a tourist 
boycott upon Austria. The boycott was comprised mainly ox a 
large tax (1000 DM) imposed on German citizens applying xor 
Austrian visas. Because ox Austria's dependency on her tourist 
industry (which was, in turn, dependent on Germany), this tourist 
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boycott was seen as a dangerous weapon with the capability o£ 
doing serious damage to the £rail Austrian economy. With the 
hopes o£ economically destroying Austria and inciting inner 
rebellion,4 Hitler and his £ellow Nazi conspirators implemented 
the move on May 20, 1933. 
Doll£uss, with the backing o£ his Heimwehr and the Italian 
government, 
the NSDAP. 
£elt strong enough to make a solid statement against 
On June 10, 1933, the government announced that the 
sale o£ the Volkischer Beobachter was to be banned in Austria. S 
In response to this action, an attempt was made on the li£e o£ 
pro-Austria leader Richard Steidle by angry Nazis on the 
£ollowing day.6 Within hours o£ the attack, all 
Headquarters 
authorities. 
were o££icially closed and sealed by 
Nazi 
the 
This was £ollowed by a decree expelling all 
soldiers in the Austrian Army with any Nazi a££iliations.7 The 
pattern o£ action and reaction, 
steadily gaining speed. 
o£ initiation and reprisal, was 
Nazi bombings increased tremendously during the week o£ June 
12-19. Using teenagers as assailants, two businesses were 




The climax o£ the week o£ terror came on the 19th, when 
armed with grenades, attacked a police auxiliary £orce 
parade o£ "Christian German Gymnasts".9 The 14 
casualties prompted Doll£uss to move quickly. On the same day as 
the Gymnast attack, the Nazi party was o££icially banned in 
Austria. 10 A severe blow had been dealt to the Austrian NSDAP. 
The German government was not silent during- this period, 
either. With the banning o£ the Volkischer Beobachter, Hitler 
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moved to retaliate by naming Theo Habicht, the German-born leader 
of the Austrian NSDAP, as a member of the German Legation in 
Vienna. This obvious attempt to influence Austrian politics with 
a dipomatic action from the Reich did not go unnoticed by 
Dollfuss, 
Legation. 
who quickly refused to allow Habicht entry into the 
By the 19th of June, Habicht would be sitting in 
Munich, the victim of forced exile by the Austrian government. 11 
Upon hearing of Habicht's reJection, Hitler moved to 
counteract the measure by expelling the supposedly diplomatically 
immune Austrian Press Attache in Berlin. 12 This action can only 
be seen as one of desparation by an irate Hitler, seemingly 
beaten in his attempts for Gleichschaltung by the wary Dollfuss. 
Yet it must be noted that the anti-Nazi actions taken by the 
government were, in fact, precipitated by the acts of terror by 
the Austrian National Socialists. It must also be noted that in 
expelling the Press Attache, Hitler only served to annoy the 
Western Powers, especially England and France, and fueled an 
already growing amount of support for Dollfuss among the European 
states. During an economic conference held in London during 
this period, Dollfuss was applauded wildly by his British hosts, 
while the German delegates to the conference were greeted with 
hisses. 13 With this show of diplomatic sympathy, Dollfuss 
undoubtedly felt 
hated enemies was 
extinction. 
that the backing needed to rid himself of 
present. The Nazi party was in danger 




with the outlawing of the Nazis in June, 1933. It was now 
53 
Germany's turn to respond to actions taken against her, and she 
did so without hesitation. As a corollary to the tourist ban, 
which was still in e££ect during the summer o£ 1933, the German 
government directed an intense propaganda campaign against 
Austria, complete with anti-Doll£uss radio broadcasts (£rom 
Habicht, now stationed in Munich> and lea£let droppings. 14 
Naturally, Doll£uss' banning ri£ the party did little to soothe 
the angry Austrian Nazis. 
1933 and well into 1934. 
Terror bombings continued throughout 
By February, 1934, reports o£ bombings 
reached an average o£ 40 per day.1S 
Perhaps more important £rom Doll£uss' outlook was the 
£ormation o£ the Austrian Legion in German towns along the 
Austrian border. The Legion was composed mainly o£ deported 
Nazis and Austrian Anschluss sympathizers in disagreement with 
the Doll£uss government. They were, in £act, supported with 
German arms and ammunition, and were trained in, n the most 
modern methods o£ street £ighting n16 by German SA men. In late 
August, 1933, rumors £lew throughout Europe concerning the 
possibility, even the inevitability, o£ a putsch orchestrated by 
the German-led Austrian Legion. 17 The British delegates in 
Vienna, Munich, and Rome were most alarmed by this new threat to 
the new European status quo. Sir William Selby in Vienna wired 
Sir Robert Vansittart in London to suggest that Mussolini be 
noti£ied in case o£ a putsch. 18 Vansittart, in a message to 
Minister Murray in Rome, suggested that regardless o£ the 
authenticity o£ such rumors, Italy should be in£ormed o£ the 
German plot. 19 The mere presence o£ an Austrian' Nazi £orce on 




i easily succeeded in terri£ying Austrian local 0££icials. 20 
Mussolini and Doll£uss, supplied with in£ormation £rom the 
t. British Foriegn o££ice and well aware o£ the threat themselves, 
were busy searching £or a remedy to the problem. On August 23, 
the two met to counteract the possibility o£ a violent putsch. 
Among the agreements made were provisions £or the supplying o£ 
! 
arms and ammunition to the Austrian Heimwhr by Italy, as well as 
t .' a secret bargain to allow 5,000 Italian troops enter into Austria 
in case o£ a putsch. 21 The Austrian xront was alerted, as 
invasion by these Austrian Nazis came to be expected. 
And yet the attack never came. It was certainly in the 
works, and was always an option: one must argue that it was 
seriously considered by Hitler and Habicht at one point or 
another. But sharp warnings £rom both Ambassador Rieth in 
Vienna22 and State Secretary von Bulow23 were speci£ic in their 
arguments against a putsch. Rieth recognized the vulnerability 
ox the small £orces (2,000 to 8,000, depending on sources), and 
warned that a German sponsored putsch, n could be 
disasterous. "24 Von Bulow echoed these ominous proJections, but 
cited the danger ox aggravating the sensitive international 
situation: Mussolini was certainly interested in the happenings 
north o£ the Brenner Pass, and Great Britain was becoming 
increasingly concerned. 25 While Habicht was certainly excited 
about the prospect o£ intervention in Austria,26 the overriding 
obJections o£ Rieth and von Bulow were enough to convince Hitler 
that armed attack was not appropriate in the summer o£ 1933. The 




all o:f Europe, did not occur. It had been 
by quick actions :from Doll:fuss, Mussolini, and the 
British diplomatic services, as well as by the cautious German 
Foreign Ministry. But there was now a new wrinkle in the story; 
with the Austro-Italian agreement o:f August 23, Doll:fuss suddenly 
:found himsel:f in an uneasy alliance with Benito Mussolini, 
would prove to be an uncom:fortable one. 
which 
Rather than risk the wrath o:f Mussolini, Germany and the 
Austrian Nazis chose to :follow a di:f:ferent route towards 
"Gleichschaltung". In September and October o:f 1933, Theo 
Habicht and Chancellor Doll:fuss began a series o:f communiques 
pointing toward an agreement between the two :forces. The terror 
bombings had continued with regularity since June, and the 
anxious moments caused by the presence o:f the Austrian Legion 
were certainly enough to convince Doll:fuss to take a negotiating 
stance. Habicht, too, was ready to talk. A:fter all, he was 
sitting in Munich, rather than in Vienna, and was interested in 
returning to Austria to get back into the :fray. 
Both sides had a number o:f demands which they wished to 
discuss. Habicht pressed :for a cabinet with six Nazi members 
<which would constitute hal:f o:f the cabinet) as well as his own 
appointment to the post o:f vice-chancellor. The bans placed upon 
the party, its press, and the para-military units o:f the party 
<the SA and the SS) were to be li:fted, and :friendly relations 
were to be pursued with the German Reich. 27 Doll:fuss, on the 
other hand, wished to stop all anti-government propaganda :from 
German and Austrian Nazi sources, :followed' by a German 
renunciation o:f all ties with the Austrian National Socialist 
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party. As long as Germany would promise not to inter£ere in 
Austrian politics, the ban on the party would be li£ted (but 
elections would still be denied).28 
Due to the con£licts in each party's demands, agreement was 
never achieved. 
Junction, and 
Neither side was willing to compromise at that 





and had received a show o£ support 
June. Italy had con£irmed her 
£rom the 
role as 
protector o£ Austria, and Doll£uss had an active, i£ not vastly 
(but still £ascist) party at his disposal in popular, anti-Nazi 
the £orm o£ the Heimwehr. 
surrender any o£ his demands. 
Habicht also had no reason to 
With the growing popularity o£ the 
party in Austria, he did have a legitimate claim £or the 
inclusion o£ the Nazis in the cabinet. He also was the 
bene£actor o£ a Nazi German government intent upon rearranging 
the situation in Austria. Dol~£uss, simply by communicating with 
Habicht, was obviously perplexed both by the violent shows o£ 
strength £rom Austrian Nazis and by the mere presence o£ the 
Austrian Legion in Bavaria. As October drew to a close, Habicht 
could a££ord to playa waiting game, while Doll£uss was strong 
enough to re£use proposals which were unsatis£actory to him. 
Neither side was willing to give an inch, and the stalemate which 
resulted would last £or the better part o£ three years. 
As 1934 began, the question o£ a violent putsch was being 
raised in Austrian and German NSDAP circles. The party was 
growing at a great rate, which naturally excited and encouraged 
the Austrian Gauleiter. In Carinthia, it was reported that, "The 
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general mood was really excellent w,30 and that party membership 
had never been so high. Funds were needed £rom Germany to help 
build the terror groups being organized. An enthusiastic 
Gauleiter exclaimed, "Now we must really begin to incite people, 
to work them up.w 31 Styria, too, reported growing members o£ 
Nazi adherents, some o£ whom were crossing over £rom the pro-
Italian Heimwehr. 32 
On January 31, 1934, the German Foreign Ministry (which 
continually stressed an evolutionary ~rocess o£ Gleichschaltung) 
got wind o£ what surely must have terri£ied the diplomatic corps. 
The Military Attache in Vienna, General Wol£gang Mu££, reported 
to the Charge d'A££aires in Vienna that a serious plan o£ action 
was being devised by impatient Austrian Nazis behind the backs o£ 
both Habicht and the German government. The plot was devised by 
Hermann Reschny, the leader o£ the radical SA. Reschny was 
~ unhappy with the £ailure o£ the negotiations with Doll£uss, and 
was tired o£ the deliberacy o£ the German hierachy. The scheme 
was care£ully 
avoid a leak 
planned, as special measures had been 
in Munich and in Austria, £or £ear 
taken to 
o£ being 
restricted £rom acting by either area. The alarmed Charge 
d'A££aires pleaded that the situation, " 
intervention on the part o£ the top leader~hip 
order to prevent an irreparable disaster. w33 
require speedy 
in Germany in 
In the £ace o£ a new threat to Austrian independence, 
Doll£uss reacted in a rather peculiar £ashion. 
completely dismantling the Austrian Nazi party with 




Marxist Social Democrats, in an e££ort to both appease Mussolini 
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and to increase the power o£ the Heimwehr at the expense o£ the 
Socialists. For three days, beginning on February 12, 1934, 
Doll£uss' Heimwehr, along with the police and the army, attacked 
and destroyed the Socialist party in Austria with a violent 
action. 34 Doll£uss, who had £ound himsel£ somewhat bound to 
Mussolini during the previous summer, was now destroying the most 
vocal and e££ective enemy o£ the NSDAP, partially in order to 
satis£y the urgings o£ Italy,35 which had been pushing Doll£uss 
to rid Austria o£ Marxists ever since the beginning o£ his rule. 
Nothing, however, was done to block or to "punish" the National 
Socialists £or their plot. 
consolidate his own £orces, 
Doll£uss, 
perhaps in 
ultimate head - to-head con£rontation with 
instead, chose to 
anticipation o£ an 
the Nazis. By 
destroying the Marxist element in the Republic, Doll£uss was 
hoping to demonstrate his own iron-£istedness to the Austrian 
citizen, and wished to draw more supporters into his oyn camp. 
The destruction o£ the Social Democratic party had an 
interesting e££ect on Austro-German relations. German Foreign 
Minister von Neurath reported on February 16 that Doll£uss was 
ready to negotiate with Germany and the Nazi party in an attempt 
to settle their di££erences. 36 Although the government had been 
success£ul in de£eating the Social Democrats, reports out o£ 
Vienna disclosed in£ormation suggesting that Doll£uss yas in a 
precarious position. The previous success o£ ,Nazi terror tactics 
had Doll£uss yorried about a possible Guerilla war in the streets 
and seyers o£ Austria noy that the Marxists yere out o£ the 




both the Army and the Christian Socialist party, doubtless 
because of the para-military group's penchant for fascist control 
within the state. 37 Moreover, the German Legation reported as a 
fact that BOY. of the Austrian population was vehemently opposed 
to the government. 3B With the Dollfuss coalition feuding, an 
action against the Nazis would be foolish, especially with their 
growing amount of support. 
talk. 
Dollfuss, therefore, was ready to 
But the German Foreign Ministry refused to comply with the 
Austrian Chancellor's desires. Dollfuss still refused to 
recognize the NSDAP in Austria, which was (for Germany) the 
prerequisite for negotiations. 39 Furthermore, the NSDAP had 





The government was seen as the vicious party, while 
were seen as innocent bystanders in the purge. 40 
Legation in Vienna urged Berlin not to compromise 
negotiating with Dollfuss. Because the government 
seemed ready to collapse, Germany drew a hard line, refusing to 
give Dollfuss any kind of opening with which to strengthen his 
position. 
The confusion of the entire situation was only deepened 
during the month of March, 1934. The conflicting attitudes of 
pressure applied by the party in Austria and the apprehensions 
over overt opposition in the German Foreign Ministry came into 
direct confrontation. The proposed plot quietly scheduled by the 
Austrian NSDAP for March 15 (behind Germany's back) had been 
averted when word of the plan reached Berlin in January of 1934. 
But this foiled scheme did not dishearten the NSDAP in Austria. 
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Bombings had continued throughout the winter, with the exception 
o£ the period during the Civil War, when the Doll£uss regime did 
most o£ the shooting. The party was becoming increasingly 
impatient. The inactivity £rom Germany disappointed the hardline 
radical Nazis, and the German Foreign Ministry was well aware o£ 
their dissatis£action. On March 15, the director o£ the South-
eastern department, Gerhard Kopke, cabled German Ambassador Rieth 
in Vienna ordering the discontinuation o£ assaults, both violent 
attacks and attacks by the Press and Radio, upon the Austrian 
government. 41 With the destruction o£ the Social Democratic 
party, it was £elt in Berlin that the Heimwehr, led by the 
increasingly power£ul Emil Fey, was a stronger £orce within the 
country than ever be£ore, and that Doll£uss was preparing £or a 
long campaign against the NSDAP.42 Rather than become entangled 
in a military situation in Austria, the German Foreign Ministry 
advised that all attacks against the government must be avoided, 
£or £ear o£ provoking a large scale action £rom both Doll£uss 
and, even more dangerous, £rom Mussolini, which could prove 
disasterous £or the Anschluss movement. 43 In its place, Habicht 
and the Austrian NSDAP would have to rely more on party 
organization, positive propaganda £or the Nazi party, and the 
increase in membership £or diplomatic success. As Kopke wrote to 
Rieth, n . the purpose o£ this will be to make it impossible 
£or any Austrian government to rule in the long run without this, 
the most e££ective and the strongest party in the country. "44 
Upon hearing news o£ this new course o£ action, Habicht 
called on the German Foreign Minister (Neurath) to voice his 
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displeasure. By censuring his anti-Doll£uss speeches, as well as 
other anti-government propaganda, Habicht £eared that the 
possibility o£ party disintegration would greatly increase. 45 
Habicht wished to continue his boisterous attacks in order to 
counter act the propaganda used by the Austrian government to 
bring Austrians back into the £old (rumors were circulating that 
Germany would soon li£t its tourist ban, which made Doll£uss look 
as i£ he had success£ully weathered the siege).46 Hitler was 
then in£ormed o£ Habicht's complaints, which he quickly 
disallowed. The more evolutionary policy was to be £ollowed, 
with a shi£t on emphasis £or propaganda: now, speeches were to 
made showing t~e advances o£ the party, its successes, and its 
promising £uture, rather than the weaknesses and ine££ectiveness 
o£ the Doll£uss regime. 47 An attempt had to be made to build a 
mass movement, even at the expense o£ alienating some o£ the more 
radical Nazis still in Austria. 4B 
This alienation did, in £act, occur. By the end o£ the 
month, a new plot had been hatched in Lower Austria to attack the 
Austrian cabinet and take its members prisoner. The small group 
o£ activists who had designed the plan requested German 
assistance in the action, and in£ormed Ambassador Rieth o£ their 
intentions. 49 Needless to say, Rieth (as an arm o£ the GFM) was 
taken aback by this suggestion. He hastily in£ormed these 
plotters that their suggestion was not consistent with German 
aims at the moment. 50 Soon therea£ter, Rieth noti£ied Berlin o£ 
the plot, suggesting that, " • appropriate steps be taken to 
stop this action. "51 For £ear that Rieth's re£usal had not 
persuaded these Nazis to desist £rom taking action, Hitler 
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contacted Habicht on April 3 requesting that, " . you would 
also take the necessary measures there to prevent any plans that 
might possibly still exist in spite of this. "52 German policy 
was now plain for all to see: the revolutionary tactics desired 
by the Austrian National Socialists were unacceptable. A more 
gradual policy was now the only way to bring the Nazi party into 
power in Austria. 
The impatient Nazis, however, could not sit on their hands. 
By the end of April Nazi terror in Austria began a steady 
increase from the winter of 1934. On the 27th came the attempted 
assassination of Heimwehr leader Emil Fey.53 Throughout May, 
June, and July, the intensity of violent actions by Austrian 
Nazis grew by leaps and bounds. As Jurgen Gehl writes; 
During March and April (1934) the Austrian Nazis followed 
Hitler's order that all extreme activities were to be 
stopped. When these tactics yielded no immediate results 
the Austrian radical elements resumed their terrorist 
activites. 54 
The NSDAP was in a bind. Negotiations with Dollfuss had been 
suggested a number of times, but had consistently fallen 
through. 55 Some young militant Nazis, certainly dissatisfied 
with the Dollfuss regime, were leaving the party in favor of 
"militant Communist Organizations",56 which were unafraid of 
flexing their muscles. The Nazi party needed to retain this 
element within their ranks in order to maintain the aura of 
strength and power, yet the only way to do so was to pursue a 
violent policy against the Austrian government, which was 
strictly forebidden in Berlin. Just as threatening was the 
notable increase in power of the Dollfuss regime, due both to the 
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almost complete dexeat ox the Marxist element in Austria and to 
a new constitution produced by the government on April 30. The 
Italian inxluence in the Heimwehr and on Dollxuss was easily 
recognizable, pulling Dollxuss more and more into a Mussolini -
orbit. 57 The outlook was indeed bleak for the NSDAP. 
The German Foreign Ministry was also well aware ox the 
problems xac~ng Nazism in Vienna. The impatience ox the party 
was recognized by Franz von Papen in Berlin, who, near the end ox 
May, recorded the dixxiculties ox the situation. Realizing the 
impulse in the Austrian ranks to act, Papen saw that such 
pressure would be in vain, and that even with the help ox the 
Austrian Legion in Bavaria, an attempted putsch would not have 
enough power to succeed. 58 In his memorandum, Papen noted two 
interesting points, both ox which were to become important parts 
ox the story in the ensuing months. Papen claimed that due to 
Mussolini's wariness toward Germany, Gleichschaltung could only 
exxectively be obtained axter some kind ox agreement had been 
reached with Italy.59 A meeting between the two parties must 
take place, with Germany securing some kind ox approval xrom 
Mussolini. Moreover, Papen mentioned an interesting rumor that 
was slowly circulating among high Nazi oxxicials; it was reported 
that certain elements ox the Austrian Army, specixically the 
ofxicer corps, were pro-Anschluss. 60 Due to the importance of 
the military in any uprising, this inxormation was certainly ox 
great interest to the German government. Ix the Army could be 
convinced 
government, 
to xollow the NSDAP in an action against the 
success might, in fact, be possib~e. The only 
question now was, were they (the Army) ready to become involved 
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in active putsch? The answer to this question would prove to tip 
the scales against the Nazis in July. 
In Austria, meanwhile, the situation was becoming more tense 
by the day. As May drew to a close, a confrontation between 
Austrian Nazis and the Heimwehr appeared to be inevitable. On 
the Austro-German border, a high concentration of Heimwehr 
formations were provoking members of the Austrian Legion. 61 Both 
sides had fired upon one another, and Neurath anxiously requested 
that measures be taken to relieve the pressure in that area. The 
South-eastern department of the GFM was convinced that either 
insurrection or open revolt would soon occur, due primarily to 
the threat of martial law imposed by the government. 62 In the 
face of direct orders from Hitler and the German Foreign 
Ministry, the Austrian NSDAP was creating the confrontational 
situation feared most by those of rank in the German government. 
On June 15 and 16, Hitler traveled to Venice to confer with 
Mussolini in a meeting foreseen by Papen the month before. While 
the conference was officially proclaimed as a meeting to improve 
German-Italian relations in general, the main topic of the talks 
was the Austrian situation. 63 Hitler quickly initiated the 
Austrian discussion by conceding that an Anschluss was not 
feasible at that time, and that he had no demands for the 
political preference of the leader of the Austrian state as long 
as he had an "independent outlook" on the situation. 64 The only 
demand Hitler really made was that national elections be held to 
represent the attitudes of the Austrian people (which, he was 
sure, would reflect an overwhelming support for the NSDAP, 
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forcing their inclusion into the government).65 Mussolini had 
little to say in regard to these statements; he found them 
irrelevant to the current situation where no elections could 
legally be held at all. The Austrian obstacle was a big one in 
Venice, and neither Hitler nor Mussolini came away from the talks 
feeling that a closer bond had been forged between them. 66 
The failure of this meeting only reaffirmed the beliefs in 
the more radical sections of the party that a peaceful, 
diplomatic "Gleichschaltung" was all but impossible. On June 25, 
Habicht met with various leaders of the Austrian Nazi party 
leaders in Zurich to discuss their situation. Among those 
present was Fridolin Glass, founder of the newly formed Austrian 
55 5tandarte 89 (which was composed mainly of ex-Austrian 
soldiers who were members of the N5DAP).67 Glass proposed that 
his unit attack and kidnap the Austrian cabinet, while also 
seizing the Austrian radio and telephone headquarters, in an 
effort to present the Nazis with a situation to set up a new 
government. 68 While the plan was not officially considered, this 
was the first mention of the eventual putsch of July 25. 
The month of July was marked by a noticeable build up of 
propaganda and anxiety in both German and Austrian Nazi circles. 
The GFM, realizing that the Austrian Legion was responsible for a 
number of terror bombings across the border, frantically 
contacted the Ministry of Interior, requesting that all 
connections between Germany and the Legion" be dropped 
immediately. The foreign press had discovered that Germany was 
responsible for supplying the Legion with the exp~osives used in 
terrorist activities, and were lambasting Germany in their 
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respective newspapers. 69 
In Austria, 
time in Munich, 
the leaders oz the Nazi party again met, this 
to discuss the proposal by Glass, who brought 
zorward interesting inzormation; " 
negotiations' with Dr. Steinhausl, 
he had had 'positive 
a senior pro-Nazi oz the 
Vienna police, with the commander oz the police emergency squad, 
and with two unnamed Army stazz ozzicers. "70 Papen's curiosity 
concerning the availability oz the Army during a putsch was now 
seemingly answered, and the conspirators agreed to set the date 
zor the putsch on July 24, when the cabinet was to next meet. 
Hermann Reschny, the disgruntled leader oz the SA, was also 
present at this meeting, 
According to the plan, 
and did not like what he was hearing. 
while the SS Standarte 89 was busy 
controlling 
zorces in 
the government, the SA would occupy any resisting 
who had the outer - regions oz Austria. Reschny, 
masterminded the zoiled plot in January oz 1934, was not terribly 
excited with the prospect oz playing second ziddle to the SS, 
especially azter the news oz the Rohm purge, two weeks earlier. 
Upon hearing the plans zor the putsch, Reschny secretly gave the 
inzormation to the Austrian security zorces. Because he zeIt 
(correctly) that the SA would not be properly armed zor an open 
conzrontation with the Army zor a number oz months, Reschny 
rezused to notizy the SA leaders around Austria. As a result, 
When the putsch zinally did occur, a number oz SA leaders were 
completely shocked, 
lack oz orders. 71 
and did nothing to zurther the revolt due to 
Jurgen Gehl argues that Hitler himselz was converted to the 
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plan by Habicht, who now rushed to the Chancellor to get the 
support of his superior. Based on Glass' report, which was 
certainly not complete, Habicht convinced Hitler that the 
Austrian Army was willing to act against the government in an 
effort to support an Anschluss. Hitler found this information to 
be most illuminating, and cQnsistent with his own beliefs. If he 
could get a force from within the state to achieve that which he 
wanted to achieve, he could obtain his goals without dirtying his 
own hands. 72 Hitler argeed to the plan, and assured Habicht that 
if the Austrian Nazi party did in fact receive the support of the 
armed forces, Germany would be able to give the new Austrian 
government political (but not military) support. 73* The Austrian 
N5DAP, armed with an enthusiastic group of people to carry out 
the putsch, the (supposed) support of the Austrian police and 
military, as well as a tacit agreement from the Fuehrer himself, 
was finally in a position to take control. 
Regardless of whether or not Hitler actually knew of the 
planned putsch, the operation commenced in both Munich and 
Vienna. The plan called for 55 troops to occupy the Austrian 
chancellery, holding the entire cabinet (including Fey and 
Dollfuss) hostage. The National Radio Center, as well as the 
* In retrospect, it is, indeed, difficult to accept Gehl's 
theory that Hitler knew of the plan and offered his support to 
it. He had consistenly followed the advice of the GFM on the 
Austrian issue, and their policy was set upon an evolutionary, 
rather than revolutionary, conclusion. The sudden shift in 
Hitler's attitude as is suggested by Gehl is in direct opposition 
to his behaviour befor this alleged meeting. Furthermore, the 
source given by Gehl as confirmation of the Habicht-Hitler 
meeting, Hermann Goehring, cannot be considered as completely 
reliable. I am of the opinion that the remarks made by Goehring 
during the war crimes trials were very often fabricated to either 
shift blame from one person to another, or to enhance his own 
role in important events. 
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Viennese telephone service, would be simultaneously taken, with 
continuous announcements· given proclaiming both the downzall oz 
the Dollzuss government and the creation oz a new government 
based on the Nazi-German model. Upon acceptance oz the new 
government by the Dollzuss cabinet, the hostages would be zreed 
and the Nazi cabinet would take its place~ Naturally, this plan 
hinged on the support oz the Austrian Army, as well as the police 
force, without whom the entire process would be zutile. 74 
The SS unit was primed and ready to act on July 24. But news 
arrived from inside sources revealing that the cabinet meeting 
planned zor the 24th had been postponed until noon the next day. 
The Nazi plans were pushed back accordingly. 75 
At one o'clock on the 25th, 154 members oz the S8 troop 
approached the Chancellery disguised as policemen and Austrian 
troops. They were admitted into the building by the police guard 
without incident, and, upon entering, proceeded to physically 
over-power the interior guards and secure the area. 76 Dollzuss, 
warned oz the plot by the Austrian police shortly bezore the Nazi 
terrorists entered the building, had enough time to dissolve the 
cabinet bezore it was taken by the National Socialists. * As a 
result, when the Nazis burst into the cabinet room, only a 
handful oz dignitaries were present, and all of them were 
* Gehl believes that Fey and the Heimwehr were aware of the plot 
well before hand, but were also planning against Dollzuss, 
thereby rezusing to let him know oz the putsch in time for him to 
escape. Pauley, on the other hand, claims that the police were 
informed of the matter 24 hours bezore it occurred, but due to 
incompetancy, were only able to inzorm Dollzuss oz the plan 45 
minutes before it occurred. Regardless oz this disparity, it is 
obvious that Dollzuss knew of the putsch, but had only enough 
time to quickly dismiss his cabinet. 
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expecting the terrorists (Why the Nazis were allowed entrance 
into the Chancellery without meeting any opposition is still a 
mystery). The Nazis had hoped to put their plan into effect 
without violence, but were unable to fulfill this hope. The 
Chancellor, in an effort to escape the building through a side 
exit, was shot in the neck by an SS man, and died during the 
course of the day due to a lack of medical attention. Emil Fey, 
meanwhile, who had been in the cabinet session when Dolfuss was 
forced to dismiss it, had called up his Heimwehr units, as well 
as the Austrian police, which quickly surrounded the building. 
After long negotiations, most of which centered around a free 
passage to Germany for the conspirators, the SS troops were 
forced to surrender. 77 
At the Austrian National Radio station, 15 Nazis had 
successfully occupied - the area, but had failed to drum up any 
kind of support. One brief message was given over the air that 
the Dollfuss government had given way to a new one, led by the 
National Socialist party, which was supposed to be the signal for 
a mass uprising; but this announcement was too short to be 
effective and, inexplicably, was not followed by any others of. 
the same vein; in fact, no information was given of any kind 
throughout the day. The Austrian Nazis simply played records 
that afternoon. 78 
A good deal of sporadic fighting from SA units did occur 
during the days following this failed attempt, but they were too 
~ 
disJointed to make much of an impact on the Austrian government. 
Many of the SA men who did not receive instructions (due to 
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Reschny's intrigues) rexused to help the SS because ox the Rohm 
purge in Germany. Those who did participate in the rebellion 
were simply overwhelmed by the Heimwehr, police, and Austrian 
Army, all ox whom were expected to Join the uprising to some 
extent. In some areas, the SS rex used to help the rival SA in 
the xighting, perhaps because they knew that in Vienna the SA had 
not assisted the SS Standarte 89 in the Chancellery.79 Fighting 
continued xor a number ox days axter the surrender in Vienna, but 
the suspense was over, and the putsch had obviously xailed. Most 
ox the 80r. ox the population tagged to support the putsch merely 
watched the proceedings with great curiosity:80 they had seen 
the destruction ox the Marxists in February, and they were now 
witnessing the dexeat ox the Nazis in July. 
The dexeat o£ the Nazis naturally had disasterous exxects 
upon German xoreign policy. Much to the embarrassment ox the 
German government, it was revealed that Ambassador Rieth had 
agreed to grant saxe conduct passes to the conspirators, which 
obviously implicated Germany in the plot. 81 Furthermore, 
Mussolini had ,been expecting Dollxuss in Rome within the week, 
and had been entertaining his xamily in the Italian capital when 
news ox the assassination reached him. The dixxiculty ox telling 
Frau Dollxuss ox her husband's death only deepened his 
displeasure. The Italian Army mobilized, sending a number ox 
divisions to the Austro-Italian border, and did not enter the 
country only upon learning ox the complete xailure ox the coup.82 
Fingers were pointed toward Hitler and the German government, as 
the plot smelled much like a German-led operation.' 
Indeed, there were a number ox German oxxicials who knew ox 
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the plot. While Ambassador Rieth was caught unaware of the plot, 
his subordinates, Counselor of Legation Altenburg and Military 
Attache Muff, were well informed of the plan, and even helped the 
conspirators in their scheme. 83 In Berlin, the Ministry of 
Propaganda knew of the plot, and issued a hasty communique 
declaring the success of the uprising and revealing details of 
the plot before they had actually occurred. 84 Whether or not 
Hitler knew of the plan is debatable; if he did not know, 
however, it would appear odd that so many of his subordinates 
knew of the plot without his knowledge. 
Regardless of whether or not Hitler approved of the 
operation, the attempted putsch was undoubtedly originated in the 
minds of the Austrian Nazi leaders. The NSDAP in Austria planned 
and implemented the coup on its own initiative, although it did 
receive German support in the form of weapons and explosives, 
which Germany had been supplying for over a year. 
plot was led by Habicht and the Austrian SS, 
Because the 
it has been 
suggested that, "The July Putsch was as much a last, desparate 
effort by Habicht to regain control of the Austrian NSDAP as it 
was an attempt to overthrow the Dollfuss regime. "85 This is not 
an entirely far-fetched idea, for we have seen that Habicht was 
not in agreement with those in the German Foreign Ministry, nor 
with Hermann Reschny. I do feel, however, that the putsch cannot 
simply be dismissed as a show of strength, a move to consolidate 
power, or an act of defiance in the face of the Third Reich. It 
is vitally important to note that the forces which overwhelmed 
the Chancellery on the 25th, and which battled unsuccessfully 
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with the Heimwehr and Army in the outer regions on the £ollowing 
days, did so voluntarily, and with an enthusiasm matched 'only by 
the solemn £eeling o£ committment to the movement. This was a 
genuine demonstration o£ the desparate nature o£ the entire party 
(with certain notable exceptions, o£ course - - i.e. Reschny>, 
rather than by a small number o£ highly placed individuals. The 
radical young Nazis were in£luencing other party members, and 
the failure o£ negotiations between Doll£U8S and Habicht, as well 
as those between Hitler and Mussolini, had convinced many 
Austrians that revolution was the only suitable means £or any 
kind o£ victory, regardless o£ the opinions held in Berlin. 
The actions by the party were, o£ course, entirely 
counterproductive £or the Anschluss movement. The NSDAP, the 
only real spokesman £or a union, was £ormally disbanded by Hitler 
on August 7, although he did set up a relie£ £und £or re£ugees 
£rom Austria. 86 The Austrian Legion, which had caused so much 
anxiety with its mere presence, was moved North, away £rom the 
Austro-German border and away £rom trouble-making. 87 Habicht was 
released £rom his duties as Landesleiter o£ the Austrian party, 
and his headquarters in Munich was dismantled. 88 Hitler was now 
£orced to completely dissociate himsel£ £rom the Austrian NSDAP 
in order to save £ace in £ront o£ France, Great Britain, and, 
especially, Italy. German inter£erence in Austrian a££airs was 
now to come to a standstill.89 
German policy towards Austria now took on a new £orm, as did 
the role o£ the party in Austria. Ambassador Rieth's blunder in 
agreeing to guarentee the putschists' sa£e passage to Germany 





Franz von Papen (who had barely escaped execution during the Rohm 
purge) • The conservative attitude o£ Papen was completely 
consistent with the evolutionary process long espoused by the 
diplomatic corps, and recently accepted by Hitler. Upon Papen's 
arrival in Vienna, the American Ambassador to Austria, George 
Messersmith, noted that, "It was his business to see that the 
Anschluss was brought about peace£ully."90 Hitler, by sending 
the peace-minded Papen to Vienna, was obviously serious about 
maintaining a strictly evolutionary policy in Austria. The mood 
£rom Berchtesgaden became one o£ thinly disguised demoralization. 
These somewhat empty hopes were illustrated in a letter written 
by Rudol£ Hess to an inquisitive party member on August 21: 
Let me assure you that, despite everything, the designs now 
taken by the Fuehrer in respect o£ National Socialism in 
Austria will one day, and in a per£ectiy legal manner, 
enable all your wishes and ours regarding Austria to be 
£ul£i,lled. 91 
The defeat of the July putsch had put Germany back@ square one. 
and the government was well aware o£ the long road which now lay 
ahead o£ it. 
The Austrian party, too, took on a new heading. The NSDAP 
had attempted to £orce its entry into a violent 
and without active support German allies. 
been pressuring the Doll£uss regime with terrorist 
activities £or months on end, and had o£ten £orced the Austrian 
Chancellor into making anti-Nazi decrees. Granted, Doll£uss was 
opposed to the NSDAP £rom the beginning o£ his reign, but it can 
not be argued that the National Socialists did nothing to 
antagonize the Austrian leader. But now, a£ter the £ailure o£ 
74 
the putsch, the party took on a new role. As Gerhard Weinburg 
astutely notes, 
The role oz the Austrian party hencezorth would not be to 
take over power inside the country but to provide a vehicle 
for taking over zrom the outside by zorce or under threat oz 
force. 92 
During 1933 and the zirst half oz 1934 the relationship between 
the party and the German government had been dizzicult to 
pinpoint. Both sides used the other in one zorm or another: the 
Nazis in Austria obtained explosives and politically rhetorical 
backing from the German government, while Hitler and his 
government saw the party as a means oz gaining at least a 
Gleichschaltung in the Austrian government. But now, with the 
German government stung and licking its wounds zrom its 
connection (or apparent connections i. e. Rieth) with the 
putsch, the Austrian party could not expect much overt help zrom 
across the border. -Now the party would take on the role oz a 
puppet organization, as Hitler became the one pulling the strings 
and inducing the other to dance as he saw zit. 
As 1934 drew to a close, the German policy oz an 
evolutionary pursuit oz entry into Austria was an undebatable 
one. The alternative had been tried and had zailed. The party, 
outlawed in Austria and disowned in Germany, was much more worse 
ozz than it had been bezore the attempt. Germany, not the 
Austrian NSDAP, was now in the driver's seat, and it was intent 
upon making the drive as slowly and deliberately as possible. 
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The failure of the July putsch caused an enormous shift in 
the attitudes and outlooks of the maJor characters in the story. 
The German government and the Austrian Nazi party were sent 
reeling from their defeat, and were forced to re-evaluate the 
situation and their own methods of bringing about an Anschluss 
with Germany. The Austrian government, along with Mussolini, was 
now Justifiably alarmed and wary of the volatile party. With its 
new leader, the ex-Minister of Justice and Christian Socialist 
Kurt Schuschnigg, the Austrian government found itself depending 
on the help of its Italian neighbor for its very survival. These 
four actors the Austrian Nazis, the Austrian government, the 
German government, and the Italian government -- scurried to find 
acceptable and effective policies to further their own needs. 
Each participant eyed the others cautiously and suspiciously, 
searching for a way to discredit its opponents, to consolidate 
its own strength, and to make its allies tow the line. 
The initial reactions to the putsch in late July and August 
were, naturally, quite varied. German policy toward Austria was 
particularly influenced by the attempted coup. Hitler and the 
German Foreign Ministry were now adamant in their demands that 
only a peaceful policy could be pursued in Austria. A number of 
approaches were taken by the GFM to deter the Austrian NSDAP from 
~ continuing its violent approach to the problem of Anschluss (or 
! , 
at least of Gleichschaltung). Customs officials' on the German 






the smuggling o£ explosives into Austrian territory. 1 It was 
generally recognized in the German hierarchy that most o£ the 
weapons and explosives used by the party in Austria were, indeed, 
manu£actured in the Reich and then brought into the republic £or 
terrorist purposes, all o£ which was' condoned by the German 
government. Now, the £irst step toward Nazi disarmament was 
enacted by the Fuehrer himsel£, Adol£ Hitler. He had o££icially 
dismantled the party in August 1934, in an e££ort to silence his 
critics abroad and to appease those whose opinion was o£ 
importance to Hitler, namely his own Foreign Ministry and the 
Italian Prime Minister. The entire Nazi-German hierarchy caught 
onto this new policy outlook, and convincingly espoused its 
evolutionary bent. In a communique with Counselor o£ Legation 
Altenburg, Rudol£ Hess and Martin Bormann argued that because o£ 
the Austrian government's re£usal to legally recognize the NSDAP, 
the, 
existence o£ the party in Austria would only entail 
£resh and heavy sacri£ices, which would £rom the outset 
prove to be senseless and purposeless. 2 
The message continued to plead £or the discontinuation o£ 
Austrian Nazi gatherings, as well as anti-Austrian propaganda. 
Inter£erence in Austrian political a££airs was now deemed £utile, 
and even detrimental, to the cause. 3 
Perhaps the most vivid evidence o£ Hitler's commitment to an 
evolutionary policy was his appointment o£ Franz von Papen to the 
German Legation in Vienna. Papen was a well known proponent o£ 
the evolutionary process, and was an unquestionably astute 






Job a clear-cut one. He was to mend the wounded zeelings and 
accusing attitudes oz the Austrian government and people. The 
disbanding oz the party was, in a grand sense, the most 
convincing move that could have been made to settle the anxiety 
zeIt by the members oz the Austrian government. While this 
action was a genuine attempt to halt the violence oz over-zealous 
Nazis, it must also be understood that this was merely a change 
in strategy, rather than an abandonment oz the goal oz Anschluss. 
Azter the zailed July putsch, Papen's evolutionary policy was 
zormulated on the idea that because Austria distrusted Germany so 
much, the only way to get back into good graces with Austria 
would be to allow Germans and Austrians to mix, and to recognize 
the superiority oz German intellect and culture. This could only 
be done with the lizting oz the tourist ban, which would allow 
the rebuilding oz trust between the two states. 4 
In Berlin, the German hierarchy was walking a very thin line 
on rather shaky ground. As a corollary to the disbanding oz the 
party, Germany had cut ozz its zunding to the Austrian Nazi 
groups. 5 Money that had once been used to publish anti-
government propaganda, buy weapons, and pay zor demonstrations 
was .now unavailable zor the Austrian party. At the same time, 
however, a reliez zund which had been operating bezore the putsch 
was continued. This zund, the "Fluchtlingshilzwerk" sent money 
to the zamilies oz executed or arrested Austrian Nazis to the 
tune oz nine million Marks in 1935 alone. 6 In doing so, the 
German government was encouraging party members to stay in 
Austria, rather than zlee to Germany where they were beginning to 
be a burden on the Austrian Legion camps. Oz course, the more 
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Nazis in Austria, the more internal support Hitler would have 
when "the day" arrived. In addition to this economic relie£ 
(which was tolerated by the Austrian government), other £orms o£ 
inter£erence were instigated by the German government. A meeting 
was called in the early autumn o£ 1934 to discuss the 
possibilities o£ using imports £rom Austria so that they would 
bene£it only the party in some way.7 
And yet these actions by the German government were mild in 
comparison with its previous policies toward Austria. The 
nurturing o£ the Legion, the selling o£ weapons to the party in 
Austria, and the cooperation o£ Germans in Vienna were much more 
overt and in£luential than the rather small-scale operations 
centering around relie£ £unds and import-tampering. Hitler was 
strict with his insistences o£ tranquility within Austria. As 
late as April, 1936, - Germany was adamant in its anti-violent 
approach. Upon learning o£ plans to £orm SA terrorist groups, an 
order was sent to R~schny in Austria stating; 
The Fuehrer most strictly £orbids any such action. You are 
requested. . to exert in£luence over the Austrian SA men 
to this e££ect. Were it to be established that there exist 
connections between the Reich and Austria which could be 
associated with terrorist outrages, the Fuehrer would be 
compelled to take ruthless measures against the 
instigators.~ 
From August, 1934 until July, 1936, Hitler and his government 
actively sought to dissociate themselves £rom anything that 
remotely resembled a repeat o£ the July £iasco. The Austrians 
had already bungled up the Job once be£ore: Germany was not 
ready £or them to do it again. 
The Austrian party was in a precarious situation £ollowing 
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the putsch attempt. Their exxort to discredit the government by 
showing its weakness when under attack had backxired completely. 
In xact, the government now took on the role ox the only savior 
in Austria. Within the span ox six months, the Austrian 
government had conxronted and beaten back both the Marxist 
element and the terrorist problem in the Republic, and had done 
so on its own. Dollxuss now appeared as a martyr, while all 
opposition parties (especially the Nazis) were perceived as the 
dexeated villains. 9 What was more, the party had lost a good 
deal ox popular sympathy during the putsch because, "taxes had to 
be raised to repair damaged public property. "!O The coup had 
been a total xlop. 
The disowning ox the Nazis by Hitler naturally demoralized 
the party, and literally set the program back to square one. 
With no centralized headquarters in either Austria or Munich, the 
disorganized party xaced the danger ox completely disintegrating. 
Although anxious to avoid direct contact with the party, Germany 
realized that the complete demise ox the party in Austria would 
destroy any chance ox Anschluss. An operation was "suggested" to 
the Austrian party, and quickly implemented by the Nazis. While 
urged to disband, the Nazis had also been encouraged to Join 
other groups in Austria in an exxort to inxiltrate and inxluence 
the political parties in the Republic, specixically the Labor 
Front, where there seemed to be a growing amount ox anti-
government sentiment.!! 
In keeping with the idea ox using other political arms to 
express Nazi ideology, Nazi peasant leader Anton Reinthaller 
,-
attempted to negotiate with the government in an exxort to secure 
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at least partial legality £or oppositionists £rom the Austrian 
government during the Autumn o£ 1934. Reinthaller proposed to 
compromise with Schuschnigg, o££ering to completely destroy the 
NSDAP in name, then combine its members with the old Greater 
German party and the Landbund to £orm a nationalist opposition 
party. This new party would be included in the government and 
would sponsor a nationwide plebiscite to determine Austria's 
£uture. In return, Nazi terror (which was already slowed to a 
trickle due to lack o£ £unding Germany) would cease altogether, 
and the 1000 Mark tourist ban would come to an end. 12 
But the Reinthaller proposal su££ered setbacks £rom the 
beginning. Schuschnigg quickly realized that the new party was 
really Just a cover £or the Nazis, and that Germany would still 
be sponsoring the nationalists regardless o£ the status o£ the 
NSDAP. Schuschnigg demanded that the national opposition would 
have to actively Join the pro-government Fatherland Front i£ it 
were to be accepted into the cabinet, a condition un£athomable to 
the Nazis as an organization. On the other side o£ the coin, 
Reinthaller's relatively late arrival into the Nazi party caused 
grumblings among the "Altkamp£ers". His use o£ ex-GYP and 
Landbund members only increased his unpopularity among long - time 
Nazis, who disliked this upstart trying to take control o£ the 
party. 13 Because o£ Reinthaller's unpopularity in his own party 
and Schuschnigg's patriotic demands, the negotiations did not 
succeed. Reinthaller, who had begun to assume control o£ the 
party, quickly lost £avor among the Austrian Gauleiter, and soon 
the debate over the right£ul leader o£ the party swung into high 






Due to his lack oz success in securing an agreement with the 
Schuschnigg government, Reinthaller voluntarily stepped down as 
the leading Nazi representative in Austria in the early months oz 
1935. In his place came Dr. Hermann Neubacher, an old zriend oz 
Reinthaller's,14 and another relative newcomer to the party. 
Like his predecessor, Neubacher was not enthusiastically received 
by the Austrian Gauleiter because oz his briez association with 
the party. When Captain Josez Leopold was released zrom prison 
in mid-1935, Neubacher zound the competition too stizz to 
overcome. Leopold, azter all, was an Altkampzer, and had paid 
his political dues in the SA. Upon his release zrom Jail, the 
Captain immediately made claims to the position oz Landesleiter 
oz the party. In an ezzort to bring order to the situation, the 
Austrian Gauleiter met to arrange an acceptable compromise. 
Leopold was named Landesleiter, while Neubacher was made the 
second-in-command and top advisor to the Captain. 15 While both 
candidates zor the position oz Austrian leader were not entirely 
pleased with the situation, they did, in zact, accept the verdict 
oz the Gauleiter and prepared to begin their work in re-
organizing the party. 
Bezore the tandem could initiate their plans, both Leopold 
and Neubacher were arrested by the Austrian police zor 
distributing anti-government propaganda. 16 This naturally threw 
new light on the subJect, and zorced the Gauleiter to again 
choose a leader. Leopold had written a statement bezore his 
arrest in whicn he specizically named the man whom he wished to 
succeed him. 17 The Gauleiter, however, were not overly eager to 
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£ul£ill the Captain's wishes; he had proven to be a less than 
distinguished politician and more militant than the rather 
moderate Austrian Gauleiter had anticipated. Rather than 
relinquish the party leadership to a Leopold clone, the Gauleiter 
set up a Committee o£ Leadership with Hubert Klausner, the 
Gauleiter o£ Carinthia, as its Chairman. 18 
While the saga o£ Nazi leadership un£olded during 1935, 
another story o£ £actionalism was being per£ormed in the lower 
ranks o£ the party. The putsch had e££ected the various party 
members in contrasting ways. As 1934 drew to a close, the NSDAP 
had a number o£ di££ering branches within it. A good deal o£ 
participants, whether they were SS men in Vienna or SA men in the 
outer regions, had £elt betrayed by their "rival" para-military 
organization. The disunity o£ the ,putsch as described in Chapter 
Four certainly carried-over, and drove a wedge between the SA and 
the SSe 
On the other hand, a large section o£ Nazi party members 
despised the coup in its entirety, and were in£uriated with the 
violent tendencies o£ Habicht, Reschny, and the other members o£ 
the putsch "braintrust". To them, the revolutionary method was 
useless and could only be detrimental to the party in general. 
These moderates, led by Dr. Walter Riehl, the old DAP £igure, 
eagerly accepted the new evolutionary process espoused by Papen 
and the German government. 19 There remained, however, a radical 
element in Austria as well. Led by Leopold and with a voice in 
Berlin, in the person o£ Dr. Joseph Goebbels, the radical SA and 
SS members continued to push £or a £orce£ul resolution to the 
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problem. 20 The party in 1936 was a divided one-in a number of 
ways. A concensus could not be reached as to the proper leader 
of the party, and the only legitimate leader, Leopold, was not 
suitable to a number of party members because of his militant 
outlook. Within the party itself, the debate of evolution vs. 
revolution continued with increasing vigor. Only the 
discontinuation of funding from Germany could prohibit the 
radical elements from forcing the issue with the Austrian 
government. As F.L. Carsten argues, 
it does not seem that the National Socialist 
underground organization made much progress in 1935-36; it 
was too much hampered by internal conflicts and by the many 
arrests of activists. 21 
Problems Within the Austrian Government 
The Austrian government, however, was not able to take 
advantage of the chaotic condition within the Nazi party. While 
it was true that the government had won a huge public opinion 
victory in its defeat of both the Marxists and the terrorist 
Nazis in 1934, Chancellor Schuschnigg did not find himself in a 
very powerful position after the victory had been won. Once 
again, Austrian economic conditions proved to be a maJor thorn in 
the side of the government, while German economic successes 
magnified the problems within the Republic. In 1935, only two 
thirds of those who had held Jobs in 1929 were still employed, 
and that figure would drop even more by the next year. In 
contrast, Germany was almost back to her pre-depression 
employment figures in 1935, and closer still in 1936. 22 High 
Austrian debts, coupled with rising interest rates, increased the 
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feeling of desperation in the country. Austrians began to look 
North again, thinking the same quick-fix thoughts that they had 
had in the 1920s and early '30s. If only the tourist boycott 
were lifted I I Then more money could flow into Austria, and the 
timber and agricultural markets in Germany would be available for 
Austrian trade. 23 During the winter of 1935, the Security 
Directorate reported that, 
while one couldn't speak of the masses being enthusiastic 
about National Socialism, the public was nevertheless 
growing lethargic toward the policies and undeniable 
dynamism of the Nazis. 24 
While the party was not exactly bringing in new members by the 
droves, at le$st it was not encountering any real opposition. 
One must therefore conclude that with a somewhat healthier 
economy, the squabbling Nazi party would have been too weak to 
survive in 1935-36. 
The frightful economic conditions within Austria were enough 
to antagonize other sections of the population as well. In early 
1936, Ambassador Papen reported that both the Trade Union 
Federation and the Freiheitsbund were actively opposed to the 
policies of the Schuschnigg government. Both social and economic 
deficiencies were cited as reasons for disagreement, as well as 
the , high Austrian rate of unemployment. Papen viewed these 
organizations as possible pro-Nazi sympathizers, for Nazi anti-
semitic propaganda had caused quite a stir in Vienna. Papen went 
on to explain that these Labor groups had drawn up a political 
platform which espoused an Austrian rapprochment with Germany, an 
appeasing attitude toward the Nazi party, anti-semitic 
legislation, and the holding of national plebiscites. 25 As is 
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obvious, dissatis£action with the government in Austria was not 
reserved solely to the Nazi party. Few were happy with the 
situation in 1935-36, and the successes o£ Germany -- the Saar 
plebiscite, increased employment, rearmament, and the "victory" 
in the Rhineland -- only increased the doubts about the Austrian 
£uture. 
Coupled with the problem o£ economic instability, the 
Austrian government su££ered another serious de£eat, which would 
seriously hamper her ability to maintain her independence. In 
April o£ 1935, France, Great Britain, and Italy had Joined to 
comprise what is now known as the Stressa con£erence. The 
Western Powers agreed to demand and protect the independence o£ 
Austria, with obvious re£erences to Nazi Germany. Mussolini had 
long been the protector o£ the Republic, and the attempted putsch 
had greatly irritated the Italian leader. But be£ore the year 
1935 had come to its conclusion, Mussolini had made a complete 
turnaround, abandoning both Austria and the Western Powers in 
£avor o£ closer relations with Germany. 
The about-£ace was largely due to the expansionist reaches 
o£ II Duce in 1935-36. The Italian con£lict in Ethiopia did much 
to alter Mussolini's priorities and alliances. As the £ighting 
in A£rica deepened, so, 
Italian £oreign policy. 
too, did the European opposition toward 
With France and Gr~at Britain in the 
lead, the League o£ Nations pleaded with Mussolini to reconsider 
his actions against Ethiopia, while the £oreign press attacked 
Italy's gluttonous appetite. Germany, however, re£used to Join 
the chorus o£ denouncements and negotiations £or peace. Instead, 
Hitler ordered that all unsympathetic press comments regarding 
89 
the presence o£ Italy in Ethiopia be stopped immediately.26 
Ethiopian representatives in Germany were denied their requests 
£or loans and arms. Mussolini noted that, "Germany did not 
support Italy's enemies, "27 and gravitated toward Germany as an 
ally. Throughout 1935 and 1936 Mussolini continually moved away 
£rom the reprimanding Western Powers and toward the more 
accepting German £oreign policy. 
This, o£ course, could only spell doom £or Austria. Along 
with Mussolini's change o£ heart came his in£luence over and 
approval o£ German tactics. Schuschnigg recognized that with 
Germany's conciliatory gestures toward Italy came Mussolini's 
acceptance o£ a number o£ German policies; most importantly, its 
Austrian policy. Without the support o£ Italy, Schuschnigg 
understandably £elt somewhat uneasy about his position with 
regard to the Austrian -Nazis and the German government. 
The £inal blow to the Austrian position came in the spring 
o£ 1936, when Schuschnigg was "asked" to do something to settle 
the situation in his country by decreasing the importance and 
power o£ the anti-Nazi Heimwehr party by "the new" Mussolini.2B 
The next month, in April, Schuschnigg drastically reduced 
Heimwehr e££ectiveness both by reinstating conscription <which 
would deplete the Heimwehr's ranks) and by cutting o££ £inancial 
assistance to the party.29 Schuschnigg, a Catholic with 
sentiments similar to those o£ Doll£uss toward his religion, did 
not trust the £ascist Heimwehr party anyway, and £elt no qualms 
,..... 
! 
when he o££icially outlawed the Heimwehr, and all other para -
military organizations £or that matter, in October. 
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Regardless ox this ~istrust, 
himselx in a position which all 
however, Schuschnigg now xound 
statesmen must dread. His 
economy was in shambles. His unoxxicial European protector, 
Mussolini, had deserted him in xavor ox his worst enemy. The 
only other European states capable ox sheltering him Great 
Britain and France -- had shown their lack ox backbone in March, 
1936 when Hitler had rolled, unopposed, into the de-militarized 
Rhineland. On top ox this, the only political organization that 
had supported him with any kind ox clout, the Heimwehr, was now 
dexunct, by Schuschnigg's own hand. Worst ox all was the ever-
present lurkings ox the German government. 
was, indeed, against the wall. 
The Gentlemen's Agreement 
Schuschnigg's back 
The result ox these conditions has become known as the 
Gentleman's Agreement ox July 11, 1936. The ntreatyn was a 
compromise ox sorts, brought on by Mussolini's insistence and 
Schuschnigg's lack ox backing xrom any sources, anywhere. 
Germany and Austria had struck bargains bexore the Agreement 
in 1936. The threat ox a Habsburg restoration had produced an 
arrangement in 1935 whereby the sting ox German Press and 
Propaganda attacks were diluted in return xor a public 
renunciation ox any kind ox monarchical return. The situation a 
year later, however, was much worse xor Austria. In January , 
1936, Mussolini had met with the German Ambassador in Rome to 
discuss the Italo- Ethiopian crisis. During the course ox this 
conversation, the Prime Minister had remarked bn the closer 
relations between Germany and Italy during the recent months, and 
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the e££ect that this new relationship would have on Austrian 
political a££airs. Hassell, the German Ambassador, responded by 
con£irming the German aim o£ Gleichschaltung, saying that Germany 
would be more than happy to assure Austria's independence in 
return £or a commitment £rom Austria to take on a £oreign policy 
in a direct line with Germany. I£ Austria chose to £ollow 
Germany as a kind o£ satellite, then Germany would quickly agree 
to support any and all Austrian claims o£ independence. 3D 
Mussolini £ound little with which to disagree, and soon related 
his £eelings to Schuschnigg. 
The Austrian Chancellor was now in no position to avoid 
con£rontation with either Germany or Italy -- especially with the 
recent display o£ French and British paci£ism in the £ace o£ 
£ascist expansionism. In March and April, 1936, a scandal 
involving illegal kickback payments to press organizations, 
political parties, and civil servants had been traced to high 





o£ Insurance Supervision, had taken his own li£e 
the a££air.31 As a result o£ the ensuing uproar, 
was £orced to re-consider the government's position 
inclusion o£ opposition party members into the 
cabinet. Some kind o£ a change was needed. Much to the dismay 
o£ a number o£ high ranking Austrian o££icials, a list o£ 
oppostionists, headed by Arthur Seyss-Inquart and Edmund Glaise-
Horstenau, had been drawn up £or Just this purpose. To Franz von 
Papen, the moment £or making an Agreement was drawing near. 32 




the early summer weeks. Finally, on July 11, the Agreement was 
signed by both the German and Austrian participants in an 
arrangement quite similar to the one discussed by Mussolini and 
Ambass~dor Hassell back in January. On the surface, the 
agreement expressed three basic statements: the German 
government officially recognized the full sovereignty of the 
Austrian state; each government proclaimed that the internal 
political structure of the other country was an internal affair, 
and that neither would interfere in each other's political 
sphere; and the Austrian government declared that it would 
"maintain a policy based always on the principle that Austria 
acknowledges herself to be a German state. -33 On the surface, 
this agreement looked like a smashing success for Schuschnigg, as 
well as a resounding defeat for Hitler. Along with Germany's 
recognition of Austrian Independence came the lifting of the 
tourist ban, which seemed like the answer to Austrian economic 
difficulties, as well as the ending of Hitler's most effective 
pro-Anschluss tool. In receiving Austria's reaffirmation of her 
nGerman-ness n, the Reich had also given-in to Austrian demands 
for the restriction of German-Austrian Nazi connections. Hitler, 
at first, was completely opposed to the Agreement. 34 
But the treaty extended far beyond this public stage. Ten 
other points were agreed upon by the two governments, many of 
which were very much to Germany's advantage. The first point of 
the Agreement officially allowed German nationals to pursue their 
political beliefs in Austria as long as they did not interfere 
with Austrian politics. While a nice gesture by Schuschnigg, 
this only haunted the Chancellery in the following years, for it 
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allowed German Nazis to enter into the country and be available 
to the Austrian party members for any number o£ services. Points 
six and seven cleared the bans set by the two states during the 
Dollfuss crisis, and reinstated both the tourist trade and new 
trade quotas between the two countries. But most important o£ 
all was the ninth point, in which Schuschnigg allowed the 
problematic oppostionists a chance to £orm Austrian politics. 
This point, in two parts, first stated that the Austrian 
government agreed to give amnesty to all national political 
prisoners who had not committed public crimes. Its second clause 
declared that the National Opposition in Austria would be 
permitted to, 
. participate in political responsibility; they shall be 
persons who enJoy the personal con£idence o£ the Federal 
Chancellor and whose selection he reserves to himself. 35 
Among their responsibilities would include the, 
• internal paci£ication o£ the National Oppositirin and 
for its participation in the shaping o£ the political will 
in Austria. 36 
With this acceptance o£ oppositionists (i.e. Nazi sympathizers) 
in the government, Hitler's (and Papen's) evolutionary aims £or 
Gleichschaltung had succeeded. Anti-government personalities 
were now to be brought into positions o£ power, and a great 
number of Nazi party members were to be unleashed onto the 
Austrian public by of£icial decree. When Hitler realized the 
success o£ the Papen negotiations, he quickly and happily 
accepted the Agreement. 
The Gentleman's Agreement in 1936 concluded the second stage 
of the move toward Anschluss. Many £actors played into this 
phase, and prohibited Schuschnigg £rom capitalizing on the 
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disgrace£ul Doll£uss assassination. The Nazi party in Austria 
was ripped apart by leadership £euds and the moderate vs. radical 
debate in 1935-36. Over 17,000 Nazis had been arrested, and 
another 40,000 had £led to German soil. The party, leaderless 
and without a popular base o£ support, seemed ready to collapse. 
Schuschnigg, however, could not muster the strength necessary to 
destroy his enemies. The economic conditions within his own 
state destroyed any possibility £or broadening his own base o£ 
support, and the dissolution o£ the Heimwehr did little to 
strengthen his position. Mussolini's dessert ion only heigthened 
Austria's precarious predicament, and helped push the' Federal 
Chancellor into the waiting arms o£ the basically silent German 
government. While the party in Austria was certainly not at its 
strongest, Schuschnigg £elt a good deal o£ pressure £rom its mere 
existence. This explains his reluctance to ride out the storm o£ 
Mussolini's departure. Germany, not yet rearmed, was not about 
to invade Austria, and Schuschnigg knew it. His £ears centered 
around his lack o£ support among the people, and the thought that 
the "dynamism" o£ the NSDAP could be enough to actively turn them 
against him. From July 11, 1936 until March 11, 1938, the party 
would increase its base o£ popular support and become more 
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The signing of the Gentlemen's Agreement broke the stalemate 
that had frozen relations between the German and Austrian 
governments, and had frustrated the most die-hard Austrian Nazis 
since the failed putsch. The first stage of the Anschluss 
situation illustrated the differing opinions within the German 
government, and was ultimately characterized by restraining 
actions from the Reich whenever the overzealous Austrian Nazis 
pushed the issue to violence. The second stage, that of extreme 
caution, served to aggravate the party, and kept the terror 
tactics (so prevalent before the putsch) to a minimum. 
Fortunately for Germany and the Austrian Nazis, neither Mussolini 
nor the Austrian government under Schuschnigg was able to 
capitalize on this period of uncertainty, and the Nazi forces 
were allowed to remain a politically influential organization, 
although not nearly as vocal as it had been during the first 
stage. The Gentlemen's Agreement in July, 1936 enabled Germany 
to gradually rebuild a foreign policy which could actively, yet 
still evolutionarily, follow a path leading toward Anschluss. 
While it was not an outwardly aggressive policy, the actions 
taken by the reJuvenated German Foreign Ministry during this 
third stage of action certainly suggest somewhat of a mild return 
to the policy, of pressure taken by the German government in 1933-
1934. 
The Austrian Nazi party, while not nearly as active in 1936-
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1937 as it had been in 1933-34, gradually rein£orced its hold on 
the position as the chie£ member o£ the national opposition, and 
increased its political in£luence £rom the second stage years. 
The party was, however, £illed with dissent, and su££ered £rom 
intense bickering between the various £actions within the 
organization. In a way, it is remarkable that the party was able 
to survive at all; the squabbles and bruised egos within the 
NSDAP certainly hampered their own e££orts o£ achieving a union 
and did little to improve the bargaining position o£ the German 
government. The £inal irony o£ the Anschluss story, however, is 
that this divided party was the most in£luential £actor in 
bringing 
1938; a 
Chancellor" Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden in 
meeting which directly led to the realization 
Austro-German union. 
The E££ects o£ the Gentlemen's Agreement 
February 
o£ the 
The meeting o£ July 11 temporarily produced a positive 
result £or all o£ the parties involved. The Agreement, which 
allowed German tourists to once again visit their Austrian 
neighbors, was an immediate boost to the Republic's economy. By 
the end o£ 1936, the German tourist trade had accounted £or over 
two million schillings in the economy, making prospects £or 1937 
brighter than they had been since 1928-29. 200,000 unemployed 
Austrians were success£ul in £inding new Jobs, as the production 
o£ industrial goods increased a £ul130r. in 1937. 1 Moreover, 
Austria had the German guarantee £or her independepce in writing, 
with the seemingly minute concession o£ agreeing to conduct her 
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foreign policy in a German manner, which in itself seemed quite 
vague. With an increasingly improving economy and an 
internationally recognized guarantee of good conduct from the 
Reich, the independence of Austria seemed stable and secure. 
The German government, likewise, could not frown upon the 
initial results of the Agreement. The lifting of the tourist 
ban, while obviously having a positive effect on the Austrian 
economy, also served to increase the nfraternization n between 
German and Austrian Nazis. The respective Gauleiter in each 
section of Austria were sent messages informing the party to 
compile lists of hotels and inns in each Austrian district which 
were run by owners sympathetic to the Nazi cause. 2 As a result, 
whenever a German tourist with strong National Socialist leanings 
(or agents from Berlin) took their vacation money into the 
country, they could also spread information and propaganda. 
Furthermore, the Agreement served to re-establish, however 
tentatively, cordial relations between the two governments. Most 
important in this sense was the Schuschnigg concession to include 
members of the opposition in the cabinet, 3 a massive step toward 
the Gleichschaltung so desired by Hitler throughout his political 
life. 
The effect of the Agreement had two effects on the Austrian 
National Socialist party. On the one hand, no one could deny 
that the amnesty of over 17,000 Austrian Nazis from prison4 was 
an effective means of pumping new blood into the rather stagnent 
organization. Among those released were a number of prominent 
Nazi figures; specifically Captain Josef Leopold, who was ready 
to make his claim to the leadership position within the party. 
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Moreover, the language o£ the Gentlemen's Agreement, which 
ensured the legal standing o£ the NSDAP, was vague enough to 
o££er the Nazis a good deal o£ £lexibility in their anti-
government activities. Bruce Pauley argues that, 
By the £all o£ 1936 the Austrian Nazis £elt bolder than 
ever. They were convinced that any attempt to suppress them 
would be construed in Berlin as a violation o£ the July 
Agreement. Even slightly anti-Nazi speeches could be so 
interpreted by German and Austrian Nazis. S 
This new ability to voice their political opinions was the £irst 
opportunity £or such expressions since the early days o£ the 
Doll£uss regime. A£ter three years o£ £orced underground work 
and silence, the Agreement o££ered the Nazis the chance to speak 
their minds. 
Not all was rosy in the Nazi camp, however. Friedrich 
Rainer, a leading moderate Nazi, expressed the general £eeling o£ 
dissatis£action £rom within the party. 6 The negotiations £rom 
whence the Agreement came had been held by Papen and Schuschnigg 
without the slightest imput £rom the Austrian party. No one had 
asked them o£ their wishes, and no one had invited the party to 
Join in the treaty. The Agreement shocked a number o£ Austrian 
Nazis, especially a£ter swallowing the humiliation o£ de£eat 
a£ter the July putsch. Jurgen Gehl notes that, 




they £ailed to overturn the regime, but 
government was now £irmly established, and 
an o££icial agreement with the German 
Many party members could not understand the reasoning behind the 
Agreement, and only saw that Germany had made concessions in the 
name o£ the Austrian National Socialists without so much as 
allowing them to be represented in the discussions. While the 
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Gentlemen's Agreement provided the party with a greater degree oz 
zreedom than they had enJoyed since 1933, the guarentee oz 
~ 
Austrian Independence and the neglecting oz the party by the 
German government disappointed and disillusioned the Austrian 
NSDAP, and served only to zrustrate them. 
Mussolini and the Italian government reacted with the memory 
oz German sympathy during the Ethiopian crisis zresh in their 
minds. Mussolini was pleased with ' the new situation, and 
expressed conzidence that the Agreement would put an end to the 
tension between Germany and Austria. 8 Germany's . azzirmation oz 
Austrian independence went zar in impressing the Italian leader; 
he zelt as iz this concession deserved an Italian response, and 
thus he a bandoned his support zor the Heimwehr when it ran into 
problems with Schuschnigg in October oz 1936. These flirtations 
of friendship with Germany were cemented barely a week after the 
Agreement had been signed, due to the commencement of the Spanish 
Civil War on July 17. General Franco's appeal to Mussolini fell 
upon attentive ears, while Hitler remained somewhat alooz from 
the entire situation. As Italy enthusiastically pumped arms, 
money, and manpower into the Iberian peninsula in an ezfort to 
destroy the Republican forces, Hitler cleverly kept his hands in 
the affair only enough so that the war's continuation could be 
ensured. As the conflict plodded along, Italy began to reel from 
the demands placed upon her by the Spanish zascists, and was 
forced to turn to Hitler for economic, military, and emotional 
support. 9 As a result, Mussolini was drawn furthe~ into Hitler's 
~~ clutches and at the same time was zorced to sacrifice his 
102 
commitment to Austria as her protector. 
much more than she needed Austria. 
Italy needed Germany 
The Gentlemen's Agreement and the ensuing events during the 
summer o£ 1936 painted a complex picture £or the three sides o£ 
the Anschluss triangle. Austria bene£itted £rom the economic 
gains made due to the li£ting o£ the tourist ban, and she had won 
a psychological victory in bringing the Germans to publicly 
recognize and respect her independence. On the other hand, she 
now £ound hersel£ quite alone in the world, now that Mussolini 
had abandoned the Republic in £avor o£ Hitler's military might. 
The Nazi party in Austria, meanwhile, was strengthened in numbers 
by the release £rom prison o£ thousands o£ her members, some o£ 
whom held great importance in the organization. 
gave the NSDAP access to political expression, 
chance to participat~ in the government. 
The Agreement 
and gave them a 
Furthermore, the 
wording o£ the Agreement was ambiguous enough to allow the Nazis 
to push their luck with little £ear o£ suppression, which could 
be argued to be in violation o£ the treaty. But the party could 
not help to £eel le£t out in the cold. It had not been invited 
to participate in discussions which greatly e££ected the 
organization, and it had been £orce-£ed the Agreement as 
something which needed to be accepted by the party in order £or 
total success to be reached. 
Finally, the German government could look at its position 
with a good deal o£ satis£action. The li£ting o£ the tourist ban 
allowed German Nazis the opportunity to "mingle" with the 
Austrian Nazis, and to £urther their common goal o£ Anschluss. 
Furthermore, Schuschnigg had agreed to recognize the party in 
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Austria, which was now to become the vehicle on which German 
policy could be implemented. Mussolini was a puppet, rather than 
a protector, and Papen had cleverly managed to ease the European 
tension by £ormally declaring Germany's commitment to Austrian 
independence (which, needless to say, ple~sed France and Great 
Britain), while not giving away anything ' concrete to en£orce this 
declaration. With the Agreement signed, Germany could now pursue 
a course which would gradually wipe out the Austrian state she 
had Just o££icially supported. As Chancellor Schuschnigg sadly 
observed, 
The real reason £or all the di££iculties was that Germany 
tacitly had an entirely di££erent conception o£ the obJect 
o£ the agreement £rom that o£ Austria. For us it was the 
maintenance and £or Germany the elimination o£ Austria as an 
entity. 10 
Germany and the Austrian Nazis 
As summer turned to £all, the two pro-Anschluss participants 
in the struggle £or Austria began to experiment with their new-
£ound status. Both the German Foreign Ministry and the Austrian 
party reacted to the new situation with great energy and thought. 
For Germany, the Agreement tore down the great barriers imposed 
in 1933, and allowed them the opportunity to sharply increase 
their use o£ the now legalized party in Austria. The party, 
however, was now thrown into the throes o£ chaos: the sudden 
in£lux o£ over 17,000 Nazis drastically rearranged the situation 
seen during the second stage. Among those released were the 
leading Nazis who, as is the case with too many cooks, spoiled 
the broth by struggling against each other rather than against 
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the Austrian government they were trying to overthrow. Both the 
German government and the Austrian NSDAP continued to push toward 
the ultimate goal oz Anschluss; but the road was not to be an 
easy one. 
The basic German outlook toward Austria in 1936-37 must be 
recognized as dizzering only slightly zrom that oz 1935-36. 
While new ideas and aims were conceived during this third stage, 
they were all based on the evolutionary precedent set two years 
bezore, azter Dollzuss' assassination. The plan was still zor 
the Austrian Nazis to lay low until the time was right, grabbing 
as much popular support as possible zor an Anschluss along the 
way. Hitler was adamant about the evolutionary tact oz his 
zoreign policy. The Foreign Ozzice had received reports that a 
number oz Austrian Nazis, visiting Berlin zor the 1936 Summer 
Olympics, had 
with the party. 
made rezerences to Hitler which connected Germany 
Hitler was inzuriated by this lack oz discretion 
and reazzirmed his commitment to the policy oz non-communication 
between the Austrian Nazis and the Third Reich. He declared that 
any Austrian party member zound communicating with Germans in 
Germany would be expelled zrom the party. 11 In conJunction with 
this order, the Foreign Ministry was most carezul to discourage 
any Nazi attempts to show overt signs oz aggression to the 
Austrian government. The GFM realized that the party was anxious 
to rebuild and resume its action against Schuschnigg, but the 
Foreign Ozzice remained zirm in its pursuit oz an evolutionary 
policy. Rather than send arms, or even large su~s oz money to 
the party, the GFM chose to handle the party with kid gloves, 
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leaving the moderate von Papen to negotiate the details pf the 
Agreement with the Austrian government. 12 Germany did not wish 
to take any chances. 
Papen, himsel:f, had his own ideas about how the Anschluss 
could and should take place. His plan centered around four main 
points, all of which clearly emphasized his own beliefs in the 
evolutionary process. The first of these ideas was to bring 
about a change in the Ministry of Security. In keeping with the 
Gentlemen's Agreement, Schuschnigg was obliged to include 
oppositionists into the government. Papen wished to put one of 
these anti-government cabinet members in the position of Police 
commander, to ensure some kind of inner assistance if and when 
times got rough. The second goal was to make sure that none of 
the men brought into the cabinet was a member of the Austrian 
Nazi party. Instead, "nationalist personalities" were to be 
used, in order to separate the NSDAP from the swirl of diplomacy: 
with no Nazis in the cabinet, the base of support for Anschluss 
would seem even broader than it really was, especially with 
oppostionists in power who sympathized completely with the Nazis, 
but who were not 'official members. The third obJect of Papen's 
plan was that of incorporating the National Socialists into the 
Fatherland Front, in an effort to camouflage Nazi actions within 




"economic pressure and patient psychological treatment with 
intensified pressure directed at changing the regime. "13 
these schemes were certainly devious and directed toward 
ignoring the solemn non-intervention promise of the Gentlemen's 
Agreement, these points certainly cannot be misconstrued as a 
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radical approach to the situation. It was, instead, the same 
type o£ gradual Gleichschaltung that had been pursued by Papen 
since his arrival in Vienna a£ter the putsch. German policy had 
not changed much; it still leaned toward the gradual inclusion o£ 
pro-Anschluss Austrians into the government by legal means. 
In November o£ 1936 these £our aims had their £irst 
opportunity to be discussed. With Italy's ice-cold shoulder 
o££ering no sympathy £or Schuschnigg and his cabinet, the 
Chancellor's State secretary, Guido Schmidt, was eagerly 
dispatched to Berlin a£ter an invitation had been received £rom 
Germany. Ambassador Papen had been working with the Austrian 
government to reach an understanding in order to bring the two 
states closer together during the Autumn months o£ 1936, and the 
text had been more or less hammered out by the time Schmidt 
"arrived. The Austrian Foreign Minister brought with him the 
sentiments o£ his Chancellor, which were quite pro-German. The 
combination o£ Mussolini's departure and the success o£ the 
Gentlemen's Agreement had encouraged Schuschnigg to negotiate 
with Germany and obtain stable relations with her, rather than 
depend on the unreliable protection o£ Benito Mussolini.14 The 
basic aim o£ the Protocol was to expand trade between Germany and 
Austria, as well as allow Austrian re£ugees to return to their 
homeland i£ in economic di££iculties. The proposal also dealt 
with the £urthering o£ cultural ties and the coordination o£ 
scholarly and media exchanges. Also important to the discussion 
was the ability o£ Germans to express their political belie£s 
while in Austria (in the £orm o£ the Hitler salute> and the 
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acceptance of Austrian innkeepers to publicly display the flag o£ 
the Reich whenever German guests patronized their hotels. 1S 
While the issues at hand were not earth-shattering in their 
importance, the simple fact that the two sides were cooperating 
says much for the improved relations between Germany and Austria. 
An important addendum to .the Protocol story must be 
considered, however. The evolutionary style employed by the 
Germans in November 1936 was accompanied by diplomatic pressures 
which had not been seen since the days of Dollfuss. As Papen 
negotiated the terms of the Protocol in early November, the 
German Foreign Ministry angrily requested that Schmidt be 
informed of German displeasure over Austrian implementation of 
the July 11 Agreement. Austria was accused of hesitating in 
fulfilling her part of the bargain; not all Nazi political 
prisoners had been rel~ased, nor had the Austrian refugees been 
officially amnestied. Furthermore, the Hitler salute and Nazi 
insignias were still denied to German citizens. Germany's man in 
Vienna, Wilhelm Keppler, was directed to bring Germany's 
dissatisfaction to Schmidt's attention. 16 This slight nudge from 
Berlin was, indeed, a maneuvre that had not been used for a 
number of years. But this kind of activity from the Foreign 
Office would gradually increase as the months passed and the 
eventual Anschluss drew nearer. While the mild push from the GFM 
was not a maJor influence in tipping the scales of the November 
Protocol one way or the other (and was not taken as an insult by 
the Austrian government), the use of such diplomatic tactics can 
be seen to have begun here, in early November of 1936. From then 
r-
on, German pressure increased gradually, until the diplomatic 
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tools o£ the trade -- letters, telegrams, and (most importantly) 
telephones -- could be enough to destroy the independence o£ a 
nation; with the help o£ £orces inside the state, o£ course. 
Throughout most o£ the third stage, however, these £orces 
within the state did not appear to be uni£ied enough to exact the 
kind o£ internal pressure necessary to bring about an e££ective 
Anschluss. The Austrian party was demolished by £actionalism, 
su££ered £rom leadership struggles, and was split by personality 
and ideology con£licts. The same rivalry (that had split the 
party during the second stage) between the moderates, now led by 
Hubert Klausner, the Carinthian Gauleiter, and the radicals, with 
Leopold at the helm, still existed in the summer and £all o£ 
1936, and would intensi£y as the third stage progressed. Due to 
the evolutionary policy o£ the Reich and Schuschnigg's £ear o£ 
radical elements in his government, the radical £action £ound 
little support and practically no place to express its desires. 
When Schuschnigg appointed Cathol~c oppositionists (Seyss-Inquart 
and Glaise-Horstenau) to his cabinet, the radicals discovered, 
much their chagrin, that the German Foreign Ministry was quite 
satis£ied with the Schuschnigg selections. As the months dragged 
on, and the more violent Nazis met with censure £rom their own 
German superiors, desparate plans began to hatch; plans which 
would go a long way to make Schuschnigg play into Hitler's hands. 
The leadership debate epitomizes the problems experienced by 
the party in 1936-37. The release o£ Nazis arrested be£ore, 
during, and a£ter the July putsch only increased tpe tension over 
who would £inally emerge as the de£inite leader o£ the Austrian 
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NSDAP. Leopold had spent most o£ the two years £ollowing the 
putsch behind bars, along with Neubacher and the other 17,000 
political prisoners. During Leopold's imprisonment Hubert 
Klausner had risen to act as the deputy leader by the vote o£ the 
Austrian Gauleiter. 17 Among those who helped the Carinthian 
leader were two young Nazis, Dr. Friedrich Rainer and Odilo 
Globocnik, who were both well-educated and energetic. These men 
were appointed to lead the political and organizational aspects 
I 
o£ the NSDAP, and were so e££ective that when Klausner brie£ly 
spent time in prison, the two young men were able to control the 
entire party by themselves. 1S 
Naturally, when Leopold was released d~ring the summer o£ 
1936, questions arose as to who would be the legitimate leader o£ 
the party. Klausner had held the post £or roughly eighteen 
months, and had at least kept the organization from sel£-
destructing. Rainer and Globocnik had shown £lashes o£ excellent 
ability as Klausner's right-hand men, and as substitute leaders 
during Klausner's short stay in prison. They also had youth on 
their side -- neither one was over thirty £ive years old. With 
Leopold's return came the obvious question of nwho will lead us?n 
This initial problem was solved without a serious struggle 
in the end o£ July, 1936. One week a£ter Leopold's release, 
Rainer and Globocnik pledged their loyalty to the Captain who, 
"modestly re£erred to himself as merely the £ederal president o£ 
a Rainer cabinet. "19 But Leopold did not trust the two leaders. 
They were, in £act, in contact with German authorities (who 
£avored them because o£ their approval o£ the July Agreement) and 
had their own plans £or assuming control o£ the party. In 
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September, Leopold dismissed Rainer, Globocnik, and a number of 
other young Nazi party members. 20 These dismissals dismayed the 
German Legation, which saw them as discouraging new membership in 
the party. 
a split 
The last thing the German Foreign Ministry wanted was 
between the old guard and the newer, more energetic 
National Socialists. 21 Although Leopold was warned not to 
disrupt the delicate balance within the party, the intense 
Austrian leader plunged ahead and splintered the already 
fragmented party to an even greater degree by dismissing Klausner 
in early October. But Leopold was not completely alone in his 
feelings 
1937, the 
of distrust for his int~rim successors. In January of 
Austrian Gauleiter met in Vienna and gave him their 
support (but 
Carinthians: 
also expressed a desire to come to terms with the 
Rainer, Globocnik, and Klausner>. Barely a week 
later, Heinrich Himmler named Leopold the official leader of the 
Austrian SS (as long as the latter was subordinate to Himmler>. 
Furthermore, on January 31 and February 1 the Austrian Captain 
was cordially entertained by both Goehring and Hitler.22 Leopold 
seemed to have the Austrian party, 
the Carinthians, at his disposal. 
with the notable exception of 
The National Opposition and the Split in the NSDAP 
As soon as Leopold's power appeared to be consolidating, 
however, a new set of rivals appeared on the scene; rivals who 
were much tougher to displace than the Carinthians. These were 
not Nazi party members, so they could not be disc~plined by the 
Leopold-led NSDAP. They could not be "disposed of" because of 
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their high visibility and obvious association with the Reich. 
The rise o£ Arthur Seyss-Inquart and Edmund Glaise-Horstenau 
completely undermined Leopold's hold on the direction o£ the 
party, and ultimately led to his £inal dismissal in 1938. 
Arthur Seyss-Inquart, perhaps the most important Austrian 
£igure during the actual Anschluss in 1938, was not a Nazi. He 
instead, a practicing lawyer with nationalist leanings, who 
was interested in the idea o£ a union with Germany, 
maintaining Austrian autonomy at the same time. 
but also in 
As has been 
previously illustrated, the only remaining maJor Austrian party 
which endorsed an Anschluss with the Reich in 1933 was the 
National Socialist party. While he agreed with the idea o£ a 
union, Seyss was opposed to any violent measures which could be 
used to accelerate the proJect. 23 Naturally, his moderation 
pleased those in the.GFM, and his non-Nazi status made him a 
prime candidate £or a position in the cabinet in both 
Schuschnigg's and Papen's eyes. Seyss' non-Nazi status helped 
him and the NSDAP immensely; because he had nationalist £eelings, 
he could represent the Nazi party. But because he was not an 
o££icial Nazi he was not arrested or persecuted by the Austrian 
government. Seyss-Inquart became a valuable liason between the 
German and Austrian governments, and o£ten received serious 
consideration £rom Schuschnigg on matters which, i£ they had been 
proposed by Nazis, would have been otherwise ignored by the 
Federal Chancellor. 24 During the months o£ caution in 1935-36, 
Seyss was £ree to act on behal£ o£ the party because he was not a 
Nazi, and there£ore a legitimate political personality.25 As 
1937 slowly progressed, Papen and Seyss, the two moderates, 
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sucked the strength out oz Leopold, and relegated the Austrian 
party to the role oz an annoying trouble-maker. 
Indeed, the instances oz 
increased markedly throughout 
or.ganized to exhibit pro-German 
Nazi aggression in 
1937. Demonstrations 




numerous plots were uncovered implicating both the German Foreign 
Ministry and the Austrian NSDAP. The appointment oz Dr. Leopold 
Tavs to the position oz Viennese Gauleiter by Captain Leopold 
only served to increase the problem. Tavs was a noted radical 
with violent intensions. With Tavs in a position oz power, the 
situation became increasingly explosive. 26 
In the zac~ oz increased Nazi activity, Schuschnigg 




process ozchoosing the oppositionist members oz 
Naturally, the radical Leopold was not a 
nor were the more moderate Nazis zor that matter. 
Their positions as Nazis made them unpalatable zor Schuschnigg, 
who wished to incorporate as moderate an oppositionist as he 
possibly could. Arthur Seyss-Inquart quickly became the zirst 
choice oz the Federal Chancellor, and he zound no arguments zrom 
the German Foreign Ozzice. The choice oz Seyss-Inquart was then 
cemented by one oz the more blatant acts oz NSDAP deziance seen 
in 1937. 
On May 2, Austrian government zorces raided an organiza -
tional ozzice oz the Austrian NSDAP. Among the booty conziscated 
by the authorities were; papers showing convers~tions between 
Nazi leaders and Reich ozzicials, evidence oz Nazi zinancial aid 
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from Berlin, anti-government propaganda orginating from within 
Germany, addresses of Austrians involved in smuggling communiques 
between Germany and Austria, and correspondences between Austrian 
S8 and German S8 officials. 27 Germany was now caught red-handed. 
She was purposefully interfering with the existence of the 
Austrian state by supporting a subversive organization which was 
intent upon destroying the Republic of Austria. 
obvious violation of the Gentlemen's Agreement. 
This was an 
One would think 
that this would give Schuschnigg the perfect opportunity to 
completely discredit and humiliate the German government, and to 
finally destroy the dangerous Austrian National Socialist party. 
But Schuschnigg refused to do so. How could he possibly gain 
from such an act? Italy, now engulfed in the Spanish Civil War 
and German aid, was of no use to Austria. France and Britain 
were not yet ready to stand up to Hitler (as was evidenced by the 
occupation of the Rhineland, Germany's open violation of the 
disarmament portion of the Treaty of Versailles, and her defiant 
departure from the League of Nations). Austria could not 
withstand the economic pressure that could be applied by Germany. 
Moreover, the refusal to fulfill his own part of the Gentlemen's 
Agreement could be enough to push Germany to use force, with the 
excuse that the Treaty had been violated. Schuschnigg reasoned 
that the only way to approach a peaceful situation with Hitler 
and the Nazis was to mix appeasement with resistance. Such was 
the approach he took. Schuschnigg appeased Hitler by agreeing to 
appoint an oppositionist in his cabinet, even though it was 
obvious that German intentions were not in Austria's best 
interests. Yet he resisted Hitler by not completely giving in to 
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the NSDAP demands o£ appointing a Nazi as the oppositionist 
representative. As it turned out, Schuschnigg's decision to 
bring Seyss into his cabinet as the State Counsellor (not a 
ministerial position) on June 16 only £urthered his own 
precarious position. 
The admission o£ Seyss into the cabinet obviously did not 
sit well with Leopold. He had been trying, unsuccess£ully, to 
get himsel£ named as the o££icial representative o£ the 
oppositionists. But Schuschnigg, and Papen £or that matter, were 
quite cool to this idea. Radical elements were vehemently 
opposed by the Federal Chancellor, and the choice o£ Seyss, the 
moderate, not only met the maJor prerequisite set down by 
Schuschnigg, but also con£ormed to the wishes o£ Papen. Leopold 
was £urious. He had so desperately wanted to show his party's 
strength (and his own importance) by landing a cabinet position. 
But Seyss-Inquart, the non-Nazi outsider, had ruined things £or 
him. As Gehl notes, 
His (Leopold's) vain attempts to obtain recognition £or the 
party reveals that the Austrian Nazis could not achieve 
success without pressure £rom the outside, and that they 
were too weak to £orce recognition £rom the Austrian 
government on their own account. 28 
Indeed, the Austrian party was not a member o£ the government. 
Schuschnigg would have nothing to do with them, and Papen had 
always pre£erred the idea o£ non-Nazis in the government to real 
Nazis. This combination shut Leopold out o£ power, and only 
heightened his already high £eeling o£ alienation. The proud 
Captain, insulted by his lack o£ recognition, t~rned on both 






Leopold had begun his tirade as early as May, 1937, when 
Papen had officially accepted the idea of allowing Seyss to 
represent the party in the government. Leopold, in a fit of 
rage, broke off all communications with the German Ambassador, 
and forbade his followers to deal with Papen in any way 
whatsoever. 29 Papen, in turn, dissociated himself from Leopold, 
thereby completing the break between the party and Germany.3D 
Leopold's followers, in reaction to Papen's retaliatory action, 
responded by spreading accusations against Papen, claiming that 
intrigue and personal gains were of more importance to the non-
Nazi Ambassador than was the ultimate success of the Austro-
German Anschluss. 31 To make matters worse, Leopold had 
confronted Seyss-Inquart upon the latter's appointment into the 
government in June. Leopold offered his cooperation only if 
Seyss would agree to a~cept a subordinate role to the Altkampfer. 
Seyss-Inquart naturally refused such a generous proposition, and 
quickly .aligned himself with the moderate elements within the 
Nazi party.32 
The inclusion of Seyss-Inquart and Edmund Glaise-Horstenau 
(a historian who shared Seyss' moderate position 
agreed to accept Glaise-Horstenau because he 
Schuschnigg 
was "most 
harmless")33 paid immediate dividends for the Anschluss cause 
at least in the eyes of the German Foreign Ministry. DnJuly 5, 
Seyss, Glaise-Horstenau, State secretary Schmidt, and Schuschnigg 
met to discuss the process by which the July Agreement could be 
completely fulfilled. Eleven issues were agreed upon, most of 
which benefitted the German cause. Among the concessions made by 
the Austrian government was a declaration assuring the legality 
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OI the Austrian branch OI the German NSDAP. Also included in the 
conIerence were agreements to li£t restrictions on the German 
media, permission to resume sales o£ Mein Kamp£ in Austria, and 
the right £or German nationals to wear swastikas while in 
Austria. 34 Gradually, the German government was si£ting its way 
into Austrian aIIairs. The Gentlemen's Agreement had broken the 
stalemate, and the moderate German policy was succeeding. 
With the Austrian agreement to allow Germany a greater hand 
in her a££airs, Hitler moved to exploit the situation. On July 
12, one week a£ter the meeting between Schuschnigg and the 
nationalists, German State secretary Wilhelm Keppler was 
appointed by the Fuehrer nto handle questions connected with 
Austria in relation to the party. n35 Keppler was in£ormed that 
his mission was to 
. issue appropriate instructions to the leaders OI the 
Austrian Party to prevent unnecessary trips to the Reich and 
not make it appear as i£ the Austrian Party were 
receiving instructions Irom the Reich which are contrary to 
the agreements made here. 36 
Keppler was also assigned to supervise the HilIswerk (which was 
still acting as the bene£actor Ior Austrian re£ugees) and the 
Austrian Legion in Germany.37 Schuschnigg's acceptance o£ both 
the July Agreement and then the secondary discussions a year 
later were huge concessions in Hitler's eyes, and he Jumped at 
the chance to get Germany back into Austrian a££airs with the 
same vitality as had been shown during the very early days o£ his 
reign. 
Leopold, meanwhile, was incensed. The addi~ion o£ Keppler 




involved, Leopold's influence would surely decline (as it 
eventually did). The Altkampfer briefly sulked, and then 
included Keppler to his list of untouchables, 
Seyss-Inquart. 3B Keppler, however, viewed 
Joining Papen and 
Leopold not as a 
dangerous element, but rather as the leader of a group of people 
who shared a differing opinion on the issue of Anschluss. As 
Leopold blustered about his rivals' lack of toughness and 
commitment, Keppler soothingly encouraged Seyss to smooth over 
the tensions between the radicals and the moderates. 39 
This request was easier said than done. During a 
demonstration held to illustrate the bond between German and 
Austrian ex-servicemen, radical Nazi forces in the crowd began to 
cause trouble. Papen, who had agreed to speak at the rally, 
ended his address abruptly as a form of protesting the 
disobediant Nazis. The disruption continued with increasing 
volume until the Austrian police were forced to disperse the 
gathering, much to the embarrassment of the German Ambassador. 40 
Upon hearing of the incident, Hitler was initially furious; the 
Austrians were suppressing the NSDAP in direct violation of the 
Gentlemen's Agreement!! Only Papen could dissuade Hitler from 
taking retaliatory measures. The party, regardless of the 
moderation espoused by Seyss, 
vociferous as ever. 
The German High Command, 
Papen, and now Keppler, was as 
however, was still adamant about 
the need for an evolutionary process toward an Austro-German 
union . On October 1, Hitler, Goehring, and von Neurath met to 
discuss an upcoming conference with Mussolini in which the topic 
of Austrian independence would most surely come up. Hitler 
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expressed his dissatis£action with Goehring's severe stand 
against Austrian legitimacy. The Fuehrer's position was 
unmistakably clear: 
Germany should cause no explosion o£ the Austrian problem in 
the £oreseeable £uture, but that we should continue to seek 
an evolutionary solution. We must merely obtain assurance 
that, in case the Austrian question were exploded by another 
party, intervention on the part o£ Germany would be 
possible. 41 
While Germany was to stay on the moderate path, she also needed 
to claim Austria as her domain. Any other state bold enough to 
obstruct the path Hitler was taking would only make matters 
worse; Germany would invade. The Austrian Party was certainly not 
£orgotten by Hitler; Leopold was not to be received by either the 
Fuehrer or the Foreign Minister. This, now, presented a problem 
£or Germany; the con£erence was in agreement that, " . we on 
our part should not o~erthrow Schuschnigg without the · certainty 
o£ a suitable successor. "42 But with Leopold's quickly £alling 
star, no able Nazi seemed in position to take control o£ the 
Austrian government i£ Germany were to be invited into the 
country. Yet the German desire £or an evolutionary conclusion to 
the Anschluss push was by no means ambiguous: Goehring's threats 
o£ invasion were to be stopped, and plans £or any kind o£ action 
against Schuschnigg were to be postponed until an adequate 
replacement could be £ound to represent the wishes o£ the German 
government. 
Meanwhile, Schuschnigg was not exactly enamored with his 
German counterparts. By mid-October, the Federal Chancellor was 
reported to be adamantly opposed to the Nazi party in Austria, 
r 
I and considered it to be the most dangerous enemy o£ the Austrian 
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people. Rumors were flying throughout Vienna that a restoration 
of the old Habsburg Monarchy was being considered, which would 
negate the need for a cabinet and destroy the legality of all 
parties in Austria. 43 Schuschnigg was Justifiably afraid of both 
his German neighbors and the political opposition in Austria. By 
suggesting a restoration, Austria was now openly defying Germany, 
and was clearly violating the Gentlemen's Agreement (which 
provided for oppositionist inclusion into the government). 
Taking this threat to German Anschluss hopes into 
consideration, the meeting held by Hitler and his generals on 
November 5, 1937 must be carefully examined. In this meeting, 
now known as the Hossbach Conference, Hitler outlined his ideas 
on the timetable necessary to acquire the "lebensraum" he so 
desparately wanted. 44 Those in attendance included Field Marshall 
von Blomberg, General von Fritsch, Admiral Raeder, Goehring, and 
Neurathi the meeting obviously had a definite military tint to 
it. The details of the meeting have been described by others 
with great precision, so it is not necessary to dwell on each 
particular point stressed by Hitler during his monolog. It is 
important to note in this study, however, that Hitler was 
explicit with regard to his attitude toward Austria: before the 
arrival of 1943-45, both she and Czechoslovakia would have to be 
incorporated into the Reich in order to strategically eliminate 
them from pursuing any kind of military action against Germany 
when the inevitable conflict with France began. Hitler also 
claimed that Austria's agricultural strength wou~d be of the 
utmost importance to the German war effort, therefore making her 
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a principal character in German foreign policy. 46 
Yet no where in the memorandum written by Hossbach (Hitler's 
secretary) does Hitler mention any kind of military action 
against the Austrian state. While Austria represented a military 
problem if Germany was to fight France (being neighbors, Austria 
flanked the Reich), Hitler did not stress any military action to 
negate the danger from the south. He would only go so far as to 
say that by 1943-45, when Germany would be forced to fight France 
regardless of the international situation, the Anschluss between 
the Reich and the Republic would have to take place. Although 
Schuschnigg was contemplating restoration, Hitler chose to stay 
on the course of evolution and not press his adversary. He was, 
after all, giving Schuschnigg six to eight years to accept the 
German offer of union by using 1943-45 as his long-term goal. 
While the Hossbach Conference cannot, or at least should 
not, be considered a nblueprintn for Hitler's foreign policy, it 
is a fundamental piece in Hitler's foreign policy puzzle. Hitler 
had obviously anticipated the intricacies of world affairs, and 
had mapped out certain scenarios which corresponded with each of 
the possible situations he foresaw. He was planning for war and 
planning on conquest; to that there is no doubt. But he was not 
laying down the guidelines to be used in the next war, nor was he 
trying to dupe his military men into agreeing with his cry for 
more armaments in an attempt to oust HJalmar Schacht (as A.J.P. 
Taylor would like us to believe>. After all, the only reference 
to economic affairs is the last sentence of the minutes: "The 
second part of the conference was concerned with concrete 
questions of armaments. "47 Obviously this conversation was not 
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the most important part oz the meeting, and was a simple 
corollary to the scenarios set down by Hitler. All that he was 
saying was that he knew there would soon be a conzlict, that 
Germany would be involved, and that iz Germany wanted to succeed 
in that struggle she would have to protect her zlanks zrom the 
growing Czech and Austrian armies. He was alerting his 
subordinates oz this and preparing them zor the oncoming trouble, 
as any good Commander-in-Chiez would do. To keep his generals in 
the dark ·would only complicate matters when decisive actions 
would need to be taken. The Hossbach Conzerence did not 
accelerate actions against Austria; it only clarizied Hitler's 
general aims and reasons behind his aims. In retrospect, by 
abstaining zrom reacting violently to the rumors oz Austrian 
restoration, Hitler showed amazing composure. He was undoubtedly 
still committed to an evolutionary policy toward Austria -- at 
least zor the time being. 
The situation in Vienna was progressing quite nicely zor 
Germany. In mid-December, Ambassador Papen was invited to 
discuss with Schuschnigg the Anschluss question and to build upon 
the Gentlemen's Agreement. Papen urged the Federal Chancellor to 
do his utmost to placate Hitler, who was preparing to act in 
events "oz the greatest historical signizicance. "48 Rather than 
implicitly £ollowing German'£oreign policy by not doing anything 
opposed to it, the Ambassador argued that a more active role was 
needed £rom Austria to convince Hitler that the Agreement was 
being honored. Hitler could very well accu~e Austria o£ 








role in playing Germany's partner . While we have seen that 
Hitler did not intend to move against Austria, it was certainly a 
good blu££; the German Ambassador was probably very sincere in 
his warnings. Papen -- the moderate -- did not want to see 
violence result £rom this issue; he was interested in pulling 
Schuschnigg into Hitler's orbit rather than trip him up in order 
to be massacred. 
Combined with Papen's pressure on Schuschnigg was an 
increase in visibility £rom the Austrian NSDAP. By December, 
1937, the party was increasing in its own standing. The SA had 
grown to 35,000 members, while the SS was being supported by 
Keppler and Himmler. The Austrian police was intimidated by both 
organizations; the SA was large enough to be dangerous, while the 
SS was regarded as the best organized section o£ the entire 
party. 49 Papen repor~ed that volkish movements were generally 
"making excellent progress" and that Nazi meetings were 
attracting more members daily.50 Moreover, Austrian authorities 
now permitted public collections o£ money £or the Nazi Hil£werk 
organization, which then supplemented "the £unds supplied by the 
Reich". 51 Yet as 1937 drew to a close, most o£ the members o£ 
the national oppostion, led by Seyss and Glaise-Horstenau, were 
in agreement that the only way to £urther the move toward 
Anschluss was to subJect Schuschnigg to "the strongest possible 
pressure. "52 
As 1938 began, the political situation in Austria was 
extraordinarily delicate. The NSDAP was £ragmented by Leopold's 
constant bickering with Seyss, Keppler, and Papen; and yet the 






organization in Austria. The SA and SS could not be wished away, 
and the growth o£ Nazi sympathizers could not be denied. 
Naturally, the threat £rom the north was o£ great concern as 
well. Germany was supplying the NSDAP with money, advice, and 
(in the case o£ Keppler) with leaders. Schuschnigg could not 
ignore the party nor the Germans £or £ear o£ stimulating 
accusations o£ treaty-breaking £rom Hitler, and thereby incurring 
the military wrath o£ the Reich. Schuschnigg was not happy with 
his position £or good reason. He was running out o£ breathing 
room. 
The Success o£ the Austrian Party 
While Schuschnigg was busy £eeling pr~ssure £rom Germany and 
the Austrian party, he success£ully kept his wits about him. In 
early January a £rustrated Seyss-Inquart requested permission 
£rom the German Foreign Ministry to resign his post as State 
Councillor in the Austria cabinet. Seyss £elt that his actions 
in the government had not been bene£icial to the cause and that 
Schuschnigg had been most £orce£ul in re£using his suggestions. 53 
While he was denied this request (to lose Seyss would be to lose 
Glaise-Horstenau as well, who would undoubtedly Join him in a 
de£ection; Germany would then have NO agents in Austria), the 
simple £act that it was made at all shows how depressed Seyss was 
with the proceedings. The Federal Chancellor was certainly 
holding his ground. 
The next £our weeks, however, shook Schus~hnigg at his 
£oundations, pushing him into Hitler's clutches. The avalanche 
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began, mildly enough, with the discovery on January 8 ox over 
10,000 postcards and pamphlets stamped as being 1938 German 
propaganda material. The evidence, xound in the car ox the Mayor 
ox Passau, pointed directly to the German Foreign Ministry as 
being in violation ox the Gentlemen's Agreement. state secretary 
Schmidt, astounded by the voluminous pile ox anti-Austrian 
materials, declared that it was the "crassest case so xar ox 
interxerence in Austrian domestic axxairs. "54 Obviously, the 
German government was not letting up in its exxorts ox destroying 
Austrian autonomy. 
The real blows, however, came at the end QX the month. On 
January 20, Schuschnigg was conxronted with reports stating that 
Leopold, the xrustated Altkampxer, was planning a coup xor the 
spring. Both the German government and portions ox the Austrian 
Army were to Join in t~e revolt against the Republic unless Nazi 
demands xor an Anschluss were met. 55 Later in the day 
Schuschnigg was told that reliable sources knew ox German plans 
to invade Austria in the spring. 
support the invasion, would 
Schuschnigg, unless he chose to 
"share the xate ox the late 
Chancellor Dollxuss. "56 Whether or not these two reports had any 
grain ox truth to them is basically irrelevant. The importance ox 
these rumors lies in that they greatly increased the tension 
within the government, and only heightened Schuschnigg's anxiety 
concerning the xuture ox his country. 
The straw that broke the Camel's back came crashing down 
upon Schuschnigg on January 25, 1938. Austrian authorities 
raided Nazi Headquarters in Vienna and conxiscated what amounted 
I to enough evidence to implicate the entire party in an act ox 
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overt treason. The Viennese Headquarters, as well as the home o£ 
Gauleiter Tavs, was £ound to be the holding area £or documents 
planning a violent couP. against the Austrian government. 
Progress toward achieving an Anschluss under the Schuschnigg 
reign was deemed impossible; there£ore the Nazis would scheme to 
agitate to such an extent that retaliation and suppression by the 
Austrian government would be the only £easible solution. A£ter 
this had happened, Hitler would be so £urious with Schuschnigg 
that an armed invasion would not only be imminent, but would be 
Justi£iable on the grounds that the July Agreement had been 
betrayed. A£ter a brie£ period o£ German occupation, Captain 
Leopold would take control o£ Austria and £orm his own 
government. 57 
This was the £inal signal £or Schuschnigg. Ambassador 
Papen, no doubt perlexed by this completely unevolutionary 




Chancellor conscious o£ the impossibility o£ letting the 
state o£ a££airs continue. "58 The time had come to do 
about the internal stri£e. The pressure was becoming 
too much. While they were certainly not the most power£ul 
organization in the world, the Austrian Nazis had the enthusiasm 
and the backing o£ the German government: two very power£ul 
assets. The Chancellor was ready to talk. 
Schuschnigg had planned to meet with Hitler at the end o£ 
the month o£ January anyway, and he seemed to have something 
concrete to say. This original meeting had been suggested late 







Toward the end o£ 1937 the Nazi underground terror was again 
in £ull swing. Telephone booths exploded, tear gas bombs 
were thrown, and mass demonstrations were arranged in order 
to induce the Austrian police to intervene. Once the police 
dispersed the crowds, Berlin protested that we did not keep 
our share o£ the bargain and allowed the persecution o£ 
National Socialism. 
At this point it seemed to me necessary to get into 
personal contact with one o£ the leading men in Germany, as 
I hoped to strengthen the 1936 agreement through personal 
intervention. 59 
But a meeting was denied Schuschnigg by German o££icials. Only 
in early January was Schuschnigg able to secure a meeting with 
Hitler; but now this con£erence, scheduled £or the last days o£ 
January, was cancelled due to problems in Germany (Hitler was 
busy expelling Generals Blomberg and Fritsch £rom his military 
sta£f).60 In the past, a cancelled meeting would not have caused 
any great alarm:' meetings can normally be re-scheduled. But the 
situation in Austria was simply too volatile £or Schuschnigg to 
stay calm. The meeting that he so desperately needed was now 
unavailable to him. 
In £rustration, Schuschnigg met with Seyss-Inquart and 
Glaise-Horstenau during the £irst days o£ February to discuss 
some kind o£ solution to the internal problems £acing Austria. 
The Federal Chancellor agreed to release all the political 
prisoners still held in Austrian prisons, develop "military, 
economic, and political relations with the Reich through the 
inclusion o£ persons £rom the ranks o£ the National Opposition", 
and give Seyss control over numerous government committees. 61 On 
top o£ the concessions, Schuschnigg asked Seyss-Inquart to accept 
a ministerial post in the cabinet, upgrading his prestige £rom 






chose to refrain from giving a reply: he had been advised by 
Papen not to commit himself yet. 
Papen, however, suddenly found himself in a precarious 
position for perhaps the first time since his close call with 
death during the Rohm Putsch in 1934. On February 4, Papen was 
mysteriously informed that he was being relieved of his position 
as Ambassador to Austria: he was being included in Hitler's 
purge to remove non-Nazis from all German government posts. This 
was not a promising sign for Schuschnigg, either, who interpreted 
Papen's dismissal as a final reJection of Germany's moderate and 
relatively peaceful policy toward Austria. 
But Papen was a survivor: he had escaped with his life in 
1934, and he would eventually elude the hangman during the War 
Crimes trials. On the 5th, the ex-Ambassador paid a visit to 
Hitler to give his final report to the Fuehrer. In order to save 
his own Job, Papen reminded Hitler that Schuschnigg was very 
interested in discussing the Austrian situation with the German 
dictator, and that. he, Papen had the ability to bring about a 
discussion. 63 Hitler, recognizing an opportunity to exploit the 
turmoil in Austria, quickly agreed with Papen that a meeting 
would be most enlightening. He had cancelled the earlier meeting 
due to internal strife. But now that he had cleansed his 
hierarchy of its non-Nazi members, Hitler could turn to other, 
more pressing matters. Schuschnigg's recent concessions to 
Seyss-Inquart clearly illustrated the Chancellor's conciliatory 
attitude toward the national opposition: the time was right for 
a meeting, and Hitler dispatched Papen to return ~mmediately to 
Vienna to arrange a meeting between the Austrian and German 
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leaders. Papen had kept his Job, Schuschnigg could speak with 
Hitler, and Hitler could now begin to push Schuschnigg into a 
corner. Papen reappeared in Vienna on February 7 to in£orm 
Schuschnigg o£ Hitler's desire to meet with the Austrian. During 
that evening Schuschnigg noti£ied Schmidt that he would accept 
the invitation and go to Berchtesgaden to see the Fuehrer on 
February 12. 64 
The Federal Chancellor was trapped. Since the ground-
breaking Gentlemen's Agreement, momentum had swung decidedly over 
to the side o£ the pro-Anschluss £orces. The Austrian Nazis and 
their German supporters had been e££ectively silenced a£ter the 
£ailed Putsch in 1934; but now Schuschnigg £ound himsel£ in a 
position where Nazi caution had been replaced by Nazi scheming 
and meddling. Germany was obviously supplying moral, £inancial, 
and material support- to the Austrian Party. The Party was 
, 
responding by applying more pressure on the government than it 
had since the summer o£ '34. Schuschnigg was Justi£iably 
concerned £or the well-being o£ his country (as well as £or his 
own sa£ety); Putsch and assassination rumors whistled through 
Vienna in early 1938, and evidence had been £ound linking the 
ever increasingly power£ul Germany with them. Now that Mussolini 
seemed to be leaning toward Germany in order to keep his 
commitment to Franco in Spain, Austria was alone in Central 
Europe. Seeing the threat £rom within his own country as a real 
danger, Schuschnigg had no choice but to approach Hitler in an 
attempt to settle the turmoil in Austria. I£ he allowed the 
situation to continue unchecked, one o£ the vicious rumors he had 
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heard might very well be enacted. While it was true that the 
nationalist £orces were divided among themselves as to the ways 
in which an Anschluss should be pursued and as to the degree o£ 
independence Austria should have a£ter the union had been 
completed (most Nazi leaders agreed that some sort o£ autonomy 
had to be kept), there was no denying that there was a great deal 
o£ unity in the conviction that an Austro-German union was 
needed. Whether it was accomplished through an evolutionary or 
revolutionary process almost did not matter, as long as it was 
accomplished. I£ Leopold succeeded in overthrowing the Austrian 
government, very £ew o£ his Nazi rivals would condemn him or his 
newly £ormed administration: he would have achieved that £or 
which they were all striving. Schuschnigg was £orced to 
counteract the pressure £rom the Nazis in the only way possible; 
he had to meet with Adol£ Hitler. 
The third stage in the Anschluss story was one characterized 
by a gradual increase o£ pressure and tension, initiated by the 
July Agreement. With that treaty came legitimacy £or the NSDAP 
and an opening £or oppositionist sentiments to be aired in an 
o££icial setting. Germany was given an opportunity to in£iltrate 
the Austrian countryside with the li£ting o£ the tourist ban, and 
had the £reedom to advise the now-legal Nazi party. The NSDAP in 
Austria, although splintered, remained a source o£ concern £or 
the Austrian government, and by the end o£ 1937 was considered to 
be the most dangerous element in the country. The Party proved 
this conviction to be true in January 1938, when its ominous 
plans £or revolution were con£iscated by Austrian authorities. 








Schuschnigg would have been so anxious to re-schedule the 
postponed meeting with Hitler as early as February 12. While he 
most certainly would have kept in touch with the German 
government, he would not have pushed for a meeting with Hitler, 
nor vould he have been so willing, as we will soon see, to comply 
with the Fuehrer's demands. Schuschnigg was forced into a 
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The £inal stage o£ action in the Anschluss story began with 
Schuschnigg's acceptance o£ the German invitation to discuss the 
strained relations between Germany and Austria. With this 
decision came the ultimate down£all o£ the government. A host o£ 
events rocked the Schuschnigg cabinet in rapid succession, the 
last o£ which was the £inal realization o£ Anschluss sentiment. 
The Federal Chancellor's £inal undoing amounted to his seeming 
"willingness to make small concessions"l to his opponents at 
every opportunity. Hitler and his Austrian supporters recognized 
this trait and £ully exploited it in an e££ort to push 
Schuschnigg into a corner. They succeeded. A£ter trying 
unsuccess£ully to cope with Nazism diplomatically, using short 
term nappeasement n concessions, Schuschnigg reacted to the 
Austrian pressure by unwisely calling £or a nationwide plebiscite 
to undermine Nazi claims o£ large popular support. 
The Austrian NSDAP, on the other hand, bene£itted greatly 
during this £ourth stage. Nazi ranks swelled to amazing 
proportions, as hundreds o£ thousands o£ erstwhile spectators 
Jumped onto the party bandwagon as momentum shi£ted over to the 
pro-Anschluss supporters. Indeed, as this sudden outpouring o£ 
Nazi support grew in volume, " . it was £requently Austrians 
who were £orcing the pace o£ events with the Germans reacting to 
them. n2 With highly vocal demonstrations, the NSDAP clearly 
illustrated its power and popularity to the £rightened 
Schuschnigg, who could not help but see his support draining away 
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from him. 
In the end, of course, it was Hitler's disgust with 
Schuschnigg's plebiscite attempt which sparked the final 
achievement of Anschluss. With timely telephone calls and 
written instructions to Austrian Party leaders, Hitler (and 
Goehring) were successful in completing the union between the two 
states. Yet it is imperative to note that without the inner 
turmoil and skyrocketing support for the National Socialist party 
within Austria, Hitler's attempt for Anschluss in the middle of 
March would have ended in total disaster. 
Berchtesgaden 
Schuschnigg's February 7th decision to accept the invitation 
to meet with Hitler was coupled with a move to negotiate with 
Seyss-Inquart. Schuschnigg wished to arrive at Berchtesgaden 
with an argeement with the opposition in hand, to be used as a 
sort of "fait accompli" against the German dictator. If 
Schuschnigg could approach the Fuehrer with a list of proposals, 
he would have the ability to mold the discussion to his liking, 
rather than to Hitler's. By already securing certain agreements, 
Schuschnigg could sar to his German counterpart; "See what I have 
done!! Now you stand by your part of the July Agreement and stay 
out of Austrian affairs!" In order to do this Schuschnigg 
quickly began negotiations with Seyss-Inquart, who, as leader of 
the opposition, was in position to officially accept any terms 
deemed satisfactory to the opposition cause . 
These negotiations only proved to give the Anschluss 
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fighters an even more solid ground on which to stand. The 
Schuschnigg government, represented by Guido Zernatto (the 
Secretary of the the Fatherland Front), made a number of sweeping 
concessions to Seyss in an attempt to pacify Hitler at their 
later meeting. Among the ten points conceded by the government 
was the maJor idea that the Austrian Nazi party (rather than the 
nebulous national oppostion) would become a significant part of 
the Austrian government. 3 This naturally came as pleasant news 
to the weary Seyss. He quickly informed Hitler of the points of 
the negotiations, and correctly interpreted them as the farthest 
Schuschnigg was willing to go in the direction of conciliation. 
Before meeting with Hitler in February, therefore, Schuschnigg 
had already conceded a complete Gleichschaltung. 4 
Much to the Federal Chancellor's chagrin, news of his 
negotiations with Seyss-Inquart reached the ears of radical Nazi 
leader Josef Leopold. As an opponent of both the Austrian 
government and Seyss-Inquart, Leopold immediately planned large 
demonstrations against the proceedings. As Keppler reported to 
the German Foreign Ministry, 
Consequently, 400 men were arrested 2 days ago and nearly 
400 members of the "HitlerJugend" were expelled from school. 
The "HitlerJugend", evidently in accordance with Leopold's 
wishes, also began rioting5 
The first of the maJor February demonstrations only irritated the 
moderates and the G.F.M. With Schuschnigg on his way to see 
Hitler, the last thing the Germans wanted was an angry Austrian 
leader. Hitler wanted to do the bullying; he did not want 
Schuschnigg to take control. 
As Schuschnigg entered Berchtesgaden, he was unaware that 
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Hitler already knew o£ his concessions with Seyss. In £act, 
those agreements had been somewhat o£ a guide in £orming Hitler's 
own tact in the proceedings. While Schuschnigg looked upon them 
as his maximum o££erings, Hitler saw the Seyss Agreement as his 
own minimum demands. There£ore, Hitler could only gain £rom the 
talks. Anything else that could be squeezed out o£ the Austrian 
Chancellor would be considered a victory. 
The meeting was more o£ a monologue than a dialogue. Hitler 
opened the morning session by berating Schuschnigg over the 
latter's apparent re£usal to stick to the July Agreement o£ 1936. 
Schuschnigg did little to de£end himsel£, except to remind Hitler 
that National Socialism was entirely responsible £or the death o£ 
Chancellor Doll£uss, and was there£ore an unappreciated part o£ 
the Austrian politibal community. Hitler could do nothing but 
agree. 6 No decisions were made, however, 
break had been taken. 7 Then the storm hit. 
until a£ter a lunch 
Hitler was basically 
asking £or the same Agreement Schuschnigg had made with Seyss, 
but with a £ew added proposals. Hitler demanded amnesty £or all 
Nazi prisoners (including Doll£uss' assassins, who were still in 
prison, and the numerous Nazis held in conJunction with the 
Leopold/Tavs plots) and promotions £or Glaise-Horstenau (£rom 
Minister 
Inquart 
without Port£olio to Minister o£ De£ense) 
(to Minister o£ the Interior).8 But 
and Seyss-
Schuschnigg 
courageously re£used to buckle under Hitler's verbal barrage, 
trying to bring about some kind o£ compensation in return £or 
these concessions. He did not want to give something £or 
nothing, which he knew would destroy any £aith 'his £ollowers 
might have in him back home. He was determined not to return to 
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Vienna empty-handed. As a result, neither man would budge. 
As the day progressed, Hitler became £urther agitated with 
the Austrian Chancellor. The old ways o£ cowing his opponents 
merely with rhetorical statements and grandiose accusations were 
not working in Schuschnigg's case. By late a£ternoon, the 
Fuehrer looked to adi££erent means o£ pressure. As Schuschnigg 
hedged on a commitment to adhere to Hitler's demands, the Fuehrer 
£lipped his ace onto the table and completely rearranged the 
entire tone o£ the meeting. Earlier that morning Generals 
Keitel, Sperrle, and von Reichen had been summoned to 
Berchtesgaden to be present during the discussions. The three 
military men had no idea why they were chosen to greet the 
Austrian delegation, but Hitler's motive soon became clear. At 
roughly 5:00 p.m., Hitler testily shouted £or General Keitel, 
gru££ly dismissed Schuschnigg with the wave o£ his hand,9 and led 
his general into his o££ice. Papen, who had traveled to 
Berchtesgaden in £ront o£ Schuschnigg, grew panicky and pleaded 
£or an audience with Hitler with anyone who would listen. 10 The 
presence o£ the power£ul Wehrmacht was naturally disheartening 
£or the Austrian Chancellor, but was quickly intensi£ied as 
Hitler stomped into his quarters with one o£ his top commanders. 
Inside the o££ice, however, Hitler invited Keitel to sit, 
and simply said, "Nothing at all".11 No military plans or 
actions were discussed; in £act, Hitler waited a £ull 45 minutes 
be£ore again seeing the 'shaken Schuschnigg. Hitler's blu££ 
quickly paid dividends, as Schuschnigg agreed to the demands made 







follow a three-day timetable to get the Protocol approved by 
Schuschnigg's figure-head partner, President Miklas. In order to 
insure this ratification, Hitler deviously ordered Keitel and the 
General staff to "spread false but quite credible news which may 
lead to the conclusion of military preparations against 
Austria. "12 Troop movements were reported on the Austro-German 
border, and rumors were spread that police and customs officials 
were calling up reinforcements. 13 As Schuschnigg traveled back 
to Austria, he was unsure whether or not his Agreement had saved 
Austria from German invasion. The German military intimidation 
was completely successful: Miklas quickly verified the 
legitimacy of the Protocol, thus saving Austria from a war which 
Hitler did not intend to fight. 
Upon returning to Austria, Schuschnigg was faced with the 
consequences of his concessions. Hitler's military parade had 
done much to unnerve the Chancellor, and the rumors of German 
mobilization did little to ease his fears. Seyss-Inquart was 
quickly appointed Minister of the Interior (on February 15), and 
Glaise-Horstenau received the post of Minister of Defense: 
Schuschnigg did not wish to invite the wrath of Hitler by going 
back on his word, regardless of the fact that he had given it 
while under duress. 14 But the promotion of the two 
oppositionists to higher positions in the cabinet was the least 
of Schuschnigg's problems. 
The Federal Chancellor had, again, given in to Hitler 
without receiving any kind of suitable concession in return. 
Schuschnigg gave the impression that, 
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he had made the concessions only under pressure. It 
was natural for Austrian and German Nazis to assume that 
more coercion would net still more gains. The Chancellor 
had also set a disasterous precedent by allowing the leader 
of a foreign country to dictate his selection of 
ministers. 15 
The German Legation reported that Schuschnigg was quickly losing 
the support of both Catholics and Jews due to his conciliatory 
t approach to the anti-semitic and anti-clerical German leader. 
Furthermore, the Gleichschaltung achieved by both Seyss and 
Hitler was viewed as a mutual agreement by both Great Britain and 
France; now neither one would be in a position to move in the 
defense of Austria if an outright Anschluss had appeared to 
conform to the Protocol; therefore, neither Western Power could 
come to the "aid" of a country that was not requesting it. Also 
important in this s~here was the refusal of Mussolini to speak up 
as Austria's protector. The Stressa Front which looked so 
formidable in 1934-35 was now completely obsolete with 
Mussolini's defection to Germany. 17 Schuschnigg had few allies 
left in Europe. 
The Berchtesgaden Agreement was initially frowned upon by 
the Austrian Party. Again, they had been excluded from the 
talks, while they were the main issue being discussed. It seemed 
like a repeat of the July Agreement. 1S Seyss was seen as a 
traitor who was now working with the Schuschnigg government, and 
now shared the contempt of Leopold and the other radical elements 
in the Party. Tavs went so far as to order his Viennese 
followers to break every window in the German Legation (an order 
which was never carried out).19 But the Protocol did lift the 
party up to the status of legitimacy, and allowed it the 
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opportunity to legally express its political beliefs without fear 
of persecution. 20 Indeed, the Austrian party exploited this new-
found freedom for all it was worth during the short weeks between 
Berchtesgaden and the Anschluss. 
The Interim Period -- February 15 to March 9 
While moderate Nazis were Jubilant over the success of the 
Protocol, the radical strand of the party was indignant. During 
the weeks following Miklas' approval of the Agreement, the more 
active party members took advantage of their sudden legal 
standing and demonstrated to Austria, and the world, the growing 
popularity of National Socialism. The real hotbeds of support 
were located in Styria and, in particular, Graz, wnere an 
estimated 80X of the population was pro-Nazi. 21 Here, the 
National Socialist Soldiers' Ring operated to furthe r the 
Anschluss cause. The group, made up of soldiers, ex-servicemen, 
and police, "comprised about a quarter of the garrison and the 
police"22 in Graz. On February 19, civilians marched to show 
their support for Anschluss without facing any police 
intervention. Huge Nazi demonstrations closed both the 




Joined in a torch-lit parade through the city. SA men were 
organizing and marching throughout Styria with complete immunity. 
The following two days saw demonstrations in over 30 Styrian 
towns with crowds ranging from 70 to 10,000 people. Policemen, 
soldiers, and members of the Fatherland Front occassionally 
participated in the rallies to add an air of muscle and unity to 
the proceedings. 24 
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Hitler, meanwhile, was not inactive at this Junction either. 
On February 20 the Fuehrer spoke at the Reichstag not only to his 
German subJects but to audiences in Czechoslovakia and (£or the 
£irst time) Austria. All o£ Schuschnigg's hopes £or a peace£ul 
relationship with Germany were shattered during Hitler's three 
hour speech. Rather than ensuring Austria's independence, Hitler 
made note o£ the "ten million Germans" living outside the Reich 
who were "su££ering because o£ their sympathy and solidarity with 
the whole German race and its ideology. "25 As Gordon Brook~ 
Shepherd astutely notes, 
The ten millions were the people o£ Austria added to the 
Sudeten minority o£ Czechoslovakia, and when Hitler 
announced in the same hoa~se breath that he would not allow 
them to be deprived o£ the 'right o£ racial sel£-
determination', everyone in Prague and Vienna knew what he 
meant. 26 
The Fuehrer obviously knew what he was doing. He was cognizant 
. o£ his swelling popularity in Austria, and was well aware o£ what 
the reaction to his speech would entail. The party was expanding 
every day now. Hitler's demand £or German autonomy only sparked 
an already accelerating movement to grow even larger, and he knew 
only too well that his speech was, in part, responsible £or it. 
This con£idence in both himsel£ and the strength o£ the 
party was clearly exhibited on February 21, the day a£ter his 
Reichstag speech. Leopold and MaJor Klausner had been summoned 
to Berlin the day be£ore, and now individually met with Hitler. 
The Captain's continual £euding with Just about everyone 
imaginable had £inally proven to be too much £or the Fuehrer. 
Based on advice £rom both Keppler and Goehring; Leopold was 
o££icially relieved o£ his "command" by Hitler, and was replaced 
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by the more moderate (and malleable) Klausner. Leopold was to 
remain in Germany serving functions unattached to Austrian 
politics, which would, in turn, remove his troublesome ego from 
the Austrian confrontation.27 
This kind of action in the past would have splintered the 
party. But nary a complaint was heard in Austria. This clearly 
shows two maJor developments in the history of the Austrian Nazi 
party. First of all, Leopold did not have a broad enough base of 
support in his own country to merit any kind of large outpouring 
of sentiment to protest his dismissal. Secondly, the enthusiasm 
and momentum brought on by Berchtesgaden and Hitler's speech 
completely overshadowed the change in leadership. Quite frankly, 
at this point the party had little need for a visible Austrian 
leader. It was a runaway freight train which was building speed 
as it raced through Austrian cities, towns, and villages. 
Astonishing amounts of workers were JOining or marching for the 
NSDAP in areas previously assumed to be Communist. 28 Swastikas 
and the Hitler salute were everywhere. Demonstrations popped up 
across the country. 29 The party was rolling along at an amazing 
pace. Nothing could have contrblled it and certainly nothing 
could have stopped it: but Schuschnigg decided to try anyway. 
On February 24, the Federal Chancellor addressed his fellow 
countrymen on the state of Austrian affairs. The speech itself 
was completely overshadowed by the response from the Austrian 
, 
Nazis. In Graz, Nazis infiltrated a crowd of roughly 20,000 
which had formed to listen to the speech over the radio. The 
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such an extent that the Loudspeakers used to carry the speech 
were rendered unusable and a Swastika £lag was raised over the 
Town Hall with the Mayor's approval. 3D In other areas, pro-Nazi 
crowds outnumbered pro-government crowds nearly £our to one. 31 
The Anschluss £ervor continued to mount throughout the last week 





seemed to be only a question o£ time until 
regime lost control o£ the situation 
the 
and 
The grass-roots movement had £inally taken hold in Austria. 
Countless numbers £locked to the party. Momentum had swung 
completely over to the National Socialists. Schuschnigg had 
shown that he could only satis£y the NSDAP £or short periods o£ 
time; then they would become mischievous again and require more 
paci£ication. The Austrian people, and Schuschnigg, £inally saw 
that the only way to completely satis£y Nazi desires was to 
accept an Anschluss. As more Austrians began to realize this, 
they quickly hopped aboard "the train" as it rumbled through 
their hometown. No one wanted to be le£t out when the eventual 
Anschluss occurred. 
Schuschnigg could see the huge shi£t o£ momentum swinging 
away £rom him and into the hands o£the National Socialists. 
Indeed, he would have been blind not to. In the a£termath o£ his 
uninspiring speech on the 24th, the Chancellor made his last move 
to prevent the mounting Nazi tidal wave £rom crashing down upon 
him. Out o£ seeming desperation, Schuschnigg secretly in£ormed 
Zernatto o£ his decision to appeal to the Austrian'people and ask 
£or their approval o£ the Schuschnigg administration. In order 
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to £orm a broad base o£ support, the Chancellor moved to 
negotiate with the Socialist leaders he had spurned since his 
tenure as Austrian leader had begun. But now, in the £ace o£ 
open revolt, Schuschnigg had no choice but to obtain support £rom 
the le£tist wing o£ Austrian society. Negotiations had started 
immediately a£ter the Berchtesgaden meeting, but now increased in 
intensity in March as the Nazi crusade continued to gain 
strength. 33 
Schuschnigg also contacted Benito Mussolini in an attempt to 
gain Il Duce's support. Schuschnigg should have known better. 
The Italian leader advised against a plebiscite, arguing that it 
would only serve to antagonize Hitler.34 Schuschnigg, to be 
£air, must not have been counting very heavily on Mussolini's 
reply: he ignored it completely, and chose to carryon without 
Italian support. He had no other choice, really. To let the 
situation continue unchecked would surely lead to Civil War. 
With sections o£ the police and Armed Forces involved with the 
Nazis, no authoritative muscle could be depended upon to squelch 
the NSDAP. Because o£ its legal status, the party CQuld do as it 
pleased, with Hitler seemingly ready to move in an instant i£ the 
Protocol or July Agreement were broken. Something had to be 
done. The plebiscite was the only way to stem the tide. 
Besides, i£ Schuschnigg should come away with a victory, he would 
be able to quiet Nazi cries o£ £ul£illing Wilsonian sel£-
determination polic~es. The plebiscite could at least slow the 





The wording of the Plebiscite, set for March 13, was 
brilliantly ambiguous. Few could have argued against all of it, 
while most (including the more moderate National Socialists) 
could agree with at least some of it. Schuschnigg was careful to 
include everyone in the statement, save for the Monarchists, the 
Communists, and the Jews, all of whom would undoubtedly vote for 
it anyway. The question asked, 
Are you in favor of a free and German, an independent and 
social, a Christian and united Austria?35 
To be sure, the nebulous question catered to a vast number of 
Austrians: patriots, pan-Germans, Socialists, Christians, and 
workers. Even the National Socialists wanted to retain some 
autonomy from the Reich after the Anschluss had occurred. 36 
While all that was asked of Austrian citizens was a simple "Yes" 
or "No" answer, a number of tactics were implemented to give an 
unfair advantage to Schuschnigg's pro-government forces. The 
voting age had been moved from 20 to 24 in order to exclude the 
large Nazi youth following. 37 Only ballots with a "Yes" vote 
were printed: if one wished to vote "No" he or she had to bring 
along their own slip of paper, which thus destroyed the private 
ballot. Moreover, the registration procedures allowed for 
multiple voting, and ballot-box stuffing. Due to these tactics, 
Schuschnigg Justifiably expected support from 65r. to 70r. of his 
countrymen. 38 
While Schuschnigg had hoped to keep his plebiscite a secret 
from Hitler until the last possible moment, his plans were dashed 
by a spy conveniently located in Zernatto's office. Globocnik 
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immediately £lew to Berlin to in£orm the Fuehrer; by the evening 
o£ March 8, 
Schuschnigg 
Hitler was in a rage over the underhanded attempt by 
to £orce the issue. The date o£ the plebiscite, 
barely £ive days away, did not allow the National Socialists time 
£or maneuvering. The Nazi propaganda machine would not have 





Hitler now £aced a di££icult decision. 
process espoused by Germany up to this day had 




Hitler acted instinctively. Globocnik was sent back to 
Austria with a letter £or Seyss-Inquart demanding postponement o£ 
the plebiscite £rom Schuschnigg. Also with Globocnik went 
instructions £or Klausner and the rest o£ the Nazi party; they 
were now given £reedom -o£ action, and permission to protest the 
Austrian government without restraint. Finally, General Keitel 
was ordered to make immediate plans £or an invasion. This, 
unlike Berchtesgaden, was no blu££. I£ Schuschnigg chose not to 
agree with Seyss' demand £or postponement, 
march. 40 
the Wehrmacht would 
On March 9, Seyss-Inquart wrote to Schuschnigg asking him to 
allow Hitler to be involved in plebiscite discussions. 41 But the 
Chancellor, knowing £ull-well the danger in letting the Dictator 
in£ringe on this a££air, re£used. Seyss was quicklyin£ormed to 
break o££ all negotiations with Schuschnigg and to intensi£y the 
protests made against the plebiscite. 42 
The party, meanwhile, was quickly mobilized by Rainer and 
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Globocnik, the two young Nazis who had given Leopold a slight 
battle for the party leadership in the summer of 1936 (it is 
interesting to note that they remained in Austria and took an 
active role in the Anschluss, while Leopold sat exiled in 
Germany) • By March 10, 
. all the preparations for future revolutionary actions 
already had been made. . and the necessary orders given to 
all unit leaders. 43 
SA and SS squadrons were alerted, and braced themselves for the 
battle that would surely ensue. Indeed, the entire party was 
ready for action. 
/ 
Back in Germany, military plans were hastily drawn up by the 
General Staff. If Schuschnigg chose to deny all diplomatic 
efforts from Germany, violent invasion would result. 44 Hitler 
had his excuse: he claimed that the plebiscite was in violation 
of the Berchtesgaden Protocol by trying to deny National 
Socialists access to the government. If he really needed to, 
Hitler would attack his own homeland. 
The situation on March 11, 1938, therefore, was quite 
complex. Schuschnigg still had control of the government and 
clung to his plebiscite idea. The Austrian Nazis were 
congregating in their various areas in preparation for come-what -
may. Seyss-Inquart was now the main link between Berlin, Vienna, 
and the party. His cabinet cohort, Edmund Glaise-Hosrtenau, was 
flying into Vienna from Berlin, where he had had a brief audience 
with Hitler and had been given a letter for Seyss. The German 
military, meanwhile, was gearing up for action along its southern 
border, as the diplomatic forces continued to scheme and plan for 
the postponement of the plebiscite. Few would have guessed that 
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by the end of the day a complete shift in the Austrian government 
would take place. 
The day began with Seyss-Inquart meeting Glaise-Horstenau as 
he landed in Vienna. The new Minister of Defense delivered a 
letter to Seyss from Hitler, which the two men read as they drove 
through the streets of Vienna on their way to work. The letter 
demanded a four week postponement of the plebiscite, and gave 
12:00 noon as the deadline for this decision to be made. If 
Schuschnigg were to refuse Seyss again, as he had done earlier, 
then, "A military action was to be understood without any 
possible confusion. "45 
the problem, the 
Knowing Hitler's serious attitude toward 
two oppositionists went immediately to 
Schuschnigg to convey their Fuehrer's sentiments. Due to 
complications, however, Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss were not able 
to completely inform Schuschnigg of the total picture until 11:30 
a.m., making the noon deadline implausible. Regardless of the 
time limit, the Chancellor was at first adamant in his refusal to 
acquiesce to the Nazi demands. But Seyss made his position very 
clear. The Wehrmacht would march, and would be Joined by the now 
impressive Austrian NSDAP forces. Schuschnigg had little choice. 
By late afternoon, the Federal Chancellor privately agreed to 
cancel his plebiscite and resign his post as Chancellor. 46 
As soon as this news reached Berlin, Hermann Goehring 
stepped in to take control of the situation (he would later claim 
full responsibility -- or credit -- for the actual transferral of 
power during the Anschluss).47 Goehring made a series of now 








giving orders and ultimatums to Seyss and the German legation. 
A£ter being erroneously in£orrned o£ a complete Nazi takeover at 
approximately 5:00 p.m., Goehring in£ormed the Legation that he 
had decided upon a list o£ Austrians deemed satis£actory to make 
up a new cabinet. Seyss was to be appointed Chancellor (by 
President Miklas, who still held o££ice), while Glaise-Horstenau 
and Kaltenbrunner (0£ the SS) would hold important ministerial 
positions. 48 Miklas, however, was not cooperating. The old 
president was not as willing as Schuschnigg to relinquish 
Austria's £reedom, and he refused to agree to appoint Seyss and 
the opposition cabinet. This only served to in£uriate Goehring, 
who now telephoned Seyss-Inquart at 5:30 p.m. A new ultimatum 
was issued, to be delivered to the President by German Military 
Attache Muff. If by 7: 30 p. m. a new government had not been 
formed, German troops would invade Austria at 8:00 p.m. that 
evening. 49 Goehring contemptuously spat that, "If Miklas could 
not understand it in 4 hours, we shall make him understand it now 
in 4 minutes. "50 But the President held his ground. Both Muf£ 
and Keppler, who had arrived from Berlin that afternoon with 
Hitler's demands for a new government, tried to persuade Miklas 
to avoid bloodshed and agree to the new cabinet set £orth by 
Goehring. Hitler alone, of course, had the authority to call for 
the military, but he . was not ready to do so at that time . 
Goehring's blu££ had been called by Miklas. 
Chancellor Schuschnigg, however, was not as bold as his 
president. He believed the invasion threat, and was convinced 
that the only thing worse than an Anschluss was a military 






At 7:00 p.m. Radio Vienna was authorized to reveal the 
postponement o£ the plebiscite; a £ew minutes later, the 
resignation was announced o£ the entire Cabinet, with the 
signi£icant exception o£' Seyss-Inquart. 52 
publicly stepping down as Chancellor, Schuschnigg had 
sabotaged the courageous stand taken by Miklas. Seyss was now 
the only other o££icial representative o£ the Austrian people, 
and he was in direct con£lict with the President. What was more, 
the Plebiscite had been cancelled, saving Germany and the 
Austrian Nazis £rom the probable embarrassment o£ £acing a pro-
government vote <albeit a £ixed one). The o££icial resignation 
o£ the government now touched o££ action £rom within Austria; the 
party began to move. 
Rainer and Globocnik, £ree to do as they pleased a£t~r 
Hitler's permission to throw caution to the wind, mobilized their 
Nazi £orces. Upon hearing the o££icial news that Schuschnigg and 
his cabinet had resigned, the two Carinthians issued orders £or 
the Viennese S5 and SA £orces to enter the Chancellery and occupy 
it as a sign o£ total command. The two then called on each 
Gauleiter, instructing them to overthrow the existing local 
authorities in Austria's eight other provinces. 53 The Austrian 
Nazi leaders could see that the collapse o£ the government was 
imminent. Now, "only through a seizure o£ power could they 
£orestall a German invasion and assume themselves the spoils o£ 
victory. 854 Rainer and Globocnik hurried to secure the country 
as being completely National Socialist, but also Austrian. They 
were too close to success, and power, to want the German Army to 
usurp it Just when it was all within reach. Even the party 
regulars in the streets were, n anxious to avoid the 
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impression that Seyss-Inquart and German pressure were alone 
responsible for the Austrian Chancellor's. . demise. n55 
Sure enough, by 8:30 members of the SS Standarte Eighty-Nine 
(the same outfit responsible for Dollfuss' murder) were admitted 
into government buildings in Vienna without resistance. 56 In the 
surrounding Gau, according to Rainer, 
the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the 
complete occupation of Austria within three hours and the 
taking over of all important posts by the party. 57 
Indeed, before German troops began filtering across the Austro-
German border, the entire country was already in the hands of the 
Austrian party" During the night, n police officers had 
already adopted the wearing of. . the swastika. n58 The Army, 
similarly, was not even trusted by its own commanding officer. 59 
Based on such evidence, one must argue that the need for German 
invasion was non-existent and that even without military 
intervention a successful putsch had occurred. The party did not 
need Hitler now, and did not want him now. They had succeeded in 
occupying the government and, with the Austrian police and Army 
supporting the party, had no one against whom to fight. 
Yet Goehring was not convinced of the complete success of 
the party. He wanted to make sure that nothing was left to 
chance, and that Germany would annex Austria with no strings 
attached. At 8:48 p.m., Goehring telephoned Keppler in Vienna to 
get a report on the situation. Keppler informed him that the 
Austrian Army was completely passive and that the government was 
now in Nazi hands. 60 Goehring, however, was not satisfied. 
Keppler was instructed to write the following message, as 
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dictated by Goehring, and then deliver it to Seyss: 
The provisional Austrian Government which a£ter the 
dismissal o£ the Schuschnigg Government, considers it its 
task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the 
German Government the urgent request, to support it in its 
task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For this purpose 
it asks the German Government to send troops as soon as 
possible. 61 
Goehring initially wanted Seyss to send it back to Germany, but 
then changed his mind. Seyss would only have to agree to the 
text: then the Wehrmacht would move in. 
But Seyss did not want the Army to move in. He wished to 
keep Austria separate £rom the Reich, and was a£raid o£ a German 
occupation. Seyss conveyed his displeasure with the idea to 
Keppler, and did not give the required "yes" answer. Keppler, 
however, now took the bull by the horns. Rather than try to 
persuade Seyss to change his mind, Keppler simply called Goehring 
back and lied. Speaking to one o£ Goehring's assistants, Keppler 
said, "Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart 
agrees. "62 Germany now had a legitimate reason £or marching into 
Austria: The German Legation, under Keppler's instructions, sent 
o££ the telegram dictated by Goehring with Seyss-Inquart's name; 
an o££icial request had been made by the only remaining Cabinet 
member o£ a sovereign state. Germany was obliged to answer it as 
she saw £it; and no one could stop her £rom intervening. 
The interesting point here, however, is that German troops 
had been ordered to march at 8:30 p.m., a £ull 90 minutes be£ore 
word o£ Seyss' "acceptance" o£ Goehring's message had arrived 
£rom Keppler. In Nuremberg, Goehring recalled that, 
The order to march in had been given and had'nothing to do 
with the telegram as such. It was immaterial whether or not 
he (Seyss) was in agreement. 63 
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Goehring replied, "Yes. Of course. ".64 Germany was 
on marching, regardless of Austrian Nazi planning 
The party's success in overthrowing the government 
was of little interest in Berlin. They were simply concerned 





however, did not know that this fateful telegram had 
He was, of course, well aware of rumors circulating 
Vienna that Germany had crossed the border and was 
entering into Austria. The Minister of the Interior now moved 
quickly. Miklas had finally seen that his resistance was futile, 
and appointed Seyss as Chancellor of Austria before 11:00 p.m. A 
radio announcement made the act public information at 11:15. 65 
Thus, as midnight came and went, the new Chancellor rushed to 
secure the independence of the country he had tried for so long 
to subvert. After enlisting Keppler's support, Seyss tried to 
halt the Wehrmacht's march into Austria. General Muff, who was 
genuinely opposed to the German invasion, was 







Obergruppenfuehrer, asking that all invasion troops be withdrawn. 
The SS man, however, squelched this request, informing him that 
the Army had already crossed the border and was unable to be 
recalled. Hitler was, in fact, very pleased with these 
developments. 66 It was too late for anyone to stop him. The 
invasion was under way. 
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A£termath 
As the German Wehrmacht heaved its way through Austria (a 
reported 701. o£ its equippment broke down during the march),67 
an enormous outpouring o£ enthusiasm was showered down upon the 
men passing through each town and village. Citizens and Austrian 
military personnel £locked to greet the "invaders". General 
Keitel recalled that, 
in every village we were received most 
enthusiastically and the Austrian Federal Army marched side 
by side with the German soldiers through the streets over 
which we drove. 68 
Indeed, the march through Austria was seen as "more a parade than 
an invasion",70 while the Army was greeted as "a £orce o£ 
liberation. "70 Correspond ants in Austria reported £or the New 
York Times that, 
Allover Austria excited crowds are cheering the union. 
and the cry that echoes through the swirling streets is a 
cry o£ triumph. 71 -
Headlines screamed, 
VIENNESE GO WILD; JAM NOISY STREETS. Yelling, Singing, 




These emotions were sincere, and the victory seemed to touch 
everyone. The Anschluss had £inally come £or Austria. 
Seizing the opportunity to re-enter his old homeland as its 
conqueror, Hitler £ollowed his invading £orces on March 12. 
Everywhere, "in all villages and towns alike, there were huge 
crowds o£ people massed to cheer Hitler wildly. "73 
Demonstrations in Vienna amassed river 500,000 citizens. Said 
Seyss-Inquart, "The enthusiasm was indescribable. "74 The great 
show o£ support £or Hitler was almost too much £or him. Indeed, 
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Hitler had originally intended to comply with Austrian NSDAP 
wishes and withdraw his troops from Austria in order to set up an 
Austrian Nazi government. But upon his triumphant arrival in 
Linz on March 13, Hitler was overcome with emotion. There, in 
his old hometown, with thousands cheering him wildly, the Fuehrer 
decided to incorporate Austria into the Reich. Hitler's old goal 
of Gleichschal~ung had been surpassed by the call of complete 
annexation. 75 
Seyss-Inquart was duly ordered to prepare legislation which 
would legally and officially conclude the Anschluss chapter of 
Austro-German relations. Although Seyss was not completely 
enthusiastic about the idea of total annexation, he and nhisn 
cabinet (uhe men had been chosen by Goehring on the phone back on 
the 11th) obeyed their instructions and wrote their own country 
out of existence. In retrospect, it is difficult to condemn them 
for doing so. According to Glaise-Horstenau, three maJor 
arguments convinced him that signing the Anschluss legislation 
was the right thing to do. First of all, Great Britain, Italy, 
and France could not, and would not, aid Austria. Consequently, 
Austria had no one to turn to for support. Secondly, Glaise-
Horstenau, 
entered under the impression of the overwhelming 
street demonstrations that were taking place. This 
mass psychology was present and it was an unequaled popular 
demonstration. 76 
And finally, as Glaise-Horstenau and his fellow cabinet members 
received the legislation, German tanks were already rolling 
through the streets of Vienna. They could either bend to the 
pressure or be broken by it. They chose to bend. 77 
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With this legislation came the formal end to the Anschluss 
story. The final chapter had come to a conclusion due to a 
number of reasons: Schuschnigg's inability to withstand German 
diplomatic pressure, Hitler's uncanny knack for correctly using a 
military bluff, and the ever-present and increasing pressure from 
the Austrian National Socialist party. 
Indeed, it was the latter of these three factors which 
proved to do the most damage to the regime. While it is true 
that during the actual Anschluss (March 9 to 12) the party had 
acted only after receiving instructions from Germany, the fact 
that the Austrian NSDAP actually controlled both the Federal and 
Provincial governments throughout the state before German troops 
occupied the area cannot be ignored. If the Wehrmacht had not 











solely by the party. The 
the takeover was basically 
complete by the time the ill-equipped Wehrmacht staggered into 
Vienna. 
To press the importance of the party even farther, one must 
remember that Schuschnigg's two maJor political errors 
Berchtesgaden and his plebiscite -- were caused by the 
unrelenting pressure applied by the Austrian Nazi party. Secret 
plans and agreements had forced Schuschnigg to do anything to 
change the dangerous situation in Austria: hence his meeting 
with Hitler on February 12. The demonstrations and snow-balling 
support for the pro~Anschluss National Socialists' which followed 
Berchtesgaden only increased the Federal Chancellor's 
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apprehensions. In a last - ditch ezfort to stizle the dangerously 
popular Nazis <and to avert possible Civil War), Schuschnigg zelt 
a need to prove to his countrymen, to Germany, and to the rest oz 
Europe that National Socialism was not the maJority voice in 
Austria. Both Berchtesgaden and, even more so, the plebiscite 
pushed Schuschnigg closer to dezeat. Both moves were taken in 
direct response to the National Socialists. 
Perhaps the most accurate statement supporting the idea oz 
the success oz the party was made in Nuremberg during the War 
Crimes Trials. In an azzadivit to the court, Dr. Friedrich 
Rainer declared that, 
The seizure of power was the work oz the party supported by 
the Fuehrer's threat oz invasion and the legal standing oz 
Seyss-Inquart in the government. 78 
Hitler's threat oz invasion had certainly caused Schuschnigg to 
cancel his plebiscite and had inzluenced his resignation. Seyss-
Inquart's presence in the cabinet azter Schuschnigg's abdication 
had given the Germans and the Austrian Nazis a priceless access 
to the Austrian government. But without the presence oz the 
indezatigable Austrian party, the plebiscite would never have . 
been cancelled, and the entire Anschluss may never have occurred. 
Without the popular movement zrom within, Hitler had no 
legitimate claim to power, and Schuschnigg had no threat oz Civil 
War to push him into his own disaster. Austria was, in the end, 
destroyed zrom within. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Anschluss o£ Germany and Austria was an event that had 
taken decades to accomplish. As early as the 19th century, 
Austrians had been aware o£ the possibility o£ a union with their 
northern neighbors. Men like Georg Schoenerer had planted the 
seeds o£ pan-Germanism into the minds o£ students as early as the 
1880s and '90s; seeds which would prove to £lower Just as the 
National Socialist party moved into position as the primary 
supporter o£ an Anschluss. 
Indeed, the cry £or union had grown monumentally with the 
conclusion o£ the First World War. Only the e££orts o£ France at 
st. Germain could prohibit the two de£eated states £rom becoming 
one. As Mark S. Simpson states, 
Had it not been £or the immediate post-war hostility o£ the 
allies to an Austro-German union, there is every reason to 
believe that Anschluss would have occurred twenty years 
be£ore it did. l 
Even in the £ace o£ such adamant denial £or "racial sel£ -
determination", Anschluss sentiment continued to be a large part 
o£ Austrian political li£e. Area plebiscites, demonstrations, 
and government questionnaires regularly rein£orced the general 
belie£ that German-Austrians were in £avor o£ union with Germany. 
Most o£ the political parties in Austria supported an Anschluss 
plat£orm £or one reason or another throughout the 1920s and into 
the early 1930s. The unsuccess£ul customs union attempt o£ 1931 
£urther illustrates the desire, on both sides o£ the border, £or 
some kind o£ union. From 1919 to 1932, one can £airly say that a 
great maJority o£ German-Austrians were in £avor o£ an Anschluss 
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in one £arm or another. 
The simultaneous ascents to power by Adol£ Hitler and 
Engelbert Doll£uss, however, served only to destroy the mass 
appeal o£ a union between Germany and Austria. While practically 
every Austrian political p~rty dropped its Anschluss plat£orm 
a£ter the rise o£ Hitler's National Socialist regime, Chancellor 
Doll£uss pushed to snu££ out Nazi strongholds in his own country. 
The Austrian NSDAP, which suddenly £ound itsel£ in the position 
as sole representative o£ Anschluss sentiment, quickly responded 
to Doll£uss' repression with acts o£ terror and espionage. The 
government, in turn, reacted with more extensive denials o£ 
political expression. With each action came a reaction. The 
avalanche o£ action continued throughout 1933 and into 1934, 
£inally culminating in the desparate Nazi Putsch attempt. Even 
in this early stager the NSDAP had proven its ability to 
in£luence Austrian o££icial policy and to £orce action £rom its 
enemies. 
The £ailure o£ the putsch brought heavy reprisals down upon 
the party. Arrests picked up, to the tune o£ over 17,000 by the 
summer o£ 1936. Germany, which had given the Austrian party 
tacit support during the £irst stage, now ignored it, hoping to 
achieve an Anschluss diplomatically (the evolutionary approach) 
rather than violently (the revolutionary approach). The 
revolutionary tactics o£ 1933-34 may well have met with de£eat, 
but the evolutionary policy o£ Germany certainly did not result 
in any great success. Only economic di££iculties and Mussolini's 
shi£t towards Hitler in 1936 brought Chancellor Kurt von 
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Schuschnigg o£ Austria to the table in July 1936. 
The Gentlemen's Agreement broke the stalemate that had 
clouded the Anschluss issue during 1935-36. 
sides initially bene£itted £rom the talks. 
Surely, all three 
Austria's economy 
improved, the Austrian NSDAP prisoners were amnestied, and 
Germany secured a position in the Austrian cabinet £or a person 
o£ oppositionist persuations. As a result, Germany £ound that 
she could push the Austrian government with more con£idence, 
while the party began to rebuild its network, thanks to the 
amnesty o£ many o£ its members. With the inclusion o£ Arthur 
Seyss-Inquart into the government in 1937, both Germany and the 
party were blessed with a representative voice in o££icial policy 
decisions. As 1938 opened, Germany and the party £ound 
themselves in a much better position than they had been in during 
1935, but still a long way away £rom the desired goal o£ 
Anschluss. 
The increased activity £rom the Austrian National Socialists 
during the £irst three months o£ the year completely changed the 
entire complexion o£ the situation, and unquestionably swung 
momentum in its own direction. The plotting and scheming o£ 
party leaders illustrated to Schuschnigg the desparation o£ the 
Nazis, and £orced him to seek some kind o£ solution to this 
dangerous element in his own backyard. In agreeing to negotiate 
with Hitler in Berchtesgaden, however, Schuschnigg only de£eated 
his own purpose. He had hoped to get compromises to strengthen 
his position and lessen the pressure being applied by the NSDAP. 
The Protocol, un£ortunately, only made the Chancellor look overly 
eager to appease his opponents, and gave him the dubious 
164 
reputation o£ one who would make any concession i£ e££ectively 
threatened. 
Sensing this weakness, the Austrian party quickly upgraded 
its propaganda drives and increased its rallies and 
demonstrations. The Austrian population also sensed the shi£t o£ 
power over to the Nazis; the party seemed to explode with new 
members in late February and early March, with citizens hoping to 
Join be£ore the actual event occurred in order to be in good 
standing with the party in the £uture. As was the case in 
January 1938, this sudden rise in vocixerous National Socialist 
support shook Schuschnigg at his £oundations. He could not let 




to be done, or else his beloved Austria would 
The Chancellor chose to call his xamous 
the hopes ox winning a maJority decision on the 
basis o£ his nebulous question. 
But again, as was the case at Berchtesgaden, this only 
proved to backxire in Schuschnigg's xace. With Hitler £inally 
o££icially unleashing the National Socialist party on the people 
o£ Austria, and Goehring directing Seyss-Inquart as to how to go 
about destroying the government, Schuschnigg had no chance to 
o££er his subJects the chance to express their wishes. By 9:00 
p.m., March 11, Austria was a National Socialist state. Seyss 
was its leader while Nazi party leaders £rom allover the country 
assumed control ox their respective towns and provinces. With 
the entrance o£ the Wehrmacht during the night o£ March 11-12, 
the Anschluss was complete. The enthusiastic welcome received by 
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Hitler and his German troops was prooz enough that Austrian 
support zor the union was genuine. The later plebiscite held by 
the National Socialists brought home returns that surprised no 
one: 99.08;' oz the population was in zavor oz Anschluss. 
It is dizzicult to deny the importance oz the role oz Hitler 
and the German government in the success oz the Anschluss. The 
evolutionary policy oz the mid-thirties had at least kept the 
party in Austria zrom killing itselz with terrorist 
Furthermore, Hitler's cool diplomatic skill 
activities. 
was largely 
responsible zor Schuschnigg's unwise concessions at 
Berchtesgaden. More importantly, the actual Anschluss took place 
on his initiative, and due to directives zrom other highly placed 
German ozzicials. The "invasion" by German troops seemed to seal 
Germany's role in the Anschluss as one 'oz the aggressor and 
victor. 
Yet the entire Anschluss story could never have been told 
without the ever-present Austrian National Socialist party. The 
Nazis' bothersome and dangerous terror 
Dollzuss years had made them a zorce to 
tactics during the 
be reckoned with in 
ozzicial circles; their continued agitation during the time it 
was supposed to be outlawed only heightened its visibility and 
reputation. The party's greatest accomplishments came in 1938, 
when it ezzectively pushed Schuschnigg into the position oz 
begging Hitler zor a solution to his internal problems. Its 
zinal victory was not only in directly inzluencing Schuschnigg to 
call his plebiscite, but in completely occupying the government 
on the evening oz March 11, bezore the German- Army invaded 
Austria. Indeed, iz the order to march had not been given, we 
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would today consider the Anschluss to be a successzul putsch 
completed by the Austrian party zrom within its own borders. 
Only Hitler's demand zor complete success prohibited the party 
zrom getting the credit that it was due. 
A great number oz things went into the zinal capitulation oz 
Austria. Mussolini's desertion oz the state, the Western Powers' 
inability to support Austria, and the constant, unrelenting 
pressure placed upon her zrom the greater German Reich. But one 
must not ignore the zact that pan-Germanism had a long history in 
Austria, and that pro-Anschluss thought was not only present in 
1919, but was supported by a huge proportion oz the German-
Austrian population. Convincing people oz the positive ezzects 
oz a union was not very dizzicult: the same arguments had been 
around zor decades, and were quite zamiliar. The National 
Socialists were successzul in tapping this Anschluss sentiment 
zrom their countrymen, and zinally molded a large body oz them 
into a vocal and visible opposition party; certainly to the 
extent that Schuschnigg zelt threate~ed enough to do something 
about it. Indeed, without this zorcezul political party the 
Anschluss would have been nothing more than simple dreams in the 
minds oz very zew. The party zorced reactions to its presence, 
and ultimately succeeded in getting the type oz reaction which 
gave it what it wanted: the union oz Austria with the greater 
German Reich. 
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